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The advantages of using cloud computing in day-to-day business attract and make 
many nations adopt it.  However, the adoption of cloud computing is coupled with 
privacy and security concerns. These concerns raise questions as to what steps to be 
taken to enjoy the benefits of using cloud computing and at the same time uphold 
privacy and security in the cloud. This study seeks to address these concerns. It 
investigates legal challenges emanating from the use of cloud computing. It also 
interrogates the adequacy of the existing legal and regulatory framework in protecting 
privacy and security in cloud environment. Similarly, the relevancy of the 
international general principles and guidelines of the best practices in protecting 
privacy are assessed. The study employs mainly doctrinal legal research methodology 
which is supplemented by historical and comparative methods. The study is delimited 
to Tanzania and South Africa to gain a comprehensive insight of the subject matter of 
the study. After the consideration of the above issues this study has found that the 
existing legal and regulatory frame work does not accommodate the protection of 
privacy and security in cloud environment. Accordingly, the study recommends a law 
reform both in Tanzania and South Africa. Also this study recommends for adoption 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
Security and privacy have been a human concern since the earliest Greek civilisations. 
However, the rise and development of Information and Communication Technologies 
fuelled the concern in today’s society. The presence of cloud computing increases the 
concern because the size and amount of data that can be collected is very huge, at a 
high speed and with a vast storage capability. Similarly, the manipulation possibilities 
have increased, and personal data can be shared easily in the cloud as well as in social 
media. Thus, technologies are coupled not only with enormous benefits but also with 
many security and privacy concerns.1 
 
Correspondingly, the dialogue of privacy protection has developed slowly over years. 
Record keeping upon individuals (the reason that led to the emergence of data privacy 
regulation) is regarded to be as old as human civilisation.2 Nevertheless, the current 
concept of data protection and privacy traces its origin from the article known as “the 
Right to Privacy”, that was published in 1890 in Harvard Law Review.3 Moreover, it 
was between 1960s and 70s that tangible privacy and data protection regulation came 
into being.4 Since late 1960s a number of international agencies such as the Council 
                                                          
1Ardent, H., The Human Condition, 2nd Ed, Chicago, the university of Chicago Press. 1958. pp 5. 
2 Bennett, C. J., Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and United States, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, (1992). pp. 18. 
3 Warren, S. D., & Brandeis, L. S. The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review, 1890, Vol 4, No 5, pp. 
193-195; The work has traditionally and frequently been cited in many scholastic writings that deals 
with the history of the Right to Privacy. It is regarded by many as the official birth date of the right 
to privacy in the world. 
4Makulilo, A. B. Protection of Personal Data in Sub-Saharan Africa, PhD Thesis, University of Bremen, 
2012. 
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of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) were active in the field of privacy and data protection.5 
 
In fact, the first data protection regulation at the national level was made in the German 
state of Hesse in 1970.6 Similarly, in 1973 Sweden made its first Data Protection Act.7 
This was unsurprisingly so because the period marked the development in computer 
and communication technology. Development of modern technologies particularly the 
internet and cloud computing made it feasible for organisations be they private or 
public and even individuals to process personal data that might interfere with personal 
privacy.8 Moreover, the legal response to the protection of personal data and privacy 
in ICT world had been to enact data protection legislation.9 
 
Additionally, Pearson and Yee posit that at the widest level, privacy is a fundamental 
human right enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) and later in the European Convention on Human Rights and National 
Constitution and Charters.10 Formally, the primary focus of privacy regulation was to 
protect personal information of individuals against government surveillance and 
impending compulsory disclosure of private information in databases. With the 
development in computer and information technology the concerns shifted to 
protection of privacy against direct marketing and telemarketing. With the rise of 
                                                          
5Lloyd, I. J., Information Technology Law, 8th Edition, Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon 
Street, United Kingdom. 2017 pp. 32 
6Ibid. p. 31 
7Ibid. 
8Makulilo. Note 4, supra. 
9Roos, A., The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study, LLD Thesis, 
UNISA, 2003, pg. 17 
10Pearson, S. & Yee, G., Privacy and Security for Cloud Computing, Springer International Publishing, 
Springer- Verlag –London, 2013. 
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cloud computing the consideration is given to the increasing risk of online identity 
theft and spamming.11 
 
The term cloud computing is a paradigm shift in the way in which information is 
managed and consumed.12 It has become a new way of distributing and acquiring IT 
services in which computing services such as software, storage, databases, servers and  
networking.13 Apparently, the impact of cloud computing is escalating and it is 
receiving an increasing attention in scientific, academia and business societies.14 Its 
adoption leads to more innovation, improving cost efficiency and scalability of 
applications to meet the demand.15  
 
The end user does not need a software or server to access information. He/she only 
needs internet connection because the server and the software management are 
accessed from the cloud under the management of the cloud service provider.16Many 
people are customers of cloud computing through services such as online searching, 
‘whatsapping’, online streaming and many others.17Examples of cloud service 
                                                          
11Ibid, p. 12. 
12ITU, Privacy in the Cloud. ITU-Technology Watch Report, Geneva, 2012. Accessed from 
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/techwatch/PAges/cloud-computing-privacy.aspx, on 12th December,2016. 
13Bhawan, L, N., Legal and Policy Issues in Cloud Computing, a discussion Paper based on DSCI-BSA Workshop, 
2013. Data Security Council of India. Accessed from http://www.dsci, on 12th December 2016.  
14Hashzume et.al., An Analysis of Security Issues for Cloud Computing. Journal of Internet Services and 
Applications, 4.5., 2013. Accessed from http://www.jisjournal.com/content/4/1/5, on 12th December 2016. 
15Sen, J., Security and Privacy Issues in Cloud Computing, in Ruiz-Martinez et.al. (eds) Architectures and 
Protocols for Secure Information Technology, IGI- Global Publishers, USA, pp 1-45, 2013.  
16Goel, A. &Goel, S., Security Issues in Cloud Computing. International Journal of Application or Innovation in 
Engineering & Management, 2012, Vol 1, Issue 4. Accessed from 
http://www.ijaiem.org/volume1/issue4/IJAIEM-2012-12-26-033.pdf, on 12th December 2016.  
17Kong et.al. Introduction to Cloud Computing and Security Issues, in Cheung A., S., & Weber, R., H., (ed) Privacy 
and Legal Issues in Cloud Computing, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, United Kingdom, 2015.  
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providers include Google, Yahoo, Ubuntu, Microsoft, IBM and Amazon to mention 
just a few.18 
 
Furthermore, the spending in cloud computing globally has been growing at the rate 
of almost six times more than the rate spent on IT.19The spending was mostly on 
software-as-a-service (SaaS). However, the trend is changing due to change in market 
requirements. The market now adopts the use of platform-as-a-service (PaaS) and 
infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) more.20 Similarly, according to the survey done by 
the International Data Group (IDG) in some selected African countries,21 it was 
discovered that the use of cloud computing is highly embraced.22 The evidence is that  
some workloads and services have been moved either to the cloud platform, software 
as a service or to cloud hosted infrastructures; and  many more are underway.23 
 
Comparatively, African market is relatively immature compared to European market 
for cloud computing services.24 A study done by System Applications and Products 
(SAP) and IDG showed that there is more development in technology and 
establishment of technological centres as well as the presence of impending 
                                                          
18Barbara, J., J., Cloud Computing: Another Digital Forensic Challenge, 2009. Accessed from 
http://www.dfnews.com/articles/2009/10/cloudcomputing-another-digital-forensic-challenge, on 
27th December 2016.  
19 Lavelle, M., Why the shift to cloud computing Reminds me of the Ford Model-T? 2016 Accessed 
from http://www.linkedin.com, on 26th December 2016. 
20 Ibid, pg. 2. 
21 The survey was done to some African countries such as Algeria, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South 
Africa. It was discovered that most of the organizations in those countries have already embraced the 
use of cloud computing.  
22 Hill, K. Cloud Computing Emerging in Africa, 2015 Accessed from http://www.rcrwireless.com/ 
20151023/featured/cloud-computing--in-africa-tag6, 0n 26th December 2016.  
23 Ibid, p. 7. 
24 Ibid, p. 8. 
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advantages of adopting cloud computing, than it were before.25Consequently, African 
continent is ready for adoption of cloud computing.26 
 
Similarly, Mukami posits that it is an evolving truth that Africa aspires of more data 
driven economies and the technology which cloud transformation can realize.27 The 
observation implies that in technological perspective, Africa is ready to adopt cloud 
computing. However, a question remains, is Africa ready in legal perspective for the 
espousal of cloud computing? The question arises due to the fact that only 22 countries 
out of 53 have enacted the omnibus data protection laws that provides for the security 
and privacy in the cloud.28 This study was therefore intended to find answers to this 
question. In doing so; it only focused on the legal framework and challenges of privacy 
and security in the cloud, by comparing Tanzanian and South African perspectives. 
 
Notably, Tanzania as many other countries follow the world trend in adopting cloud 
computing. That is clearly shown by the deployment of the National ICT Broadband 
Backbone (NICTBB) as well as the landing of two submarine cables.29 These are 
Southern and Eastern Africa Communication Network (SEACOM) and the Eastern 
Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy).30The above initiatives facilitated the 
                                                          
25Ibid. 
26 Ibid, p. 9. 
27Mukami, S., Technology: We Need to Embrace Cloud Computing, 2017. Accessed from 
http://www.potentash.com/2017/03/21/embrace-cloud-computing/, on 8th August 2017. 
28Greenleaf, G., Global Data Privacy Laws 2017: 120 National Data Privacy Laws, Including 
Indonesia and Turkey.  145 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 10 [2017] UNSWLRS 45. 
Accessed from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/ on 24th April 2019. 
29Esselaar, S. & Adam, L. (2013) Understanding what is happening in Tanzania: Evidence of ICT Policy 
Action, Policy Paper II. Accessed from http://www.researchICTafrica.net, on 28th April 2017  
30Ibid. 
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availability of high capacity broadband connections to other parts of the world and 
hence promoting the use of cloud computing. 
 
Furthermore, the government promote the use of ICTs, cloud computing inclusive in 
the work place. This was accelerated by the establishment of ICT units in Ministries 
Department and Agencies (MDAs) as well as in Local Government Authorities 
(LGAs). The same is adopted in Micro and Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and 
the private sector.31 This implies that the country has an experience of cloud 
computing at different levels. At regulatory level, the right to privacy is protected 
through article 16 of the Constitution,32 and in some sectoral laws.33Yet, there is no 
specific or an omnibus law that provides for data protection.34There are also a number 
of laws and regulations that were made under the National ICT Policy (NICTP), 2003 
for promoting electronic commerce,, protecting consumers and addressing cybercrime 
challenges. However, they did not address privacy issues.35Consequently, the NICTP 
2003 was revised and renamed NICTP 2016 to include privacy and security element.36 
 
Correspondingly, South Africa is regarded as one of the leading countries in Africa in 
                                                          
31The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of works, Transport and Communication, National 
Information and Communications Technology Policy, 2016, Accessed from 
http://www.Tanzict.files.wordpress.com, on 28th April 2017. 
32The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. 
33These include Cyber Crimes Act, 2015, Electronic and Postal communications Act, 2010, HIV and 
AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2009, Medical Practitioner Act, 2002, Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, 2002, Registration and Identification of Persons Act, 2002, Tanzania Intelligence and security 
Act, 1996. 
34ITU, Cloud Computing in Africa- Situation and Perspectives, 2012. Accessed form 
https://www.itu.int/en/publications/ITU-D/Pages/pudlications.aspx?parent=D-PREF-THEM.07-
2012&media=electronic, on 28th April 2016. 
35These laws are Electronic and Postal Communication Act, No 3 of 2010, Universal Communication 
Act of 2006 and Cybercrimes Act, 2015 accessed from http://www.itu.int>ITU-D>treg>publications, 
on 28th April 2017. 
36The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Works, note 31, supra. pg. 5. 
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using cloud computing.37 At regulatory level, privacy right is protected firstly, under 
common law, and secondly by article 14 of the country’s Constitution.38 There is also 
a specific legislation for privacy protection, known as the Protection of Personal 
Information Act, 2013, (POPI). This law upholds privacy right as provided in the 
Constitution.39 It also provides guidelines on how to protect that right. POPI is aligned 
to the 1995 European Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) as well as the 
contemporary international best practices and laws on privacy protection.40However, 
despite POPI legislation in place, only a few of its sections have come into effect. 
These include sections that provide for the establishment of the office of the 
information regulator as well as the definitions section.41 This implies that privacy 
right though accepted and upheld by this law, is not legally and properly protected, 
going by the observation that most of its sections for protection are not yet effected. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Different experts have raised concerns about security and privacy in cloud computing 
adoption and use.42 The Cloud Security alliance in 2013, for instance, identified data 
breaches and data loss as areas of concern regarding cloud computing.43 The former 
                                                          
37Gillward et al., The Cloud Over Africa, 2013.Accessed from 
http://www.researchictafrica.net/publications, on 2nd May 2017. 
38Roos, A., Data Protection Law in South Africa, in Makulilo, A. B. (ed) African Data Privacy Laws, 
Switzerland, Springer International Publishing AG, 2016, pp. 189-228. 
39 Ibid. 
40Michalson, L. Data Privacy or Data Protection in South Africa,2013. Accessed from 
http://www.michalson.com, on 28th April 2017. 
41DLA Piper, Data Protection Laws of the World, South Africa, 2017. Accessed from 
http://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com, on 29th April 2017.  
42Njue, D., Cloud Services Opportunities and Challenges for East Africa, 2013. Accessed from 
http://www.slideshare/itnewsafrica/cloudservices, on 26th December 2017. 
43Samson, T., 9top Threats to cloud Computing Security, 2013. Accessed from 
http://www.infoworld.com/t/cloud-security/9-top-threats-cloud-computing-security-
213428?page=0,0&source=footer, on 11th September 2017. 
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refers to the release of protected information that includes personally identifiable 
information, financial information, personal health information and the like to an 
untrusted environment either intentionally or unintentionally.44 When this security 
incident happens, sensitive, personal and protected data are copied, stolen, viewed, 
communicated or used by someone not authorized to do so.45 Likewise, data loss is 
another security issue which threatens cloud computing.  It includes deletion of data 
by malicious hackers, natural or human induced calamities as well as by unconcerned 
cloud service providers (CSPs).46Likewise, security and privacy challenges in the 
cloud computing are caused by a lack of control by cloud service consumers.47 That 
is, their data are stored in the cloud infrastructures that are managed, owned, and 
operated by the service providers within the territory or in other jurisdiction.48 This 
poses threat to data security, privacy, integrity and confidentiality principles.  
 
To address the problem of a lack of security and privacy in cloud computing there has 
been some efforts in place. The legislation in EU on data protection, for example, has 
served as the key point of departure for the development of national data privacy 
regimes in different parts of the world as well as the best practises.49 International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) also issued reports and proposals for the best 
                                                          
44Kong et al., Introduction to Cloud computing and Security Issues, in Cheung, A. S. Y. & Weber, R. 
H., (ed) Privacy and Legal Issues in Cloud Computing, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
Cheltenham, United Kingdom, 2015. pp 17. 
45Ibid. 
46Ibid, pg. 17. 
47Turahi, D., Security and Privacy: Can We Trust the Cloud? 2013. A paper presented in East African 
Information conference in Kampala Uganda on 13th to 14th August, 2013. Accessed from 
https://www.isaca.org/chapters2/kampala/documents/Security%20and%20Privacy%20in%%20the
%20cloud.pdf, on 27th December 2017. 
48Kauba, C. & Mayer, S. When the Cloud Disperse: Data Confidentiality and Privacy in Cloud 
Computing,2013. Accessed from http://www.uni-salzburg.at/teaching/sal/p, on 27th December 2016. 
49Bygrave, L. A., Data Privacy Law-An International Perspective, 1st Edition, Oxford university Press. pp 265. 
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practice of security and privacy in cloud computing. Similarly, Madrid Resolution50 
provides for the standards accepted worldwide for data privacy and security 
protection.51  
 
In June 2014, African Union member states adopted the African union Convention on 
Cyber Security and Personal Data, which also aims at protecting data security and 
privacy.52 The problem is however that these guidelines, terms and agreements are not 
universally binding.53 As a result, there is lack of legal harmony across regimes for 
enhancing data security and privacy in cloud environment.54 That is, almost every state 
has its own municipal legal regime for cloud computing. The preliminary survey 
showed that legislation for data security and privacy in the cloud is different between 
Tanzania and South Africa despite being both southern African countries.  
 
The preliminary information suggested that Tanzania depends mainly on technical 
protection of data rather than legal protection of privacy and security. In South Africa, 
privacy legislation known as the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 
(POPI)55 exists. Nonetheless, only sections dealing with definitions and the 
appointment of the information regulator have come into effect.56 Similarly, 
                                                          
50This is a joint proposal for a Draft International Standards on the Protection of Privacy with regard to the 
processing of Personal Data, which was welcomed by the International Conference of Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners, held in Madrid on 5th November, 2009.  
51ITU, Privacy in Cloud Computing, 2012. ITU-Technology Watch Report, Geneva. Accessed from 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/techwatch/pages/cloud-computing-privacy.aspx, on12th Dec 2016. 
52African Convention on cyber Security and Personal Data was adopted by the 23rd ordinary session of the assembly 
of the African Union on 27th June 2014, in Malabo, Guinea. The Convention covers a wide range of online 
activities such as cyber security, cybercrime, data protection and electronic commerce. 
53Ibid, p. 8. 
54Ibid. 
55Ross, note 38, supra. 
56The south African President signed a proclamation in April 2014 declaring only some sections of the Act to be 
effective. 
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sluggishness in adopting available international security and privacy 
recommendations is also observed. For example, while African union member state 
adopted the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data in June 
2014,57however, only two country has ratified it to date, although 10 countries have 
signed it. This has deterred the application of the Convention considering that it 
requires the ratification of fifteen (15) member countries to enter into force.58 
 
The foregoing elucidation explains the nature and the extent of the problem that this 
study sets out to investigate - security and privacy protection of privacy in the cloud. 
The consequence has therefore been threat to data security and privacy and hence the 
slow pace and unwillingness to adopt cloud services. The study draws examples from 
Tanzania and South Africa in comparative perspective with the intention of exposing 
the status of legal framework and mechanisms for privacy protection in cloud 
computing. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The following objectives guided the present study: 
 
1.3.1General Objectives 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the legal challenges involved in 
the use of cloud computing with regard to security and privacy of information and 
suggest how it might be curbed to provide privacy and security in the cloud in 
                                                          
57African Convention on cyber Security and Personal Data was adopted by the 23rd ordinary session of the assembly 
of the African Union on 27th June 2014, in Malabo, Guinea. The Convention covers a wide range of online 
activities such as cyber security, cybercrime, data protection and electronic commerce. 
58Access now Policy Team, African Union Adopts Framework on Cyber Security and data Protection, 2014. 
Accessed from https://www.accessnow.org/african-union-adopts-framework-on-cyber-security-and-data-
protection, on 23rd October 2017. 
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Tanzania and South Africa respectively. 
 
1.3.2Specific Objectives 
In order to achieve the general objectives of the study the following specific objectives 
guided this research: 
i. to examine the legal challenges of privacy and security in cloud computing. 
ii. to analyse the adequacy, relevancy, and appropriateness of the existing legal 
framework for privacy and security in Tanzania and South Africa and to establish 
the extent to which they recognise and tackle challenges arising from cloud 
computing. 
iii. to analyse the accepted general principles and guidelines of the best practices on 
privacy protection, and suggest a framework for protecting privacy in the cloud in 
Tanzania and South Africa. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This research study intended to answer the following questions: 
i. what are the legal challenges emanating from the use of cloud computing? 
ii. how relevant, adequate and appropriate are the existing legal and regulatory 
framework and practices protect privacy and security in the cloud in Tanzania and 
South Africa? 
iii. to what extent are the general principles and guidelines of the best practices 
relevant in protecting privacy and security in the cloud in Tanzania and South 
Africa? 
1.5 Literature Review 
 12 
There is a dearth of literature that discuses and makes comprehensive examination 
specifically on security and privacy in the cloud computing in Tanzania and South 
Africa. Although several authors have written on this subject most of the literatures 
are foreign to Africa. The review of the few literatures available undertaken in this 
study discloses that there are two schools of thought dealing with protection of privacy 
and security in the cloud.  
 
The first school of thought advances the use technological means in their different 
studies and scholarly writings as a means of providing privacy and security of personal 
information in the cloud. They advocate for the use of different mechanism trying to 
limit access of personal information in the cloud, how and when. This is equivalent to 
what Lessig was referring to as privacy by code.59Additionally, there is a second group 
of thought in which scholars are advancing protection of privacy through legal 
mechanism. They advocate for using legal framework to control access to personal 
information and time and manner of accessing personal information. They also 
advance the use of sanctions in protecting privacy and security of personal 
information. 
 
The scholars who argue in favour of technological measures in solving privacy and 
security issues in the cloud include Meetei and Goel, Takabi and Hashzume. Meetei 
and Goel posit that cloud computing has different architectures depending on services 
they provide.60According to them, cloud computing brings about new challenges on 
                                                          
59Lessig, L., Code, 2006. Basic Books, New York, 2006. 
60Meetei, M. Z. & Goel, A., Security Issues in Cloud Computing, in 2012, 5th International Conference 
on Biomedical Engineering and Informatics (BMEI), pp 1321-1325. Accessed from 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/261153895_Security_issues_in_cloud_computing, on 14th 
November 2017. 
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security and privacy that were not present in the traditional computing system. They 
mention some risks coupled with the use of cloud computing and legal risk being 
among them. These include data storage challenges,61 data transmission challenges, 
application security, security of cloud integrity, and security challenges related to third 
party resources. They posit that in adopting cloud computing security mechanisms 
should be put in place for smooth running.  
 
Although a number of authors are in agreement with Meetei and Goel, other scholars 
dissent. Takabi and his fellow scholars, for instance, in analysing the security and 
privacy challenges in cloud computing environment, dissent that though it is important 
to rely on technical means in providing privacy and security in the cloud, technical 
means alone are not enough.62 They argue that legal mechanisms for data security and 
privacy protection must be embedded in all security solutions. 
 
Correspondingly, there is a category of scholars who advocate for the legal 
mechanisms for privacy and security in the cloud. These include Ramgovind and his 
fellow scholars who argue on the quest for a legal framework for cloud computing 
together with technical mechanisms for privacy and security.63The authors posit that 
the modern-day technology of cloud computing compels cloud computing customers 
to rely on the third-party service providers on data security. This poses a problem as 
                                                          
61Customers store their data in the cloud and hence do not possess them locally anymore. 
62Takabi, et al., Security and Privacy Challenges in Cloud Computing Environments. IEEE Security 
and Privacy Journal, 2010, 8(6), 24-31. Accessed from 
http://www.asu.pire.elsevier.com/en/publications/security-and-privacy-challenges-in-cloud-
computing-environments, on 29th December 2016. 
63Ramgovind, et al., The Management of security in Cloud Computing 2010. A paper presented in 
Information Security for South African Conference in Johannesburg. Accessed from 
http://www.unisa.pure.elsevier.com, on 28th December 2017. 
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the only legal agreement in that relation is the Service Level Agreement (SLA), which 
according to them is not enough.  
 
The same view is shared by Turahi, who argues that a regulatory institution is among 
the security and privacy challenges facing cloud computing.64 According to him, the 
current practice of depending on the service provider for data privacy and security 
leads to legal quagmire and transitive trust on establishing who is accountable in 
complying with regulation if the services are subcontracted to a third-party cloud.65He 
proposes forming a legal framework for cloud computing which encompass data 
protection, trust, and privacy policies.  
 
Although cloud computing is different from traditional computing, King and Raja 
express that regulations for cloud computing are necessary to reach the potentials of 
cloud computing.66 The regulations, among other things, should focus on privacy and 
security of sensitive consumer data. They suggest that to achieve the above-named 
goal, laws are to be revised to offer heightened privacy and security of personal data 
in the cloud environment. They are of the view that there is the need to reform privacy 
laws to lay a firm regulatory foundation for the growth of cloud computing. 
 
Furthermore, Adrian contends that the potentials brought about by cloud computing 
pose an enormous risk to privacy and security.67These potentials include among 
others, the way in which information may be collated, managed, stored, controlled, 
                                                          
64Turahi, note 47, supra. 
65 Ibid.  
66 King, N. J. and Raja, V. T., Protecting the Privacy and Security of Sensitive Customer Data in the 
Cloud, computer Law and Security Review, 2012, v. 28, pp 308-319. Accessed from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com, on 14th November, 2017. 
67Adrian, A., How Much Privacy do Clouds Provide? An Australian Perspective, Computer Law and Security 
Review, 2013, v. 29, pp 48-57. Accessed from http://www.sciencedirect.com, on 5th December 2017. 
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and manipulated. The author posits that the right to privacy in the cloud, to some 
extent, is protected by the existing laws, some of which are not specific for the cloud. 
However, she advocates that privacy and security in the cloud are under countless 
threat owing the development in technology. The scholar is of the view that it is very 
unfortunate that the available legal framework is inadequate to secure privacy. She 
cites also Solove, who maintains, 
The problem is caused in significant part by the law, which has allowed the 
construction and use of digital dossiers without adequately regulating the 
practices by which companies keep them secure.68 
 
In this sense, cloud computing calls for legal innovation according to Adrian above. 
Maaref, in the ITU report on situation and perspectives on cloud computing in Africa 
argues in accord with the above authors.69 He for example, provides that in some 
African countries cloud computing is already in use as a solution for IT under 
equipment problem. Moreover, there are prospects for more development in adoption 
and implementation of the technology if some accompanying measures are taken into 
account timely. These measures include, but not limited to legal and regulatory 
mechanisms. The author also highlights that in regulatory level, more than half of 
African countries do not have legislation on data protection or any agreement with 
other countries on this regard, except some few countries.  
 
Similarly, the scholar also posits that African leaders agree that there is a dire need to 
have regulatory environment that meets the international standards. Agreements 
                                                          
68Solove, D., The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, in Chandler, A. et al, Securing 
Privacy in the Internet Age, Berkeley, CA, Stanford University Press, 2008. 
69Maaref, S. ITU, Cloud Computing in Africa: Situation and Perspectives, 2012. Accessed from 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-d/treg/publications, on 2nd January 2017. 
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regarding personal data protection and data transfer security are necessary for the 
proper adoption and implementation of cloud computing. Likewise, the author 
suggests that there is the need to improve the legislative as well as regulatory 
framework. Such improvements can mitigate the challenges facing the migration to 
the cloud environment, and maintain conformity with international standards as well 
as the best practices in the field. 
 
Besides, Gillward and his fellow authors in their article titled, Cloud over Africa, 
analysed cloud computing in five selected African countries which are Ghana, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Kenya, and Tunisia.70 The scholars posit that cloud computing in these 
nations is still in infancy stages of growth except South Africa where there is higher 
rate of cloud activities. Similarly, the authors claim that security and privacy are 
among the factors hindering the growth of cloud computing in most of the developing 
countries in Africa. Likewise, they provide that although cloud computing falls within 
ICT framework, in ICT regulations there is no special provisions providing for cloud 
services in all selected countries. They recommend for the enactment of data security 
and privacy protection legislation in all the countries. 
 
Equally, the above stand is shared by Omwansa and his fellow authors in a baseline 
survey of cloud computing in which they made an analysis of cloud computing in 
Kenya.71 They are of the view that cloud technology can be adopted and properly 
implemented if there is proper legal and supportive framework. The authors posit that 
                                                          
70Gillward et al, note 37, supra. 
71Omwansa, T. K, Waema, T. M. & Omwenga, B. Cloud computing in Kenya, A 2013 Baseline Survey, 
2014. Accessed from http://www.c4dlab.ac.ke/uploads/2014/4, on 3rd January 2017. 
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the question of security and privacy of data in the cloud is one of the biggest challenges 
affecting cloud computing. In their report, they recommend that the ICT policy as well 
as the legal framework should be reviewed and make it flexible and effective to 
promote cloud computing. They also advocate for the need of specific laws to ensure 
the protection of consumers and end users of cloud services. They also argue that 
sometimes it is not necessary to have a specific law providing for cloud computing, 
but aspects relating to cloud computing should be clearly added and provided for in 
the existing law through amendment. These aspects include but not limited to data 
protection, information security, privacy, cybercrime, and conflict resolution for cloud 
environment. 
 
In general, reviewing the above literature clearly portrays that privacy and security are 
a serious challenge brought about by cloud computing. Consequently, the need to have 
a legal protection for privacy and security is evident. It is also depicted that privacy 
and security protection in the cloud is not properly regulated for. However, the minds 
are still troubled on the fact that there is no consensus whether to have a specific law 
for cloud computing or to amend the existing law so as to accommodate and provide 
for the challenges brought by cloud computing. Moreover, the reviewed literature has 
not covered the parameter that this research intended to cover. The literature is silent 
on the topic of privacy and security issues in the cloud in Tanzania. Little seems to 
have been said in relation to the same topic for South Africa.  
 
However, even the South African status is not discussed in detail. Moreover, the 
literature is silent on what to be done in the developing countries to protect privacy 
and security in the cloud for the interest of the internet community universally. 
 18 
Therefore, there is apparent dearth of legal literature in Africa on data security and 
privacy in the cloud computing. These are the lacunas that the author has filled to 
provide a clear understanding of the existing situation in Tanzania and South Africa 
and be able to add in the pool of knowledge and provide supportive environment for 
privacy and security in the cloud. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The study employed qualitative legal research approach and doctrinal legal research 
methodology. The study also supplemented the methodologies with historical legal 
approach and comparative methods. The doctrinal legal research method entails the 
analysis of primary and secondary sources of law. The methodology was used to 
analyse literature on privacy and security issues in the cloud and appraise the existing 
legislation on the subject matter. The rationale for using this methodology is expressed 
in latin maxim as “lexlata” and not “lexferenda”. That it is regarded as the main legal 
methodology which focuses primarily on what a law is in a particular area and not 
what it ought to be.72  
 
Correspondingly, the methodology extends from the textual examination of statutory 
provisions and case laws to exploration of legal scholarly works with the intention of 
proposing a legal reform which is part of the law as it ought to be or the “lexferenda” 
aspect. As a matter of fact, it is the method that is tremendously used in similar legal 
                                                          
72Dobinson, I. and Johns. F., ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in McConville, M., and Wing, H. C., (eds) 
Research Methods for Law, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh) 2007, pp18-19. 
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studies.73 In addition to what is previously mentioned, the methodology was used to 
evaluate relevant literature on the subject matter of the study.74 
 
Additionally, it facilitated the critical legal examination of relevant legislation, 
policies, case laws, international and multilateral instruments’, reports, treaties, 
government reports, protocols, thesis, journals, books and international information 
security and privacy standards that are the primary and secondary sources of data. The 
researchers’ main goal was to locate, collect the law that includes legislation and case 
laws, and apply them to a specific set of material facts with the intention of solving a 
particular legal problem. 
 
Specifically, under this methodology, the researcher’s intention was to analyse the 
existing legislation, model laws, reports, case laws, and other publications and assess 
how they relate to the subject of the study. It necessitated the use of different legal 
methods including inductive and deductive legal reasoning as well as rules of statutory 
interpretation to critically analyse the collected materials against the backdrop of the 
research questions. Specifically, this methodology was selected to answer one of the 
research questions, which require an examination of data security, and privacy legal 
challenges arising from the use of cloud computing.  
 
                                                          
73Masoud, B. S., Legal Challenges of Cross-Border Insolvencies in Sub- Saharan Africa with 
References to Tanzania and Kenya: A Framework for Legislation and Policies, PhD Thesis, University 
of Nottingham Trent, 2012. 
74 Singhal, A. K. & Malick, I.Doctrinal and Social Legal Research Methods: Merits and Demerits, 
Educational Research Journal, 2012, Vol 2 (7), pp 252-256. 
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Moreover, this methodology was very appropriate in this study owing to its 
potentiality in giving rise to the growth, continuity, tenacity, and certainty of law. The 
application of this methodology made it possible for this study to make an analysis of 
the existing legislation relating to security and privacy of data. It also enabled the study 
to ponder on how the law ought to tackle the emergence encounters and risks. It also 
facilitated the analysis, discussion and recommendation which promotes innovation 
and development of more privacy regulation. Moreover, through application of legal 
interpretation and analysis, this methodology aided in formulating recommendations 
that can be applied in Tanzania and South Africa. 
 
Accordingly, the researcher made use of historical, analytical, and perspective 
approach to analyse different pieces of law.75Historical legal research involve among 
other things, the study of the historical growth of a certain legal principles or legal 
establishments or legal profession.76Through historical legal research, the researcher 
traced the historical predecessor of security and data privacy agreements and 
legislation. The focus was on what were the main issues that made the data security 
and privacy law to emerge? What were the conditions and mischief that were supposed 
to be cured by that particular law? The rationale behind this approach was to ascertain 
whether the mischief and issues that led to the emergency of that law were still relevant 
to data security and privacy in cloud computing environment.  Besides, the researcher 
analysed on whether the existing legal framework carters for security and privacy 
                                                          
75Kiunsi, H., B., Transfer Pricing in East Africa: Tanzania and Kenya in comparative Perspective, PhD 
Thesis, the Open University of Tanzania, 2017.  
76Taylor, L., Writing a Legal Research Paper- Research methodologies, in Scragg, J., et.al. (eds), Legal 
Writing: A Complete Guide for a Career in Law, LexisNexis, New Zealand, 2014. 
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issues in cloud environment. Also, the researcher critically examined how and to what 
extent the existing legal framework solved data security and privacy challenges in 
cloud in the selected countries. 
Besides, comparative research method involved comparing different jurisdictions to 
establish a conclusion about them.77 The rationale for using this methodology was to 
get insights into other country’s law, the law of our own country; and in particular, to 
get a glimpse of our own perceptions and instincts in relation to the law.78Equally, this 
methodology was selected because it is regarded a good means of disseminating fresh 
ideas into a legal system.79 Similarly, it is a method widely used to align the laws 
applied in different legal systems.  
 
Moreover, it helped in to making comparative analysis of the status of security and 
privacy of personal data in the cloud accorded between Tanzania and South Africa. 
The researcher checked the availability of specific legislation for security and privacy 
of data in the cloud. The finding would enlighten the necessity to enact such a 
legislation. This is because the extent of implementation might not be the same 
between the two states, as some might have put initiatives worth following and 
emulating by the other.  
 
                                                          
77Richardson, H., Characteristics of a Comparative Research Design, 2018. Accessed from 
http://www.classroom.synonym.com/charasteristics-comparative-research-design-8274567.html, on 
31st July 2019. 
78Eberle, E,. J., The Method and Role of Comparative Law, Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review, Vol 8, number 3, 2009.  
79Vibhute, K., &Aynalem, F., Legal research Methods, Teaching Material prepared under the 
sponsorship of the Justice and Legal System Research Institute, Ethiopia, 2009. Accessed from 
http://www.files.Zchilot.wordpress.com, on 31st July 2019. 
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Additionally, comparative analysis enabled the investigation of European Union (EU) 
forgetting some insights on how it deals with security and privacy issues in the cloud. 
EU was selected because its legislation in data protection is regarded as the key point 
of departure for the development of national data privacy regimes in different parts of 
the world as well as the best practice.80Article 25 of the EU Data Protection Directive, 
which is now repealed, to a great extent has influenced the international character of 
data privacy law by imposing a condition to non-EU nations to implement mechanisms 
that would be considered adequate by the EU for the protection of privacy, if such 
nations were to continue receiving personal data originating from EU.  Similarly, the 
General Data Protection Regulation retains the adequacy requirement. Consequently, 
it was deemed imperative to engage in a comparative legal analysis. 
 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
This study confined to Tanzania and South Africa. South Africa was chosen due to the 
fact that it was being named as one of the leading countries in the use of cloud 
computing in sub Saharan Africa.81 It was thus found interesting to examine how data 
security and privacy protection was accorded to the cloud computing environment in 
the legal regimes of one of the leading countries in implementing and adopting cloud 
computing. Furthermore, the presence of information security Act known as the 
Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 (POPI) was among the reasons for 
selecting of South Africa. The availability of literature in English and online legal 
materials was also among the reasons for selecting South Africa as a case study.  
                                                          
80Bygrave, L. A., Data Privacy Law- An International Perspective, 1st Edition, Oxford University 
Press.United Kingdom, 2014. 
81Omwansa. Note 71, supra. 
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Tanzania was selected because it was the second biggest economy in East African 
Community (EAC) following Kenya. It is also a country in which cloud computing 
adoption was growing tremendously. However, the preliminary survey showed that it 
lacked specific data protection and privacy laws in its legal regime.82So, it became of 
interest to examine how legal frameworks protected data security and privacy in this 
country without a specific legislation providing for the same. It is however important 
to highlight that Tanzania was a case study and South Africa served as benchmark for 
comparative purposes. 
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
Limitations are constraints and incidences that arise in a study which are largely 
beyond the researcher’s control. They normally limit the extensity to which the study 
can go. Hence,  in most cases, they affect the study outcome and the conclusions that 
can be drawn.83The researcher expected to encounter some limitations while 
conducting this study. One of them was dearth of literature discussing specifically 
security and privacy issues in cloud computing in libraries. The second limitation was 
scarcity of decided cases on privacy and security issues in the cloud, both in Tanzania 
and south Africa. To some extent, this affected the study. However, all the above 
limitations are counteracted by opting for the use of online books, online journal 
                                                          
82Privacy International & Tanzania Human Right Defenders Coalition., The Right to Privacy in the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Stakeholders Report, Universal Review, 25th Session in Tanzania, 
2015.Accessed from http://www.privacyinternational.org, on 4th January 2017. 
83Simon, M. K. & Goes, J. Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations and Scope of the Study in 
Dissertations and Scholarly Research: Recipes for Success. Seattle, WA: Dissertation Success LLC, 
2013. Accessed from http://www.dissertationrecipes.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/04/limitationscopedelimitation1.pdf, on 15th January 2017. 
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articles and other electronic materials from reputable sources. Moreover, the 
researcher used mainly the cases that tested the constitutional privacy rights to in the 
study to portray necessity of security and privacy right protection in the cloud. 
 
1.9 Delimitations of the Study 
Delimitations of the study are factors that arise from intentional choices that are made 
when designing the study about where the boundaries of the study are going to be 
drawn. They mainly arise from the limitations attached to the scope of the 
study.84Privacy and security of data is a wide subject in ICT law. It has many different 
components, which are difficult to be studied in detail and at once. It is in this line that 
this study only focused to privacy and security in cloud computing. In spite of the fact 
that the study used data from developing as well as developed countries, more 
emphasis was on how developing countries strive to ensure privacy and security of 
personal data in the cloud. Nevertheless, since there were so many developing 
countries, the study focused only on Tanzania and South Africa because the researcher 
found the area interesting for advancing knowledge and shedding light on some legal 
solutions in the existing problem. 
 
1.10 Organisation of the Study 
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One lays out the contextual 
framework of the study. Chapter Two describes cloud computing concept, its history, 
evolution and current trends. It also designates what cloud concept means in the field 
                                                          
84 Wiersma, W., Research Methods in Education: An introduction. Boston, M. A. Allyn and Bacon, 
2000. 
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of communication technologies, its nature and character. Furthermore, it also presents 
and pronounces some key issues that relate to the negative aspect of cloud computing. 
Chapter Three covers the description of the theoretical framework of privacy and 
security. Likewise, it gives an overview of the phenomenon about its background. At 
the same time, Chapter Four revisits international benchmarks for privacy and security 
in the cloud environment. It makes an in-depth examination of the engagements for 
the facilitation of privacy and security of personal data in the cloud, and the extent to 
which they implicate and enlighten security and privacy in the cloud regulation in 
Tanzania and South Africa. 
 
Chapters Five and Six respectively discuss the existing legal frameworks as well as 
practices of privacy and security in the cloud in Tanzania and South Africa. They also 
discuss the origin, historical background as well as the emerging reforms of privacy 
and security in the cloud in the above-named countries. These chapters also provide 
an insight on the extent to which the current legal frameworks address privacy and 
security issues in the cloud in the context of existing theories and international 
standards. 
 
Chapter Seven concludes the study and summarises key findings of the study by 
outlining what has been revealed from the foregoing chapters. It also portrays 
contribution to knowledge that this study makes as well as the agenda for further 
research. The main thrust of the preceding chapters includes providing insights in the 
legal challenges on privacy and security in the cloud in Tanzania and South Africa. It 
also suggests how both Tanzania and South Africa can devise and craft workable 
 26 





ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
2.1 Introduction 
The rise and development of the internet has facilitated the growth and development 
of different technologies around the globe; cloud computing inclusive.85 Particularly, 
from the dawn of early 21st century the evolution of the internet and the prevalent 
adoption of virtualisation technology86 has led to the emergency of cloud computing 
and it has become in the forefront of innovation.87 Consequently, cloud computing has 
become one of the concepts which often attracts discussion from all angles, especially 
the academia and businesses. It is noteworthy that cloud computing model has 
witnessed a huge move towards its acceptance and adoption by various users and 
providers over the past few years.88 
 
Furthermore, it has been an evolving IT environment, which has remarkably revamped 
peoples’ insight of computing software and its distribution, development models as 
well as infrastructure.89It delivers various utilities as a revolutionary enormous model 
                                                          
85Nazir, M., Cloud Computing: Overview & current Research Challenges, IOSR Journal of Computer 
Engineering, 2012. Vol 8, Issue 1, pp. 14-22. Accessed from  
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where cloud users can store personal and valuable information remotely and hence 
avail themselves of on demand prime computer resources.90 Consequently, it is 
projected as the upcoming generation of high-tech paradigm for tomorrow’s 
promise.91 This chapter examines the origin and development of cloud computing. It 
begins by defining cloud computing from different perspectives. The attention then 
turns to tracing its origin and development. The description is also used as a 
springboard for explaining the characteristic, delivery models, and deployment models 
of cloud computing as developed in literature. Besides, this chapter highlights the dark 
shortcoming of cloud computing despite its benefits. 
 
2.2 Cloud Computing Concept 
Although there is no single universally agreed definition of the term cloud computing, 
there have been different attempts to define it by various people and organisations. 
Yousef. et al are among the first group, which tried to define cloud computing.92 
According to these scholars, it is a new computing model, which enables manipulators 
to momentarily exploit computing infrastructures available over the network, which is 
provided by the cloud service provider as a service on pay per use basis.93Particularly, 
this definition denote to both the computing applications that are provided as services 
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over the internet as well as software systems and hardware in the data centres that 
provide cloud computing services. 
Equally, the International Business Machine (IBM) defines it as the distribution or 
transmission of on demand computing resources.94 This implies that everything 
needed from applications to data centres can be accessed over the internet on a pay for 
use basis.95 Furthermore, the resources offered are elastic in nature as they can be 
scaled up or down promptly and simply according to the demand.96 It is noteworthy 
that services issued in cloud are also metered so that the client pays only for what 
he/she uses and the IT resources in the cloud are offered at a self-service mode.97 It is 
in the same vein that Lamba and Singh give a simple definition, which provides that 
cloud computing entails the amalgamation of a technology and platform, which offer 
hosting as well as storage services over the internet.98   
 
Moreover, it is also defined as an environment of the hardware and software resources 
in the data centres that provide various services over the web or the internet according 
to the user’s requirements or to meet user’s needs.99 Additionally, Kumar and Goudar 
provide that: 
“Cloud computing is a complete new technology. It is the development of 
parallel computing, distributed computing grid, computing, and is the 
combination and evolution of virtualization, utility computing, Software-as-a-
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Service (SaaS), Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and Platform-as-a-Service 
(PaaS).Cloud is a metaphor to describe web as a space where computing has 
been pre-installed and exist as a service; data, operating systems, applications, 
storage and processing power exists on the web ready to be shared. To users, 
cloud computing is a Pay-per-Use-On-Demand mode that can conveniently 
access shared IT resources through the Internet. Where the IT resources 
include network, server, storage, application, service and so on and they can 
be deployed with much quick and easy manner and least management and 




However, it is the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) that issues a more commonly accepted definition of cloud computing. It 
defines cloud computing as; 
“a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction."101 
 
 
Therefore, from the above explanation, it is established that cloud computing offers 
expedient on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources.102 Resources in this context denote computing applications, network 
resources, platforms, software services, virtual servers, and computing 
infrastructures.103In other words, cloud computing can be described as a situation in 
which computation is delivered by the service provider on subscription basis anytime 
and anywhere.104Still, it is described as a paradigm that enables its consumers as well 
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as businesses to use computing resources which include applications and software in 
the absence of installation and accessing their data at any computer via internet.105 
As pointed out, in this part, cloud computing is defined from different perspectives, 
yet none of the definitions can be considered superior to others on the ground that each 
has its own limitations. Nevertheless, it is possible to make predilection of a particular 
definition to suit a particular context. It worth highlighting that this approach is not 
going to undermine other definitions on the fact that this preference may not fit in 
other contexts in which other definitions can do. Therefore, in this study, the definition 
given by the NIST is more preferred than others; and hence it is guiding the study. The 
rationale for its selection is that it is the commonly accepted definition in defining 
cloud computing. Further, it is in accord with the gist of this study. Also, it is 
noteworthy that the term cloud computing is otherwise referred as the cloud, and these 
terms have been sometimes used interchangeably in this study. 
 
2.3 Emergency and Growth of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing has a long history. Some authors describe cloud computing as the 
end product of distributed and grid computing.106 It is an innovation whose emergence 
can be described in different perspectives: technological and IT deployment 
perspective.107 Beginning with technological standpoint, cloud computing is seen as 
an advancement of computing in which virtualisation technology is used to exploit 
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hardware effectively.108 Under the IT deployment point of view, cloud computing is 
regarded as an effort to change the way computing resources and applications are 
delivered.109 It is worth highlighting that, in this part, the emergence of cloud 
computing is described from both perspectives. It begins with the emergency of cluster 
computing technology, which represents a number of computers engaged to 
accomplish one task, to improve performance, reduce cost, and enhancing load 
balancing.110  
 
Moreover, due to technological advancement, cluster computing was replaced by grid 
computing.111 The latter technology is more disparate, geographically distributed and 
loosely integrated.112The grid computing paved the way for the emergency of utility 
computing. Under this new model, computing resources are accessed and used from a 
common pool of resources on pay per use basis or metered service.113In addition, the 
concept of cloud computing traces its origin to the utility computers concept as 
proposed by John McCarthy in 1961. He proposed that: 
“If computers of the kind I have advocated become the computers of the 
future, then computing may someday be organized as a public utility 
just as the telephone system is a public utility. … The computer utility 
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Ultimately, his ideas matured in 1999 when Salesforce.com became the first company 
to introduce the concept of distributing enterprise applications by using its website.115 
Cloud computing gained momentum in 2002 when the Amazon Web Service (AWS) 
was introduced.116 The AWS platform was a bunch of enterprise designed services 
that offered computing resources, remotely managed storage, and business 
functionality.117However, it was until 2006 that cloud computing concept appeared in 
the commercial ground.118 This was in line with the launching of the Elastic Compute 
Cloud (EC2) by the Amazon, a service that empowered different companies and 
organisations to let computing capacity as well as processing power to operate 
applications in their businesses.119When the term was coined in 2007, it generally 
meant combined hardware and software deployment concept.120This was made 
possible by the introduction of Google Docs, which raised public awareness and 
spread the news about cloud computing. As of late, introduction of the Google App 
Engine in 2009, allowed individuals as well as companies to create and store their 
paper works in the cloud.121 
 
2.4 Cloud Computing as a New Medium 
The rise and advancement of modern technologies, especially the internet, led to the 
emergence of cloud computing. However, it developed from the pre-existing and well 
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researched concepts including virtualisation, distributed and grid computers.122 
Despite the fact that the concepts underlying cloud computing are not new, the 
innovation of cloud computing arises from the way it delivers computing services to 
cloud computing customers.123It is now regarded as the future generation paradigm in 
computation.124 The use of internet facilitates the delivery of applications and 
resources as a service in the cloud computing environment.125In essence, this new 
model denotes change from computing as a product that someone can buy to 
computing which is a service that can be provisioned to as well as accessed by the 
customer over the web from the cloud.126 Arguably, it is perceived as the next 
evolution that is going to have a huge impact on organisations as well as businesses 
on how they manage their IT infrastructure.127 It has been accepted as a new computing 
prototype that can deliver services on demand at a cheaper price.128 
 
2.5 Essential Characteristics of Cloud Computing 
NIST definition as provided in 2.2 is the most accepted by the industry as well as the 
academia in defining cloud computing. The NIST model, which is guiding this study 
establishes five main characteristics of this new paradigm.129 These characteristics 
have in the past attracted and are still attracting significant interests from both the 
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scholarly research perspectives as well as the industrial perspectives.130The 
characteristics established differentiate cloud computing model from traditional 
computing and other paradigms.131 These include on demand self-service, broadband 
network access, measured services, resource pooling, and rapid elasticity. The 
characteristics are going to be discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs. 
 
Initially, on demand self-service is one of the essential characteristics of cloud 
paradigm. This is the feature which allows the customer to use web services and 
acquire an additional computer facility, such as server time or network storage, 
according to his/her needs without long delays and human interference on the 
provider’s side in the process.132Moreover, it implies that cloud consumers can define 
as well as modify computing capabilities, such as server time, quantity of data stored 
in the cloud and the speed of data access and processing independently according to 
his needs automatically without requiring human interaction from the service 
provider.133 
 
In addition, it is worth highlighting that cloud computing paradigm calls for the 
broadband network access. It denotes that resources are accommodated in the cloud 
and can be accessed through standard devices or platforms such as smart phones, 
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computers, tablets, laptops, Macs to mention just a few.134 Putting it differently, it 
signifies availability of broad network access that can be accessed through different 
devices or platforms such as mobile phones, computers etc.135 This is an important 
characteristic of cloud computing due to the fact that cloud users or customer access 
cloud services using any device that can connect to the internet, and hence it is 
regarded as an enabler as well as a trait of cloud computing.136 
 
Moreover, measured service is another characteristic of cloud computing.  It advocates 
that service providers are empowered to automatically monitor and record cloud 
resources spent or allotted to the client so as to facilitate the pay-per-use billing, which 
is central to the cloud paradigm.137 This infers that cloud service providers may 
control, monitor, and optimise the use of cloud computing resources using automated 
metering tools,138 resource allocation as well as load balancing.139 It is noteworthy that 
cloud clients pay for the resources they used only or what is assigned to them 
depending on the agreements. 
 
Furthermore, location independent resource pooling is another characteristic of cloud 
computing. This characteristic is to the effect that computing resources of the cloud 
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service provider are pooled to serve various clients via multi-tenant model.140 Through 
this model, various physical as well as virtual resources are dynamically allocated and 
reallocated depending on the clients’ needs or demand.141 Notably, location is said to 
be independent on the sense that the customer has no knowledge or control on the 
exact site of the provided resources or facilities.142 However, with the use of the higher 
level of abstraction the customer may specify the location such as the state, country, 
or data centre where the resources are located.143 It is worth highlighting that, that the 
resources that are referred here include memory, storage, and network bandwidth and 
processing.144This implies that cloud clients share a pool of computing resources with 
other customers on pay per use basis.145 
 
In addition to the above, rapid elasticity is also the characteristics of cloud computing.  
It is the ability to offer scalable services, which allows automatic quick scaling up or 
down the resources according to the demand.146This implies the ability to adapt to 
changes of the workload through provisioning and de-provisioning computing 
resources in an automatic manner to the extent that the available resources match with 
the demand on that particular time.147 This allows quick scaling up or down of 
resources automatically according to the demand.148Moreover, through rapid elasticity 
cloud computing facilitates computing resources as well as client accounts to be 
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elastically and rapidly provisioned so as to enable the user to scale their services up or 
down according to their demand.149 
 
2.6 Benefits of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing as a new medium has been around for almost two decades. It has 
been accepted and adopted by organisations of all sizes and shapes as well as the 
academia.150 This is due to the fact that it is coupled with benefits such as cost 
efficiency, flexibility, almost unlimited storage, automatic software/hardware 
upgrade, scalability and agility. These are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Adoption and proper implementation of cloud computing has the benefit of cost 
efficiency to cloud users. According to Reza and his fellow authors, cloud computing 
is widely adopted on the ground that it helps in reducing cost.151By adopting cloud 
computing, companies and business organisations do not need to invest on hardware 
and software, as they receive in-house service from the cloud service provider.152 
Cloud customers rent the infrastructure and pay for what they use only. It is 
noteworthy that it is the service provider who manage, patch, and upgrade cloud 
services. In this regard, the cloud customer is relieved of the operation and 
maintenance cost and hence low operation cost. 
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Similarly, adoption of cloud computing enhances flexibility in business. With cloud 
computing, workers become more flexible in and out of the working stations as they 
can access work related files and other documents from anywhere, all the time and  
simultaneously.153 Moreover, they are able to access files from internet through web-
enabled devices such as smart phones, notebooks, laptops, and many more.154 Notably, 
the services offered by cloud computing increase business flexibility as they enable 
companies to handle business demand, as the files and the data stored virtually on the 
internet can be easily accessible and worked upon.155 
 
Correspondingly, cloud adoption is coupled with the advantage of automatic software 
as well as hardware upgrade. This is made possible by the cloud computing feature 
which allows frequent, safe software updates.156This guarantees the best software 
without disturbing the working schedule.157Moreover, the frequent updates do not 
need prolonged installation of software. This feature does not only lower the cost 
significantly but also increases profit and put the organisation in technological 
forefront.158 
 
Scalability is another key benefit of cloud computing adoption. With cloud computing, 
the cloud consumer is able to scale up or down the IT resources according to their 
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needs. It implies that the computing resources can be adjusted to adapt the changes in 
the work to be done. As a result, the existing resource becomes proportional to the 
demand at that point of time.159It is worth highlighting that scalability feature is 
automated with the adoption of cloud computing. Moreover, cloud computing is 
embedded with almost unlimited storage. This is due to the fact that adoption of cloud 
computing allows the cloud customer to store data in the cloud and hence worry not 
about running out of storage space or the cost of installing more storage space.160 
 
2.7 Cloud Delivery Models 
Cloud computing architecture is also categorised basing on service delivery models. 
Generally, there are different models such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Network 
as a Service (NaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 
Storage as a Service and Testing as a Service, to mention just a few. However, this 
study focuses on the delivery modes extracted from the NIST definition as discussed 
in part 2.2 above. It establishes three cloud delivery modes, i.e. Software as a Service 
(SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).161 These 
are discussed in the following paragraphs. SaaS is a cloud computing delivery model 
in which software and other applications as well as computational resources needed to 
run them are provided as a service over the internet on demand.162 The model enables 
the consumer to use the providers’ applications and software that are available in the 
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cloud according to his demand.163 Google App and Sales force are examples of SaaS 
providers.164 
 
In most cases, the consumer use software from different cloud service providers 
without dealing with deployment and maintenance of the software.165Cloud computing 
customers can access the SaaS  (hosted applications) such as Google doc and Gmail 
from a variety of devices including cell phones, laptops and iPads to mention just a 
few.166In a SaaS model, the service provider is the one who is responsible with 
assuring security, performance, and availability of the software and 
applications.167However, this model poses privacy and security challenges because the 
consumer has no control on how input data are processed in the cloud by the service 
provider.  
 
The PaaS is another cloud computing delivery model in which platform access is 
offered as a service.168The model delivers development platforms and environments 
for which development tools are hosted in the cloud and the same are accessed through 
the browser.169 With this model, customers may set up web applications and services 
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over the web in the absence of installation of any tools in their computers.170This 
implies that with the purchased access, the customers are enabled to develop and 
deploy their applications as well as software in the cloud without specialised system 
administration knowledge.171 
 
Rodero, et al., provide a simplified definition of PaaS, as a container platform as well 
as an execution setting where customers who are developers deploy and run their 
applications.172 It is also regarded as execution environment in which third parties who 
are developers employ and operate other complementary components, which enable 
the development, testing as well as management of other software components.173 The 
model enables customers to build software application employing tools provided by 
the Cloud Service Provider (CSP).174 Examples of services offered by the PaaS 
delivery model to its users include but not limited to tools for designing and 
development, hosting, support, storage, server software, operating system, scripting 
environment, architecture, and the overall infrastructure supporting application 
development.175 Under this model, customers or developers need not manage and 
control the basic infrastructure due to the fact that they are managed by the platform 
automatically.176 It is worth noting that those resources include but are not limited to 
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servers, storage, network and the operating system. Google application engine is one 
of the examples of the PaaS that is provided to end users.177 
 
Besides, IaaS is the third cloud delivery model, which is generally regarded as a 
bottom layer or the footing of cloud computing. It is a model in which the CSP supply 
a bundle of virtualised computer resources such as a service. These include storage 
capacity, servers, networking, memory processing power, and bandwidth in the 
cloud.178 The customers acquire the resources and employ it to run their operating 
system.179 Under this model, the customers outsource their data in lieu of purchasing 
and installing the computing resources required.180 The IaaS customers are the ones 
responsible for running and maintaining of the software applications as well as the 
operating systems, but they need not manage the basic cloud infrastructure.181Some 
popular examples of the IaaS include Drop box, Microsoft window server and Amazon 
EC2 web services.182 
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2.8 Cloud Deployment Models 
Correspondingly, in order to deliver cloud computing services, the CSP generally uses 
different deployment models. According to Kaur, there are four main deployment 
models in delivering cloud services.183These are private cloud, public cloud, 
community cloud and hybrid cloud. Generally, the main characteristic of cloud 
computing is that all these models are deployed through the internet via pay as you go 
policy. A brief description of the deployment models is given below. 
 
Private cloud is a deployment model of cloud computing which provides cloud 
services to a particular private organisation only, it may comprise a number of 
consumers.184It can be operated, supervised, and owned by the organisation itself, a 
third-party organisation or jointly run by them either on site or off-site.185 The main 
feature of this model is that it involves a well-defined and certain cloud environment 
in which only the designated client can operate.186Under this model, computing 
resources (the cloud)are accessible and used by a single organisation privately.187 This 
enhances reliability, performance, control as well as privacy and security. This is due 
to the fact that all the data are stored in the organisation’s private servers.188Yet, like 
other deployment models, it can be scaled up and down quickly depending on the 
resources available and the needs of the consumer.189 
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Moreover, public cloud is another deployment model of cloud computing. It entails 
provision of cloud infrastructure to the public users over the internet.190 Under this 
model, anyone with internet connection can access the resources in proportion to his 
demand.191 Similarly, it is a model in which the infrastructure is located offsite in 
providers’ premise and is fully owned by him is enabled to scale up it up and down 
easily.192It is the service provider who is responsible for managing and operating the 
resources.193 The model may be provided freely or as a pay as you go service.194 The 
model enhances economies of scale, because the customer does not need to set up any 
resources in advance. That is, they just utilise the resources from the public cloud by 
using network connection when the need arises.195 Examples of public clouds include 
Google App Engine, Amazon Elastic-Compute-Cloud, iCloud, and IBMs blue Cloud 
to mention just a few.196 
 
Community cloud is another type of deployment mode in which cloud infrastructure 
is provided solely for the use by a particular community of clients that have shared 
concerns.197Under this deployment model, various cloud models are joined together 
to meet particular requirements of the community of clients.198 The community 
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members, generally, have and share cloud requirements and concerns such as privacy, 
security, compliance considerations as well as performance.199 It may be administered, 
owned, and controlled by a third part or one or more organisations in the community 
and the infrastructure may exist off site or on site.200 This is a type of cloud is preferred 
by government organisations.201An example of community cloud is government cloud 
(G-cloud).202 
 
Lastly the hybrid cloud is a type of cloud in which two or more types of cloud 
infrastructure such as public and private are amalgamated. They are bound together 
by standardised or proprietary technology that allows data and application portability 
and manipulation. Data stored in the private cloud of travel agency by a program run 
in the public cloud is an example of hybrid cloud.203 
 
2.9 The Shortcomings of Cloud Computing 
Currently, the world is rejoicing on the advantages brought by cloud computing in 
business and cooperate world. However, these advantages are not pain free. Even 
though the cloud unleashes wealth of benefits to business and establishments such as 
economies of scale, scalability services, on demand network access and location 
independent resource pooling and many more, it also offers cyber criminals a 
conducive attacking environment. This is due to the fact that huge amount of data is 
stored in the same place and at the same time can be accessed on shared resources 
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using different devices and users. This implies that there are limitations in cloud 
computing.204These includes invasion of privacy, security challenges and service 
traffic hijacking to mention just a few. The limitations are discussed in detail in the 
following subsections. 
 
2.9.1 Invasion of Privacy and Security 
As it has been pointed earlier, cloud computing brings vast potentials to the 
governments, individuals as well as businesses. Nonetheless, it brings with it a 
pressing concern on invasion of privacy.205 According to Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP), privacy protection is one of the top ten challenges in the 
cloud environment.206 It is worth highlighting that cloud computing model does not 
necessarily violate privacy. Nevertheless, it is the transfer, the storage, and processing 
of personal data in the cloud that constitute risks to privacy. This is because users do 
not have control on how and when their personal data can be accessed, but the cloud 
service providers.207 
 
Consequently, they are able to infringe security and privacy rights of the data subjects 
by collecting, storing and/or processing personal information without knowledge, 
consent or authorisation of the data subject, and may arbitrarily censor any type of 
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communication.208 Moreover, in many cases, the data owner is not aware of where, 
how, and by whom the data are being processed. In some cases, they may be stored 
and processed in other countries.209 
 
Furthermore, invasion of privacy also entails situations in which sensitive, protected 
or confidential data stored in the cloud is viewed, used, stolen, copied, or transmitted 
by a person who is not authorised to do so.210 It also involves intentional or 
unintentional release of protected information, which includes personal health 
information, financial information, personal identifiable information and many others 
to untrusted environment.211A good example of this is the involvement of the 
Cambridge Analytical in the manipulation of general election in Nigeria in 2007 and 
2015; and in Kenya in 2013 and 2017.212Personal data of some citizen of these 
countries were collected from Facebook without their knowledge and used to 
influence voter’s behaviour.213 Therefore any manipulation of personal data in the 
cloud without knowledge and consent of the data subject is part and parcel of invasion 
of privacy and security. 
 
2.9.2 Security Challenges 
Security is another issue posed by the coming of cloud computing. While security has 
various meanings, in this study, it refers to confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
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prevention of unauthorised disclosure, amendment, deletion, and withholding of 
information.214 Cloud computing architecture poses security issues on data that is 
processed and stored in the cloud. As a matter of fact, sensitive data in the cloud, can 
be accessed anywhere in the globe by anyone.215 Cloud architecture also attracts 
malicious hackers as it makes it easy for attackers to hack the cloud system. It is 
actually for these reasons that the Government of the United States does not store 
classified data in public cloud.216 
 
An, A., Z., et al opine that data theft is a trending issue facing CSPs.217 In the same 
vein, Yousef and his fellow authors argue that security in the cloud is one of the main 
issues which has not received industry wide solution.218It has also spawned a plethora 
of research studies, discussions, speeches as well as policy enactments intending to 
establish legal and technological solutions to the problem.219 
 
2.9.3 Service Traffic Hijacking 
Service traffic hijacking is another vulnerability explicably caused by cloud adoption. 
It is a type of security breach whereby attackers hijack an organisation or individuals 
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cloud account by stealing safety credentials.220The stolen information is then used for 
doing malicious and unauthorised transactions such as implanting false information, 
data manipulation, redirecting cloud clients to other illegal sites as well as 
eavesdropping on different activities and other transactions.221 An example of this 
happened in 2010when the Amazon cloud was hacked.222 As a result, hackers accessed 
client’s information unlawfully and used it to victimize many of the Amazon cloud 
users. 
 
Moreover, the severity of this vulnerability is clearly shown in Cloud Security 
Alliance 2013 report in which service traffic hijacking was recognised as the third 
greatest security risk in cloud computing.223Service traffic hijacking can lead to data 
loss, leakage of personal information, falsification of data, unlawful erasure of data, 
exposure of data to unauthorised people, and many more data breaches. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
Currently, cloud computing is defined and discussed across ICT industry in different 
disciplines with differing contexts. To bring the point home, cloud computing refers 
to a variety of internet-based computing service. It is deployed in different models 
such as public, private, community, and hybrid models. More so, it is also delivered 
in different categories such as infrastructure as a service, platform as a service, and 
                                                          
220Allouche, g., How Safe is your Cloud Data from Service Traffic Hijacking? 2014. Accessed from 
https://www.socpub.com/articles/how-safe-is-your-cloud-data-from-service-traffic-hijacking-5653, 
on 10th July 2018. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
223Lord, N., A Definition of Cloud Account Hijacking. Digital Guardian, 2018. Accessed from 
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-is-cloud-account-hijacking, on 15th September 2018. 
 51 
software as a service to mention just a few. Likewise, its peculiar characteristics 
include on demand self-service, rapid elasticity, measured services, location 
independent resource pooling and broadband network access and so forth.  
 
Cloud computing is currently the most enticing technology partly due to benefits such 
as cost reduction, efficiency and scalability. However, it has also a number of 
disadvantages that raise concerns of the clients in adopting technology. Notably, cloud 
computing technology entails the use of remote servers and computing resources with 
huge storage capacity which deprive its users’ knowledge of where their information 
is kept, when and who accesses it. Lack of this knowledge deprive users the control of 
data and subject their data to manipulation and misuse. 
An example of this is clearly shown in the Cambridge analytical scandal previously 
discussed in 2.9.1. Additionally, some of the cloud deployment models such as the 
public cloud often experience some forms of malfunction and outrage, which affects 
the security of data stored in the cloud. For instance, the disruption of the Sales force 
CRM in 2016 caused storage collapse for more than ten hours. The concern of the 
present study is the lack of industry-wide solution for these issues and inapplicability 





CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
3.1 Introduction 
The concepts of privacy and security have been part and parcel of human history for 
so many years. As a result, their origins are buried in antiquity.224Privacy is an illusory 
term.225 It is a sweeping concept that encompasses, among other things, seclusion over 
one’s home, pre-eminence over one’s body, one’s command over the information 
about himself/herself, freedom of thought, dispensation from surveillance, protection 
from searches and interrogation as well as of one’s reputation.226 Due to its nature, it 
has attracted different theories, which vary in scope over the years.  
 
Of significance to note is that privacy protection cannot be separated from 
technological development. The rise of computer and development of ICT 
technologies, for example, have fuelled the concerns in the post-modern society. This 
chapter presents the concepts and theories of privacy and security, its development 
and the current position. At this juncture, it is worth highlighting that security concept 
entails plentiful meanings. It is said to be a combination of features of availability, 
integrity, confidentiality, which implies the deterrence of the unlawful disclosure of 
information, averting the unauthorised withholding of information, and last but not 
least, prevention of amendment or deletion of information.227 Putting it differently, 
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security requires that only the authorised actions are taken against the information.228It 
is noteworthy that security is discussed here as one of the data protection principles, 
which advocates for reasonable safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorised 
access or use, destruction, modification, or disclosure.229The rationale is to show the 
importance of privacy and security in the development of human beings and how it is 
an issue in cloud computing era. 
 
3.2 Conceptualising Privacy and Security 
Privacy and security have slowly and simultaneously developed. It has extensive 
historical roots in sociological and anthropological debates about how broadly it is 
appreciated and well-kept-up in various cultures.230 However, the historical use of the 
concepts has not been uniform, which brings about misperception about its meaning, 
scope, and value. Indeed, what is regarded as privacy differs from one society to 
another; depending on the development level of the society in question, era as well as 
individuals.231 
 
Although, privacy is connected and applied to various social conditions, it has no 
generally accepted definition of privacy, and it is generally perceived as an imprecise 
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concept.232 Moore contends that it is very difficult to define the concept of privacy 
because protocols of association as well as disassociation are guided by culture and 
are specifically relative.233He exemplifies his point by giving an example that opening 
a door without knocking may be accepted in one culture but considered a grave 
violation of privacy in another.234 
 
In addition, Westin advocates that it is impossible to have a concrete definition of 
privacy due to the fact that privacy issues are mainly issues of values, power as well 
as of interest.235Westins’ concept is supported by Liver, who is of the view that it is 
difficult to define the notion of privacy, as it is difficult to define other allied services 
such as equality and liberty.236 According to her reasoning, privacy is imitative of 
other concepts such as liberty and equality.237The above concepts are in line with 
Gutwirth’s observation that it is difficult to give a precise definition of privacy concept 
due to the fact that it is not a perceptible item that can be simply enclosed into a definite 
definition.238 Wacks cement the above school of thought by arguing that the long quest 
of privacy meaning has produced an on-going discussion that is often sterile and 
eventually fruitless.239 
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Although privacy concept is difficult to define precisely, some common understanding 
of privacy still exists.  For instance, Warren and Brandeis define privacy as the right 
to be let alone.240On the other hand, Westin defines privacy as the individual’s, 
group’s, or institutions’ right to control and manage information about them, as well 
as the right to decide and control when, to what extent and how information about 
them is communicated to others.241 Zureik, et al. extended Westin’s privacy concept 
by providing six elements of privacy: i.e. the right to be left alone, secrecy, 
personhood, intimacy, limited access to self and control of personal information.242In 
contrast, Gavison is of the view that privacy is a limitation of others’ access to an 
individual.243Moreover, in extending Gavison’s view Moore defines privacy as a right 
to control access to and uses of, places, bodies, and private information.244 
 
Indeed, in the widest sense (mainly from the European point of view), privacy is 
regarded as a fundamental human right, protected in the United Nation Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and subsequently in the European Convention 
on Human Rights as well as different charters and national constitutions.245From early 
1970s, the main focus of privacy has been personal information. It was mainly 
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intended to protect individuals from government surveillance and probable 
compulsory disclosure of private information in records.  
 
In 1980s, privacy concerns were associated with telemarketing as well as direct 
marketing. Well along, attention was given to the growing threat of spamming as well 
as online identity theft.246Different forms of privacy have been identified. These 
include ‘the right to be left alone,’247, the ‘control of information about ourselves,’248 
‘the rights and obligations of individuals and organisations with respect to the 
gathering, usage, disclosure, and retaining of personal identifiable information’249 and 
the emphasis on the ills that arise from privacy abuses.250From the above discussion, 
it is an obvious knowledge that privacy is someone’s right to be free from meddling 
or interference from others. It is of significance to highlight that from the above-
mentioned forms of privacy, the gist of this work is informational privacy and security 
in the cloud. Notably the definition that guides this study is Westin’s definition of 
privacy as the right of an individual, group, or institutions to control and manage their 
personal information, and the right to control and decide who, when, how and to what 
extent information about them is shared to others.251 
 
Moreover, Pearson defines security as the protection of confidentiality, veracity, and 
accessibility of information.252It is in the same line that Avizienis defines it as the 
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combination confidentiality, integrity, availability, deterrence of unauthorised 
deletion or amendment of information, preclusion of unlawful disclosure of 
information and prevention of unsanctioned withholding of information.253 Security is 
established as one of the essential principles of privacy. It is a principle of privacy 
which advocates for the measures to protect against unauthorised access or disclosure, 
destruction, modification and unauthorised use of information.254 
 
Privacy concept is sometimes used interchangeably with the concept of security. In 
Europe, the term privacy is used in relation to data protection laws and regulations. In 
USA security is used instead of privacy when referring to data privacy laws.255The 
above explanation shows that privacy and security are two sides of the same coin. 
Nevertheless, there are some distinct differences as well as similarities of the two 
concepts. Indeed, both terms have a common intention of protecting sensitive data. 
However, privacy differs from security on the fact that it relates to handling 
mechanisms for personal information. It deals with individuals’ right as well as aspects 
such as notice, accountability, security, access, choice and fairness of use of personal 
information.  
 
On the other hand, security is a sub-set of a comprehensive privacy concept. Its main 
thrust is information privacy as contrary to other forms of privacy such as territorial, 
matrimonial or bodily privacy. It intends to provide safeguards against security threats 
such as unauthorised access or use, modification or disclosure and loss of information. 
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The above overview shows that the terms, privacy and security sometimes overlap 
with each other but they are not the same. For the purpose of this research, privacy 
concept is used in a broad sense, which includes a range of informational interests in 
the cloud. Furthermore, security is used as one among the principles or elements of 
privacy, which advocates for the protection of information in the cloud against loss, 
unauthorised access and use, destruction, modification and disclosure. 
 
3.3 Origin of Privacy and Development 
Privacy right was mostly accepted as the right in 19th and 20th centuries. Nevertheless, 
it existed long before the time of its acceptance.256 It is as old as man himself is. It has 
developed sluggishly throughout the history. Its origin can be traced back to the 
ancient societies. However, what was considered private and what was accorded legal 
protection differed.257 From the legal perspective, the code of Hammurabi258 is the 
first code to protect privacy.259 It contained paragraphs that protected the home against 
intrusions and the ancient Roman law protected the same.260 The ancient Hebrew used 
to have laws that were protecting against surveillance. In England, the off-declared 
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principles that declared the home as one’s castle was made in the 15th century.261 In 
English common law, eavesdropping was protected since 1769. English legal scholar 
defined it as listening “under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken 
after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales.”262 
 
The concept of privacy originated from the difference between private and public.263 
The distinction of these words arises from the natural need of a human being to 
differentiate himself or herself from all others (Which is as explained above is as old 
as the man himself).264 Nonetheless, the perimeter of what is private and what is public 
differs according to the type of society and time of its existence.265 Historical records 
show that members had limited prospects for self-determination as their private lives 
were controlled and influenced by the state in the ancient societies. Accordingly, Plato, 
in his writings of the laws dialogue, theorises that the life of the people was 
indomitable by the state and its aims.266 This implies that there was no room for 
individual freedom and autonomy, and everything was done for the sake of public 
interest. This shows that in ancient societies, the concept of privacy did not exist in 
contrary to the today’s society.267 
 
Correspondingly, in the medieval era, privacy was considered a person’s right as it is 
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the case today. Individuals existed as part and parcel of the community and their 
private life was largely controlled and monitored by other members of the society.268 
This is evidence that there was lack of individual privacy. However, at the dawn of 
19th century, changes in economy transformed the way people lived. Development of 
economy led to the growth of cities and hence urban life. Urbanisation led to the 
growth of population in cities and as people were over crowded in cities, they lost 
privacy as they lived in crowded places. Furthermore, they lost privacy as they were 
no longer living under close control and watching eye from other members of the 
community or under the constant moral control set up by them.269 It is underscored 
that transformation of the society and the growth of cities provided a fertile ground for 
the birth of privacy right. 
 
Similarly, the emergency and evolution of (tabloid) newspapers which were a 
productive ground for gossip and photojournalism facilitated the emergency of 
privacy right.270 The consequences of these changes led to the budding of privacy right 
too.271It was Warren and Brandeis who firstly propounded for the privacy threats 
caused by society as well as technological development in their famous article titled 
“the right to privacy” published in 1890.272 In their study, they argued that as the 
society changes economically, politically, and socially, the law has to evolve in the 
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same pace to create new rights and hence meet the needs of the society.273 They were 
the first to petition the recognition of the right to privacy, which they defined as the 
right to be left alone.274 However, it was until the second half of the 20th century when 
privacy right was accepted and acknowledged in international legal documents.275 It 
was accepted as human right and it started appearing in different international and 
national legislation of the nation’s adopting those documents.276 
 
3.4 Legal and Classical Theories of Privacy and Security 
Privacy is a complex concept with no standard or universally agreed definition.277 It 
was accepted as a concept worthy of protection at the end of the 19th century. Its 
acceptance followed the article titled the Right to Privacy published by Warren and 
Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review at the end of 19th century.278 Afterwards, due to 
extensive applicability and intricate nature of privacy, it was theoretically examined 
in several different manners by different disciplines.279 This led to the emergence of 
many theories of privacy from different disciplines such as law, political science, 
philosophy, medicine, information science, engineering and ethics, to mention just a 
few.280 For instance, psychology examines privacy as a mental mechanism that intends 
to shield and control information.281 Political science approaches privacy as a public 
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problem demanding public policy resolution.282 Philosophy attempts to integrate 
privacy recondite fundamentals.283 Furthermore, there have been numerous critical 
arguments on the concept of privacy or its worth from feminist perceptions and also 
from philosophical perspectives.284 
 
Notwithstanding the presence of many theories, there is a consensus among the 
advocates of those disciplines that privacy is a concept that is difficult to define, and 
hence there is no universally accepted definition. Post provides that privacy is a value 
so multifaceted, so entwined in competing and conflicting, so engorged with numerous 
and diverse meanings, to the extent that it is difficult to ascertain if it can be clearly 
addressed at all.285In many scholarly writings, this difficulty has been expressed in 
different ways. It is Professor Daniel Solove who provided a very comprehensive 
summary of the views emphasised by some dominant researchers in the following 
paragraph: - 
“Time and again philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have lamented the 
great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy. Arthur Miller has 
declared that privacy is difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague and 
evanescent. According to Julie Inness, the legal and philosophical discourse of 
privacy is in a state of chaos. Alan Westin has stated that few values so 
fundamental to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory … 
William Beaney has noted that even the most strenuous advocate of a right to 
privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and 
scope of this right. Privacy has a protean capacity to be all things to all lawyers, 
Tom Gerety has observed. According to Robert Post, privacy is a value so 
complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged 
with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be 
usefully addressed at all. Several theorists have surveyed the interests that the 
law protects under the rubric of privacy and have concluded that they are distinct 
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and unrelated. Judith Thompson has even argued that privacy as a concept serves 




Furthermore, there are a number of reasons that can be attributed to the difficulties of 
defining privacy. For example, Gutwirth argues that it is not easy to define privacy 
because of its abstraction.287He is of a view that privacy has several meanings which 
occur in context; hence, it is a contextual and relative concept.288 Liver postulates that 
it is not easy to define privacy concept on the fact that there is difficulty of defining 
associated values such as equality and liberty.289 She is of the view that the difficulties 
of defining privacy arise due to the fact that there are no reasonable conditions that 
can facilitate the identification of privacy and help in distinguishing it from similar 
concepts such as equality and liberty.290 Her arguments provide implication that 
privacy is a by-product of equality and liberty concepts.291 
 
In addition, other reasons or factors that posed a difficulty in defining privacy precisely 
include but not limited to difference of disciplines from which the scholars belong. In 
addition, different aspects of privacy due to development of technology and the 
numerous meanings of privacy and the inherent elusiveness and its contextuality have 
complicated the task of defining privacy. Last but not least, the acceptance of privacy 
as a right from different cultures due to development of socio-economic and political 
factors is another aspect that brings difficulties in defining privacy. These changes 
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bring about difficulty in defining privacy on the fact that formerly privacy was defined 
basing on western culture. With new developments, cultures such as those in sub-
Saharan Africa, Islamic states, and China have accepted and defined privacy in the 
context of their history as well as political and socio-economic development.292 
 
Despite the absence of a universally agreed definition of privacy, several theories 
share standards or general features of privacy. Analysts analyse them in different 
common groups, to enable their understanding as well as upholding a clear focus. For 
resistance, Moor groups these theories into three groups which are Accessibility 
Privacy, Decisional Privacy and Informational Privacy.293In contrast, Bygrave 
classifies the theories into four groups: Non-Interference, Limited Accessibility, 
Information Control as well as Intimacy.294 The two sets of classification are different 
in number but some of the contents presented therein overlaps. For example, Moors’ 
information privacy can be equated with Bygrave’s information control. Similarly, 
Moors’ decisional privacy is in the same line with Bygrave’s Non-interference Theory. 
However, it is not easy to fit Bygrave’s Intimacy Theory in Moors’ classification.  
 
Comparable to Moor and Bygrave, Davis classifies privacy into four theories, like 
Bygrave, but he uses different designation. These are limited Access, Control, 
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Possession of Information and Leaving Alone.295Nevertheless, this classification, to 
some extent, overlaps with the classification given by Moor and Bygrave. Yet, Davis’ 
classification differs from Moors and Bygrave’s on the fact that he includes Possession 
of Information Theory whereas the latter do not. Additionally, Tavani categorises 
privacy theories into four groups, as did Bygrave and Davis. Nonetheless, he uses 
different terminologies such as Non-intrusion, Control, Limitation and Seclusion.296 It 
is important to note that though Bygrave, Davis and Tavani’s classifications are alike 
in numbers, they differ in contents. For instance, Bygrave includes intimacy in his 
classification whereas, Davis and Tavani exclude it. Davis’ classifications encompass 
possession of information while Bygrave and Tavani eliminate it. Similarly, it is 
difficult to fit in Tavani’s Seclusion Theory in Bygrave and Davis’ classifications. 
 
Conversely, Whitley organises privacy theories into three categories. These include 
privacy as Control over Personal Information, Privacy from Judgement or Scrutiny by 
others, and Privacy as no Access to the Person Ream.297The first and the third of 
Whitley’s classification fit in the other classifications mentioned above. However, the 
second classification falls out of the ambits expounded by other scholars.298 In 
contrast, Solove classifies privacy theories into six groups. These are Control over 
Personal Information, Limited Access to Self, Personal Hood, Secrecy, Intimacy and 
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the Right to be Let Alone.299However, the above theories as propounded by Solove, 
seem to override with each other. This is clearly portrayed by Person Hood and 
Secrecy Theories, which overlaps with the Limited Access to Self and the Right to be 
Left Alone Theories. The overriding reduces Solove’s categorisation of privacy 
theories into four groups similar to other researchers such as Tavani, Bygrave and 
Davis.  
 
Similarly, Tavani gives another version of privacy classification with six categories:  
Restricted Access, Control, Ontological, Categorical, Contextual Integrity and 
Integrated Theories.300Some classes he propound overlaps with other classes provided 
by others including himself. Moreover, he introduces new theories in the study of 
privacy, such as Ontological, Categorical, Contextual Integrity and Integrated 
Theories that are not mentioned by others. It is important to note that though Tavani’s 
new classification is the same in number as Solove’s classification, they differ in 
contents. It is not possible to fit in Tavani’s Ontological Theory, Categorical as well 
as Contextual Integrity in Solove’s Theory.  
 
In contrast, Allmer proposes three theories of privacy.301 These are Structuralist 
(Restricted Access), Individualistic (Control) as well as Integrative Theories. Allmer’s 
classification, largely, fits in Tavani’s classification. However, Tavani’s Ontological 
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Theory as well as Categorical Theory and Contextual Integrity are not part of Allmer’s 
classifications. It is in the same line that Fuchs provides three theories of privacy. 
These are Restricted Access, Control and Integrative Theories.302 His classification 
differs from Allmer’s in nomenclature, but they have the same contents. However, 
Fuchs’ classification differs from Tavani not only in contents, but also in number. 
 
As pointed above, the classifications of privacy theories encompass some shared 
features, regardless of the differences shown. Generally, the theories can be classified 
into six main categories which are Non-interference, Information Control, Restricted 
Access, Intimacy, Reductionism and Pragmatism Theories. However, none of them 
should be regarded as more acceptable or superior than others. This is because all of 
them are coupled with some limitations. These are discussed in the following part. 
 
3.4.1 Non-interference Theory 
The Non-interference Theory is a privacy theory that is also known as Seclusion or 
Non-Intrusion Theory. It has its origin in the article entitled “The Right to Privacy”. It 
was published by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 in Harvard Law Review. In this article, 
Non-interference Theory was coined as the “Right to be Let Alone”.303 It is against 
this background that scholars like Solove basically classify this theory as the Right to 
be Let Alone.304 Nevertheless, referring to Non-interference Theory of privacy to the 
right to be alone is too narrow. It excludes other elements or forms of the Non-
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interference Theory which do not precisely denote the Right to be Let Alone. 
However, for the purpose of this work reference to the Non-interference Theory 
simply means the Right to be let Alone.  
 
The central idea of the Non-interference Theory of privacy is that a person is 
considered to enjoy privacy right only if she/he is not interfered with any other person 
in any way. This implies that an individual is regarded to have privacy or enjoy privacy 
when there is no one trying to interfere, involve or gain access to him or her. However, 
according to Moor, Non-interference Theory that is equated to the Right to be Let 
Alone is too narrow and broad hence does not afford not only a definition but also a 
comprehensible conception of privacy.305 It is noteworthy to highlight that this theory 
of privacy comprises some elements of other theories of privacy such as personhood, 
control over personal information and access to self.306 
 
Different scholars give some criticism to the Non-interference Theory as well as the 
Right to be Let Alone. For instance, Allen contends that if privacy is regarded as the 
Right to be Let Alone, any form of aggressive or injurious demeanour directed to 
another individual could be considered as an abuse of the right to privacy.307 She 
argues that if that were the case, then a blow in the nose would be an abuse to personal 
privacy as good as peeking in the bedroom.308 Solove attacks the Non-interference 
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Theory on the ground that it is too wide and vague conception of privacy.309 Tavani 
criticises the Non-interference Theory on the fact that the theory tends to mix the 
elements or contents of privacy and the right to privacy and hence confusing.310 He 
also contends that if privacy simply means the right to be let alone or free from 
intrusion, then the theory is confusing privacy and liberty. 
 
It is in the same line that Moor criticises the Non-interference Theory on the fact that 
the right to be let alone is too narrow and too wide at the same time.311 To support his 
arguments, he gives an example that if ‘A’ approaches ‘B’ on a public road and asks 
him what time it is, ‘A’ has not left ‘B’ alone but neither has ‘A’ invaded ‘B’s privacy. 
Likewise, if without B’s consent A goes through B’s personal files, then A has invaded 
B’s privacy, but according to this theory A has let B alone. So, it is uncertain on what 
does the theory intends to protect.312 Heeney and Weigand provide that the main 
assumption of Non-interference Theory is that people build their lives in isolation or 
individually and hence any intrusion from others are a curtailment of the best.313 
 
Moreover, they argue that the Non-interference Theory fails to differentiate ordinary 
human dealings from intrusive ones.314 However, this appears to be too facile as 
individuals engage freely in interactions and generally, they demand attention from 
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others for a pleasing life.315 Nevertheless, in reality the Non-interference Theory of 
Privacy or the Right to be Let Alone mislead scholars to think that any kind of 
information about an individual is a privacy concern. However, if that could be the 
case, no any type of information about an individual could be collected at all in real 
life situation.316 It suffices to say that this is a very important theory in development 
of privacy in spite of the drawbacks highlighted above. Though it was promulgated 
ahead of time by Warren and Brandeis in seminal article, it contained some flares of 
intuition into a stronger theory of privacy.317 Moreover, the first propounders of the 
Right to be Let Alone intended to discover the origins of the right to privacy in the 
common law, not to offer a complete conception of privacy.318 
 
3.4.2 Information Control Theory 
This is one of the most predominant privacy theories, in which privacy is defined in 
relation with the control of information.319 It was originally proposed by Allan Westin 
in his book entitled Privacy and Freedom. He gave a classical definition of privacy as 
summarised in the following paragraph:  
“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others”. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual 
to social participation privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdraw of 
a person from the general society through physical or psychological means, 
either in a state of solitude or small group intimacy or when among a large 
group in a condition of anonymity or reserve.320 
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His definition is accepted by many scholars as providing a clear picture of the 
Information Control Theory. The theory advocates that if a person has control over his 
personal information, he/she is having privacy.321 Moreover, it is the theory that is 
developed upon two assumptions. The first assumption is that a person has power over 
his/her personal information either directly or indirectly, against data processors as 
well as data controllers. Secondly, a person has ability to influence the processing of 
his/her personal information by data controllers and processors directly or 
indirectly.322 Here, the term influence and power are basically the same, as the use or 
exercise of power inevitably encompasses elements of influence.323 
 
It is noteworthy that Information Control Theory entails some elements of restricted 
access.324 This is supported by the fact that it limits control to the preliminary 
disclosure of personal information, which shows that the control over personal 
information originates from the Restricted Access Theory.325The theory has also 
established itself with regards to concealment. The Concealment Theory was put 
forward by Posner who advocates that someone is enjoying privacy if he can withhold 
or conceal information about himself.326 Furthermore, Information Control Theory 
encompasses some aspects of ownership rights beyond someone’s personal 
information. For example, Parent embraces this right when he defines privacy as the 
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situation of an individual lack of documented private information about himself or 
herself known by other people.327  
 
The Information Control Theory also perceives privacy as control and self-
determination over personal information as well as access to individual’s personal 
affairs.328 It focuses mainly on personal self-determination than on privacy. The 
Information Control Theory also embodies some aspects of the Limited Access 
Theory. Solove appeals for this concept when he provides that control over 
information can be viewed as a subset of the limited access conception.329 
 
Westin defines privacy in relation to individuals as well as groups and institutions. 
This implies that he had in mind those societies in which groups are central than 
individuals. Numerous other theorists have supported the Control Theory of Privacy 
and defined privacy in relation to control of information. It is in the same line that 
Fried argues that privacy is not merely an absence of information about an individual 
in the minds of others. Some what it is the control that an individual has upon the 
information about himself or herself.330 Miller endorses the Control Theory when he 
posits that privacy is the person’s ability to control the circulation of information about 
him or her.331 Beardsley embraces the Control Theory when she describes that privacy 
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is an individual’s right to decide when and how much information about him or her 
can be communicated to other people.332 Schoeman appeals for a version of the 
Control Theory when he defines privacy as a measure of control over information and 
intimacies or access.333 
 
Although the Control of Information Theory is undoubtedly an element of privacy, it 
has been criticised by many theorists and a number of objections against it has been 
raised. Firstly, they argue that the theory underscoring control is wrongly developed 
and insufficient when it provides that a person loses privacy when he or she has no 
control over his own private information. For example, Moor states that the definitions 
that stress control are inadequate because, in some situations, someone may have no 
control over the transmission of his or her personal information without loss of 
privacy.334 Contrarily, the critics suggest that sometimes there can be a loss of privacy 
without a loss of control and vice versa.335Additionally, the proponents of the 
Information Control Theory are criticised because they did not define clearly the types 
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of information that individuals are expected to have control; and the extent of control 
individuals can expect to have over someone’s information.336 Schoeman provides a 
good example here: 
“One difficulty with regarding privacy as a claim or entitlement to determine 
what information about oneself is to be available to others is that it begs the 
question about the moral status of privacy. It presumes privacy is something to 




From the above observation, it is clearly depicted that according to the Control Theory, 
individuals can control and protect any information they regard as private and want to 
control. However, privacy is not merely an issue of individual prerogative, rather, it is 
dependent on what the society accepts as private and deems apposite to protect.338It is 
in the same line that Whitley while discussing about the challenges of personal control 
over personal information in an online environment, under the Information Control 
Theory observes :  
“Control is seen as something that occurs at the start of a disclosure process 
and privacy control is seen solely in terms of limiting what personal data is 
made available to others. In practice however, this is a rather partial view of 
how personal data is disclosed and shared by others. It is increasingly common 
for individuals to register with various online services and disclose data about 
themselves (name, email address, age etc.) This data is then stored in 
enterprises databases for significant periods of time and may be shared with 
other parts of the enterprise or selected third party organizations. Whilst in 
earlier times control over personal data may have been best undertaken by 
preventing data from being disclosed, in an internet enabled society it is 
increasingly important to understand how disclosed data is being used and 
reused and what can be done to control this further use and reuse”.339 
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Hitherto, the above criticism has been contradicted by Shoemaker, who emphasises 
that the criticism given to the Control Theory seems to be unfair given that the 
proponents of the Control Theory could provide the extent and ambit of privacy.340 
According to him, it is impossible for the proponents of the Control Theory to provide 
the extent to which ones’ privacy ranges as well as its exact domain of unknown 
information, and conclude that someone has privacy only when if he can control access 
to that exact domain of unknown information.341 Consequently, if there is no unknown 
information about an individual that is left for him to control, an individual has no 
privacy either.342 Yet, the problem of ambiguity still lingers over the Information 
Control Theory, as there is the need to address precisely what amounts to appropriate 
zone of information to be controlled and the degree of control needed.343 
 
Secondly, Information Control Theory, particularly Westin’s version has received 
criticism for being too narrow. Privacy definition given by Westin stresses that there 
is a loss of someone’s privacy only when something about him has been 
communicated.344 However, not all losses of privacy entail communication.345A good 
example of a situation in which there can be loss of privacy without communication 
of information is given by Davis. He assumes to be naked in his room and Tom peeps 
through the window.346 In this scenario, there is the loss of privacy though nothing is 
communicated because the peeping; Tom knows how Davis looks like when he is 
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naked.347 Similarly, DeCew contends that privacy can be invaded even when no one 
knows something about one’s person, like in situations such as being forced to hear 
propaganda, being manipulated by subconscious announcements, or being disturbed 
by an annoyance that frustrates one’s capacity to think or read.348 
 
Thirdly, the critics of Informational Control Theory criticises that property rights 
cannot be part and parcel of this theory. For example, Solove observes; 
“Information can be easily transmitted, and once known by others, cannot be 
eradicated from their minds. Unlike physical objects, information can be 
possessed simultaneously within the minds of millions. This is why intellectual 
property law protects particular tangible expressions of ideas rather than the 
underlying ideas themselves. The complexity of personal information is that it 
is both an expression of the self as well as a set of facts, a historical record of 
one’s behaviour. Further, there are problems with viewing personal 
information as equivalent to any other commodity. Personal information is 
often formed in relationships with others, with all parties to that relationship 
having some claim to that information”.  
 
 
In other words, property right notions pose a noteworthy challenge when it is extended 
as part of informational privacy. The challenges extend from the concepts to the 
principles of owning corporeal properties. Similarly, Moore stresses that if 
Informational Control Theory entails property rights as well as privacy rights. Then 
privacy rights may amount to a special form of property right.349 
 
Despite the criticism given to the Informational Control Theory, is viewed as an 
important theory that is directly applicable to privacy issues raised in data processing 
practices in organisations.350 It also builds upon and harmonises well with most of the 
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elementary rules of data protection law; especially rules that allow individuals to 
participate in as well as influencing the processing of their personal data.351 
Additionally, Information Control Theory gives privacy concept considerable 
standard force, for allowing privacy advocates to tap in its idea of self-
determination.352 
 
3.4.3 Restricted Access Theory 
Restricted Access Theory is a privacy theory that is also known as Limited Access 
Theory. It is a theory that presupposes that a person has privacy only when there is 
limited or restricted access over information about him or her in a particular context.353 
There are different theorists with different variants of this theory, who advocate 
privacy there must be restriction or limitation of access to person or information about 
the person in some contexts for the sake of privacy. Gavison’s variant defines privacy 
as a limitation or restriction of other’s access to a person.354According to her, the 
limitation required for privacy entails three elements that have to work together: 
anonymity, secrecy, and solitude.355 
 
Similarly, Moor defines privacy as a restricted access to an individual or information 
about that person.356 He stresses that someone has privacy in a situation if in that 
situation; information about that person is protected from observation, intrusion as 
well as surveillance by others.357In this context, the term situation is defined to mean 
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an activity in a location, for instance dwelling in one’s home. It can also mean 
relationships like doctor/patient and computer database in which information about 
individuals is stored.358 Moreover, Shoemaker defines privacy in terms of limitation 
or restricted access of someone’s information in a certain domain.359 He sees that the 
domain of information in which others are having no or limited access to be one’s 
privacy zone.360 
 
However, several objections have been raised against the Restricted Access Theory.  
First, the definition is said to be vague and too broad, regarding the attention given to 
an individual, any information gained about an individual or any physical access to an 
individual. This is because if that could be the case then any interference to privacy 
deprive privacy most of its inherent meaning.361Furthermore, its vagueness and 
broadness is seen on the fact that it does not show what matters are private and what 
kind of degree of access is accepted as reasonable and which ones amounts to privacy 
violation.362 Secondly, Restricted Access Theory underrates the part played by control 
and choice in privacy. This is to say, it does not consider that in enjoying privacy, one 
can decide to provide access to one self’s information and restrict or deny others that 
access.363 Thirdly, it confuses privacy and secrecy, by stressing that an individual has 
privacy only if access of information about him/her is restricted or limited.364 
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Nevertheless, Restricted Access Theory has credit for recognizing the importance of 
having situations, zones or contexts of privacy to restrict or limit outsiders from 
accessing someone’s information.365 It also gives technology proper credits for 
enhancing online privacy and the ethical challenges for protecting privacy.366 It also 
has some elements of Information Control Theory as well as being compatible with 
non-interference Theory.367 The theory also distinguishes privacy from solitude, 
autonomy as well as liberty.368 
 
3.4.4 Intimacy Theory 
Intimacy Theory of Privacy defines privacy as a form of intimacy.369 This is a 
progressively popular theory, which identifies that privacy is essential for one’s self-
creation as well as personal relationships.370 It advocates that privacy is mainly 
concerned with the sphere of our personal lives that are intimate or sensitive.371 It also 
supports that access to some personal information, which is sensitive or intimate, 
should be restricted.372 Accordingly, when one’s information, which is sensitive or 
intimate, is divulged, there is a violation of privacy.373 There are different variants of 
this theory, yet the most influential one is Inness’. She defines privacy as:  
“the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, which 
includes decisions about intimate access, intimate information, and intimate 
actions. “,……. an action as intimate if it “draws its meaning and value for 
the agent from her love, liking, or care” for another person”.374 
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The above definition is commendable mainly because it has extended the scope of 
privacy beyond information and accommodates actions as well.375 Moreover, it is in 
the same vein that Gerstein posits that intimacy cannot exist without privacy.376 
Similarly, Fried provides that intimacy is the disclosure of information about personal 
beliefs, actions or emotions, which an individual does not share with everyone, and 
has the right not to share.377 However, his assertion is objected because it defines 
intimate information as information, which one can choose to reveal to some people, 
without showing the existing relationship that makes it to be intimate.378 For instance, 
an individual may share some information with a priest or lawyer, that he/she may not 
share with a friend or lover. However, this does not imply that that she/he has intimate 
relationship with the priest or lawyer.379Nonetheless, some criticisms have been 
generally raised against Intimacy Theory.  
 
First, regardless of the fact that privacy facilitates the development of trust feelings, 
caring, love and friendship, they do not paint a complete picture of what is generally 
accorded protection by privacy.380 DeCew is therefore, on point, when she states that 
our financial information is private but not intimate.381Secondly, objections are raised 
on the ground that not all intimate or private matters are characterized by friendship, 
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love, trust, and caring. Farber addresses this point when he writes that sexual affairs 
may exist devoid of caring, liking or love and acts like buying gifts and giving presents 
are not regarded as intimate but they express friendship, caring, love as well as 
liking.382Thirdly, privacy as intimacy theories is objected on the fact that it fails to 
acknowledge that the value of privacy is not solely on the growth of intimate 
relationships. Weinstein observes; 
“There is a wide range of instances where to speak of something as 
private is not to imply intimacy. Individuals not intimately related may 
nevertheless assert that their relation or activity is a private one in the 
sense that it is not the proper concern of the community or some 




The fourth criticism showered to Intimacy Theory is that in some situations intimacy 
instead of being facilitated by privacy it may suffocate it.384 An example of this can 
be seen in small scale societies in which levels of privacy are low while intimacy levels 
are high.385 From the above discussion it is clearly depicted that privacy as propounded 
by Intimacy Theorist, is applicable to modern societies, which are individualistic and 
found mainly in urban areas.386Furthermore, on the other hand, privacy-as-intimacy is 
regarded too broad, as it does not satisfactorily define the scope of intimacy on the 
other hand, the theory is viewed too narrow because it excludes other issues that do 
not encompass loving and caring relationships.387 
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3.4.5 Reductionism Theory 
This is a theory that developed as a critic of privacy concept.388 It is a theory which 
holds that it is not necessary to have a distinct legal right to privacy.389 In the legal 
field reductivism privacy theorists are of the view that claim of the right to privacy 
can be determined by using other branches of law.390 In other words, they stress that 
privacy is a right reducible to other concepts as well as rights, including but not limited 
to the right to life, liberty, and property.391 Consequently, it is a superfluous right, 
which cannot be isolated from its associated rights. The main theorist of this theory is 
William Prosser, who advances an argument that any privacy claim can be fixed into 
different tort claims.392 
 
Judith Thomson is another prominent advocate of this theory, who asserts that privacy 
right is not a right on its own, but the one that is overlapping with others, which include 
the right of being over looked and unlistened.393 She is trying to reduce or disregard 
privacy by examining it in terms of a multifarious legal rights as well as non-privacy 
morals.394The variant of privacy put forward by Thomson stresses that privacy right is 
a cluster of different rights and conceptions, which are not necessarily in common with 
all rights in the cluster. Hence, there is no need to settle disputes about its 
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limitations.395 However, her variant is objected on the fact that what belongs to a 
cluster is not clearly established. A different variant of this theory is propounded by 
David who advocates that if fundamental interests were properly protected, there will 
be no claim of the right to privacy.396 He is of the view that claims for the breach of 
privacy amounts to a fundamental wrong, and the individual’s claim to privacy right 
is derivative, because the state needs to protect the immediate rights. 
 
Some objections have been raised against the Reductionist Theory. Firstly, it is 
criticised on the ground that it is too broad on the fact that it includes the right not to 
be listened and looked at in privacy definition.397The second criticism raised is that it 
is too narrow in asserting that privacy is a derivative right. The argument is raised that 
even if it is a derivative right still, it may form a coherent cluster.398 So far, it is 
necessary to highlight that privacy right has some kinds of interconnection with other 
rights. That is, despite that many national constitutions in the world lack specific 
provisions for the protection of privacy, the supreme courts in different states are able 
to glean privacy rights from the provisions of other rights that are specifically provided 
for in the constitution. 
 
3.4.6 Pragmatism Theory 
Pragmatism Theory is a recent theory of defining privacy that is developed by Daniel. 
J. Solove. He did so after studying and realized the shortcomings of the then existing 
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theories of privacy. He later labelled them as traditional theories. His new divergent 
theory is known as a new theory of Privacy or Pragmatism Theory.399 He is of a view 
that traditional method of conceptualising privacy eventually comes up short due to 
the fact that they try to define common group of desirable and appropriate elements 
which differentiate privacy rights from other categories of rights.400 He suggests that 
using a common denominator as a means of conceptualising privacy is wrong.401 He 
stresses that privacy is a concept whose meaning cannot be narrowed down to any sole 
thing. This is due to the fact that it generally stands for a number of associated 
things.402 In lieu of the traditional theories, he introduces a new pluralistic approach, 
which views privacy as a term, which encompasses wide and various groups of 
associated things.403 
 
Pragmatism Theory is propounded by Solove. Borrowing from Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
he employs the concept of family resemblances.404 The concept focuses on the 
interrelated characteristic of a group of things.405It accepts that a group of things may 
not share a core defining characteristic, but may form a network of resemblance which 
sometimes overlaps and criss-crosses.406More so, the result of using the concept is the 
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establishment of a principle of a web of relations that will be used to trace and map 
instead of having principles such as a checklist of conditions that should be fulfilled.407 
 
In espousing this concept Solove proposes that it is important to classify certain things 
as including privacy when it is in resemblance with other things in the same 
category.408In the same line, he promotes a bottom up approach instead of top down 
approach.409More so, the approach he proposes conceptualises privacy founded in 
particular contexts which evolve all the times.410 To put it differently, the approach 
intends to explore privacy contextually. This is by studying particular practices, then 
assessing if something is private or not, instead of trying to fit every situation into a 
rigid predetermined category.411It is in the same vein that he advocates that in this 
approach privacy should be looked at in terms of practice.  
 
Additionally, the word practice in this situation denotes activities, traditions, norms 
and customs.412He contends that privacy violations can be studied as interruptions of 
specific practices such as intrusion on seclusion, meddling with peace of mind, 
violation of personal security, searches of one’s property or person to mention just a 
few.413 The importance of the family resemblance model is seen on the fact that the 
notion of a web of relations is flexible and does not call for stringent boundaries and 
at the same time does not allow infinite possibility.414 Besides, Solove stresses that in 
this approach, the privacy’s value should also be examined by relying on context 
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specific basis. This is contrary to using theories, which create an overarching value of 
privacy such as intimacy, secrecy, or protecting dignity.415 
 
Similarly, in his view, privacy value in a certain situation depends on the intention of 
the practices involved as well as the significance of those purposes.416 His approach 
stresses the importance of valuing privacy instrumentally so that it becomes a means 
of accomplishing other valuable ends.417Similarly, Solove observes that landscape of 
privacy changes regularly to accommodate change in the society, especially with the 
development of technology. He comments: 
“….the issue of how we conceptualize privacy is of paramount 
importance for the Information Age, for we are beset with a number of 
complex privacy problems, causing great disruption to numerous 
important practices of high social value.” 
 
 
However, some objections were showered to Solove’s Pragmatism Theory, which he 
named as a new theory of privacy. Firstly, his concept is objected for being too general 
such that it overlooks the fact that at some points it is upon the legislature to decide 
where among other rights privacy right fits in.418It is noteworthy that the assertion that 
privacy should be looked at contextually and through practice will enable the 
lawmakers to solve the problem. Nevertheless, that does not suffice to get the complete 
picture. They must rely on reasoning from the first principles or the abstract definition 
of privacy.419 Therefore, the attempt to conceptualise privacy while negating any other 
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theories of privacy rights inexorably, will lead to the vagueness that was hovering over 
this concept before.420This implies that Solove’s move of trying to abandon traditional 
privacy theories is misleading and has a danger of closing the on-going privacy 
debates. 
 
The second criticism hinges on the ground that the new theory developed allows huge 
amounts of subjectivity. This is shown by the fact that the community by using this 
practical-based mode has to agree on what rights privacy surpass and which rights 
surpass privacy.421 Moreover, through this concept, it is impossible for people to reach 
consensus about the value of privacy compared to other rights in different 
circumstances, as the people are not holding the concept of rights in the same 
ideological order.422 Thirdly, the theory as propounded by Solove does not provide the 
basis for founding the reasons for considering some acts of injury as privacy violations 
and others are not.423 
 
Fourthly, the new theory appears to be a way of theorising privacy violations instead 
of privacy concept.424 This is because Solove focuses on the disruption of certain 
practices which amounts to harm and this attaches itself into legal and policy analysis 
intended to remedy or prevent harms.425Regardless of the objections discussed above, 
Solove’s new theory of privacy as provided in his book of Understanding Privacy is 
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commendable for bringing new light in understanding privacy as well as its 
importance in the society. It has also done a praiseworthy job in cutting through the 
muddle that regularly surrounds the concept of privacy.426 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Different concepts and theories are being developed on privacy and security discourse 
due to development of information technology. Consequently, there is no universal 
agreement with respect to the meaning, scope as well as the ambit of those concepts 
and theories. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that certain common 
understanding is achieved on privacy concepts and theories. Moreover, due to 
development of information technology, new conflicting theories are emerging and 
some instead of protecting privacy, affect privacy. The strengths and weaknesses of 
some of those theories are pointed out above.  
 
Besides, it is important to highlight that regardless of the strength as well as limitations 
of the privacy theories, it is still plausible to make a preference of a theory that suits 
the context of this study.  The approach is not undermining other theories as the 
preferred theory ought not to fit well in other particular contexts in which other 
theories can fit. Therefore, in this thesis the preferred theory is the Restricted Access 
Theory (or Limited Accessibility Theory). It is deemed appropriate because it is in 
line with most of the data privacy law principles.  
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As previously pointed out, the Restricted Access Theory defines privacy in terms of 
restriction of others’ access to a person or information, which presupposes conditions 
vis-a-vis claims or rights. This is in line with the data privacy law that provide 
conditions to be met for data processing to be considered lawful. Yet, it is important 
to point out clearly that other privacy theories also portray privacy with different 
degrees of limitations. For instance, the Information Control Theory elucidates clearly 
the concept of consent that is required as a prerequisite for the lawful processing of 
personal data. Still, in some exception to the general rule, personal data may be 




INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKS FOR PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD 
4.1 Introduction 
Privacy rights used to be protected unilaterally by different nations without due regard 
to others. Formally, just like other laws and regulations, privacy legislation used to be 
applicable within the competency and territory of a particular nation only. 
Nevertheless, in some few instances, national legislation acquired applicability status 
outside their jurisdiction.427However, in a long run, those legislation brought about 
limitations in transferring of personal data, which led to flimsy protection personal 
data, isolation as well as economic barriers. To avert and grapple with those 
challenges, different nations negotiated bilateral agreements, followed by regional and 
international harmonisation of privacy and data protection legislation as well as 
policies.428As a result, there was a development of regional and international 
initiatives on personal data and privacy protection, which encompassed substantial co-
operation between different countries.429 
 
The undertakings led to a rise of agreements that are binding many nations legally as 
well as politically.430It is noteworthy that the internationalisation of privacy as it is 
understood today originates from European nations since 1980. It was intended to 
eliminate obstacles in cross border data flow to promote policies and regulations for 
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international market and guaranteeing its protection.431 
 
Thus, regional and international agreements on privacy provide accepted standards for 
privacy protection laws and as well serving as benchmarks that guide individual 
countries in drafting domestic laws. Nonetheless, accepted standards for privacy 
protection that have developed as benchmarks for guiding the drafting and developing 
domestic privacy laws has its origin in European countries (developed) and hence they 
may have some limitations in application to developing countries such as Tanzania. 
This chapter highlights privacy protection law as it is manifested in international law. 
In this context, international law implies any law, which is binding or non-binding, 
which is negotiated at international or regional level, and which results in applicability 
in more than one nation.  
 
In this work, international law is discussed in two categories. First, the discussion 
begins by briefly looking at the legal and regulatory frameworks that were developed 
under the patronages of the United Nations (UN). Secondly, the frameworks 
developed under the auspices of the regional organisations at regional level are also 
highlighted and discussed. Moreover, general principles of data protection are also 
explained. Lastly, it is worth noting that the discussion of this chapter forms the bases 
for the discussion of Chapter Five and Chapter Six, respectively.  
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4.2 UN Privacy and Data Protection Initiatives 
As previously indicated, the current privacy and security protection trace their history 
back to 1945, the end of the Second World War. That is, most of the international 
treaties and declarations made under the auspices of the UN for protecting 
fundamental human rights established the foundation data protection.432 This part 
discusses the human right treaties and declarations with the element of protecting 
privacy as well as the United Nation Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerised 
Personal Data File (UN Guidelines) which deals with privacy specifically.433 
 
The treaties and declarations were negotiated and made as a reaction to the suffering 
due to the totalitarian oppression before and during the Second World War.434 It was 
necessary to protect privacy of information on the ground that the tyrannical regimes 
relied on the personal data under their authority to earmark and attack 
humankind.435The most noteworthy instruments for this discussion are the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 and the United Nation Guidelines for the Regulation 
of Computerized Personal Data File (UN Guidelines) 1990. 
 
                                                          
432Bygrave, note 430, supra. 
433A/RES/45/95/adopted on 14/12/1990. 
434Bygrave, L., A., Privacy Protection in a Global Context- A Comparative Overview. Scandinavian Studies in 
Law, 2004, Vol 47, pp.319-348, pp 108-109. 
435Hilberg investigates the Jews persecution in German under the Nazi regime and perceives the following; “In the 
hands of the police the identification system together with its personal documents and most importantly the 
assigned names and the noticeable label in public used to be a strong weapon. Most importantly, the system was 
a tool for enabling residence and movement restriction. It was also used as a control measure by facilitating 
picking up of Jews from anywhere and on anytime. It also had a paralyzing effect to the victims, as it made the 
Jews to be compliant and amenable to the commands that ever. It exposed the Jews and it was like all the eyes 
were fixed on them. Under those condition, it was impossible for Jews to resist hide or escape, and as a result 
most of them were lost.” Hilberg, R., The Destruction of the European Jew, Holmes & Meier Publishers, New 
York,1985. Pp 173-180. 
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Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a landmark document in human 
rights history.436It is the first international declaration of human rights adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations after the experiences of the Second World 
War.437The declaration establishes the recognition of undertaking basic human rights 
by the international community.438 The preamble of the declaration clearly highlights 
the undertaking particularly in the second, fourth and fifth recitals. It provides; 
“Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the 
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and 
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest 
aspiration of the common people;……Whereas the peoples of the United 
Nations have in the charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worthy of the human person and in the equal rights 
of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom;….. Whereas member states have 
pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the united Nations, the 






Further, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is just a declaration of human 
rights and not a treaty; hence, it does not create legal obligations to the member states 
directly.440 Yet, it has been referred to in many judgements in different regional and 
national courts as the standard source of elementary human rights.441Moreover, it has 
                                                          
436United Nations. The Universal Declaration of human Rights, 2015. Accessed from 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights, on 1st August 2018. 
437Australian Human Rights Commission. What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 
Accessed from https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/what-iniversal-declaration-human-
rights, on 1st August 2018. 
438Canadian Institute of Health Research (CIHR), Selected International Legal Norms on the Protection 
of Personal Information in Health Research, 2011. Accessed from www.cihr-
irsc.gc.ca/e/document/protection_pi_e_pdf, on 1st August 2018. 
439United Nations, note 436, supra. 
440Australian Human Rights Commission, note 437, supra. 
441O’Donnell, M., K., New Dirty War Judgements in Argentina: National Courts and Domestic 
Prosecutions of International Human Rights Violations. New York University Law Review, 2009, 
Vol 84, pp 333-374. Accessed from https://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/files/pdf, on 1st August 
2018. 
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a profound impact on the growth of international human rights law.442It is noteworthy 
that regardless of the declaration having no binding force and mechanisms for its 
enforcement, it is the basis of other different international agreements that are legally 
binding on the nations which ratify them.443 
 
Privacy as a basic human right is explicitly acknowledged under Article 12. The article 
states, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home, or correspondence, no to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interferences or attacks.” However, 
the language used in the article prohibits only arbitrary interferences to the privacy 
right, not any other infringements of privacy.444Likewise, Article 27 sheds some light 
on privacy right. Article 27(1) specifically states, “everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.” The expression “freely to participate” as used 
in the above article connotes principles of consent which is generally a prerequisite in 
conducting any scientific health research.445 
 
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 is 
another international human rights instrument made under the auspices of the UN. The 
ICCPR has its basis on the UDHR.446It is basically an agreement on civil and political 
                                                          
442 Ibid. 
443Ibid. 
444Canadian Institute of Health Research, note 438, supra. 
445Makulilo, note 428, supra. 
446United Nations UN: Human Rights Treaties, Civil and Political Rights, 2014. Accessed from 
https://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/un-treaties, on 2nd August 2018. 
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rights that is legally binding.447The gist of the instrument is to implement, give legal 
effect and clearly elaborate the principles stated in the UDHR.448The instrument 
consists of five recitals as well as fifty-three articles. 
 
The right to privacy is protected in the ICCPR under Article 17. The article provides 
that: 
(1) “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 
(2) everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.”  
 
The above provision is worded nearly identical to Article 12 of the UDHR. Yet, in 
contrast to the former, it prohibits not only arbitrary interference with one’s privacy 
but also unlawful attacks on his honour and reputations.449Similarly, the ICCPR does 
not encompass the limiting clause that is identical to Article 29 of the UDHR.  
 
The state parties are duty-bound to implement the covenant. Furthermore, it is  
noteworthy that at the international level, the covenant establishes the Human Right 
Committee (HRC)  the covenant while working as complaints handling authority.450 
                                                          
447Up to 20th May 2014, the general status is that there are only 171 parties to the ICCPR. However only 
74 parties signed the treaty. Nevertheless only 69 parties signed and ratified the instrument and five 
parties have signed, yet they have not ratified the treaty. Accessed from 
https://www.treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapters=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_noIV-
4&src+IND, on 2nd August 2018. 
448Canadian Institute of Health Research, note 444, supra. 
449Diggelmann, O., &Cleis, M., N., How the Right of Privacy Became a Human Right, 2014. Human 
Right Law Review, Vol 14, pp 441-458. Accessed from http://academic.oup.com/hrlr/article-
abstract/14/3/441/644279, on 2nd August 2018. 
450 ICCPR, Article 28 (1). 
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The HRC has competent jurisdiction only to the state parties that have declared 
explicitly to recognise its competency.451Moreover, the state party has to ensure that 
it has invoked and exhausted all the domestic remedies available before submitting 
complaints to the HRC.452 If all the attempts to resolve the issue proved failure within 
six months, the state party is permissible to refer the issue to the HRC.453Nevertheless, 
if the state parties remain dissatisfied after all the efforts of the HRC in resolving the 
dispute, with prior consent of the state parties concerned, the HRC may assign an ad 
hoc conciliation commission to determine the dispute.454The commission is required 
to consider the matter, resolve it and issue a report, not later than twelve months after 
its engagement.455In addition, the state parties are required within three months after 
receiving the report, to notify the chairperson of the committee whether or not they 
accept the deliberation or contents of the report of the commission.456 
 
However, it is interesting and worth noting that the deliberations or comments of the 
committee based on the complaints submitted carries a huge weight though it is not 
binding under the international law.457The comments, together with the committees’ 
report issued under Article 40 (4) of the ICCPR to the state parties, offer peremptory 
advice on the purview of the covenant’s provision.458It is also worth highlighting that 
the HRC has no qualifications of a judicial body, and hence the enforcement 
                                                          
451 Ibid, Article 41(1). 
452 Ibid, Article 41(1) (c). 
453 Ibid, Article 41 (1) (b) 
454 Ibid, Article 42 (1) (a). 
455 Ibid, Article 42(7) (a) (b) (c). 
456 Ibid, Article 42 (7)(d). 
457Ulyashyna, L., Does Case Law Developed by the European Court of Human Rights Pursuant to ECHR Article 
8 Add anything Substantial to the Rules and Principles Found in Ordinary Data Protection Principle? A Tutorial 
Paper Presented at the Norwegian Center for Computers and Law (NRCCL). Spring 2006. 
458Bygrave, L., A., Data Protection Pursuant to the Right in Human Rights Treaties, International Journal of Law 
and Information Technology, 1998, vol 6, No 3, pp. 247-284.  
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mechanism as provided in the ICCPR continues to be comparatively weak.459 
Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has no jurisdiction to matters arising 
from non-observance of the ICCPR, regardless of the fact that the latter is a convention 
made under the auspices of the UN.460It is in this line that jurisdiction on matters 
provided for in the ICCPR are vested to the national courts of the state parties.461 
 
Likewise, the UN Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerised Personal Data files 
(hereinafter referred as to in the present work as the Regulation)was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in December 1990.462It represents the initial initiatives by the 
UN to establish rules and regulations for the protection of personal data.463These 
initiatives by the UN underscored the importance of data protection in the developed 
community as well as in developing communities in the globe.464 Unlike the ICCPR 
and the UDHR, the UN guidelines were made specifically for the protection of 
personal data.465The Council of Europe (CoE) Convention for the Protection of 
                                                          
459Ibid. 
460Crook, J., R.,The International Court of Justice and Human Rights. Northwestern University Journal 
of International human rights, 2004, vol 1, pp 1-8. Accessed from 
https://www.law.northewestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v1/2/Crook.pdf, on 4th Aug 2018.  See also 
Article 36 of the State of the international Court of Justice (ICJ/0). 
461 ICCPR, Article 2 (3) (b). 
462Greenleaf, G., W., Asian Data Privacy Law: Trade and Human Rights Perspective, Oxford University 
Press, 2014. 
463 The genesis of the UN Guidelines can be traced back to the UN General Assembly Resolution 2450 
of December 1968 (Doc E/CN.4/1025) in which the Un Secretary General was invited to scrutinize 
the effect of technology on human rights, including deliberations of individuals’ right to privacy in 
the light of advances in recording and other techniques. As result of the study a report was published 
in 1976 asking states to adopt privacy legislations which will provide for computerized personal data 
systems in the public as well as in private sectors. It should also list minimum standards for such 
legislations. Bygrave, L., A., International Agreements to Protect Personal Data in Greenleaf, G and 
Rule, J., B., Global Privacy Protection. The First Generation, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
Cheltenham, UK/ Northampton, MA, USA, 2008,Pp 15-49, 17.    
464Weber, R., H., & Heinrich, U., I., Anonymization, Springer, London, Heidelberg. New York, 
Dordrecht, 2012. 
465Greenleaf, note 462, supra. 
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Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 1981466 (CoE 
Convention) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Guidelines on the Protection on Privacy and Trans border Data Flows of 
Personal Data, 1980467 (OECD Guidelines) are other regional instruments that 
preceded and paved the way for the birth of the UN Guidelines. 
 
The essence of UN Guidelines is the first to set out minimum safeguards that needs to 
be incorporated in domestic legislations of all the member states.468 Secondly, it meant 
to guide national and international, governmental and non-governmental organisations 
when processing personal data.469For the above goal of the UN Guidelines to be 
achieved, it sets out a recommendation of principles to be applicable while processing 
computerised personal data files. Yet, it is worth noting that the guidelines are mere 
recommendations, not legal norms binding state parties to it.470 Moreover, it cannot 
be overlooked that although the UN guidelines provide for the means of 
implementation, the duty of developing definite comprehensive regulations and 
procedures applicable while processing personal data is upon the initiative of each 
individual state.471 In doing so, the member states should focus on the principles 
established in the UN Guidelines as the minimum standards. 
 
                                                          
466 ETS No 108, it was opened for signature in January 1981 and it came into force in October 1985. 
467 OECD Document C (80)58/FINAL, adopted on 23rd September 1980. 
468 UN Guidelines, Part A. 
469 Ibid, Part B. 
470Weber, R., H., & Heinrich, U., I., note 464, supra. 
471 Greenleaf, G., note 465, supra. 
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The UN guidelines are made up of ten provisions. However, they have neither a 
preamble nor definitions of terms in the document. The omission weakens the practical 
usefulness of the guidelines.472 Furthermore, the application and scope of the UN 
guidelines are confined to the processing of personal data of an identifiable individual 
that is held in a computer file in private and public sector.473 Similarly, the wording of 
the guidelines provides some exceptions to its applicability. It goes that subject to 
some appropriate adjustments the principles provided for in the guidelines may also 
apply to manual files.474 Correspondingly, in some situations the principles of the 
guidelines may apply to legal persons in cases where they have information 
concerning natural persons.475 
 
There are seven guarantees or fair information principles for processing computerised 
personal data set out in the UN guidelines. These include lawful and fair collection, 
purpose specification, interested personal access, non-discrimination use, accuracy, 
security, and disclosure limitation (which are linked to purposes specification and 
interested person principles).476 These principles are the general personal information 
principles for processing personal data and they are found in many data privacy 
instruments in the world.477It is worth noting that although they are mentioned and 
analysed individually, the existence and application of one principle necessitates the 
presence of the other.  This implies that one principle cannot be upheld at the expense 
of the other.  
                                                          
472Bygrave, note 459, supra. p. 30 
473 UN Guidelines, Para 10. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Ibid. 
476Greenleaf, G., note 471, supra. 
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Trans-border data flow is also an important concern of the UN guidelines.478 It is a 
requirement of the guidelines that if two or more nations are contemplating of 
transferring personal data and they are having comparable safeguards for protection 
in their laws, information should be freely circulated in those jurisdictions. Yet, if 
there are no reciprocal safeguards, the guidelines provide that limitations to such 
circulation may not be imposed unduly and only as far as the protection of protection 
demands. However, the provision raises some questions. The first question is who is 
duty-bound to ascertain the comparability of safeguards? Second, what are the 
benchmarks/criteria of comparison? What is the basis that the concerned nations 
should consider, so that they will not impose unjustifiable restrictions to the free flow 
of information? The guidelines do not provide answers to those questions. The silence 
certainly, leads to practical difficulties in the implementation of the guidelines.  
 
Moreover, for these UN guidelines to take effect, UN calls the member states to 
appoint a regulatory authority to offer supervision.479It is in the same line that the 
guidelines set out three characteristics that are necessary for the regulatory 
authority.480These include technical competence, impartiality, and independence in 
regard to persons or agencies, which are responsible for establishing as well as 
processing data.481Similarly, the guidelines provide for the powers of the regulatory 
authority as part and parcel of that implementation. The latter should be empowered 
to impose criminal sanctions and the power to issue individual remedies when the 
principles are not adhered to. 
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479 Ibid.  
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Regardless of the fact that the UN guidelines underscore the importance of data 
protection in the world, its principles have been underused and undervalued.482This is 
mainly caused by its status of being mere recommendations and hence its 
implementation being left to the discretion of the member states.483As a result, the 
guidelines have not had a substantial impact since their approval.484 Since the 
guidelines came into being, there have been huge technological advances, which 
qualify to necessitate reform in the privacy instruments.485Nevertheless, strangely 
enough, there is no current attempt to amend the UN guidelines.486 It looks like the 
guidelines have been abandoned. However, there is a plausibility for the guidelines to 
influence security and safety in cloud in future due to the fact that currently privacy is 
back on the UN agenda as well as in government and international organisations.487 
 
The analysis of the UN systems privacy and security protection leads to the following 
conclusion: 
First, while the ICCPR and the UDHR lay down strong normative basis for privacy 
protection laws, accepted both in regional and state jurisdictions, they do not expressly 
provide for data protection principles.488However, their normativity are clearly 
depicted in the recitals as well as preambles of the national and regional privacy and 
data protection legislation. Consequently, this upholds the understanding and 
                                                          
482Casagran, C., B., Global Data Protection in the Field of Law Enforcement: An EU Perspective. 
Routledge, New York, 2017. 
483 Ibid. 
484Greenleaf, note 476, supra. 
485Casagran, note 483, supra. 
486 Ibid.  
487 Greenleaf, note 484, supra. 
488Kuner, C., An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects. Computer 
Law & Security Review, 2009, Vol 25, pp, 307-317. Accessed from 
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acceptance of the international instruments pointed our earlier within national legal 
systems. Likewise, the incorporation of privacy right in the Bill of Rights in many 
national constitutions is considered to be the domestication of the privacy right as 
established by the UDHR and the ICCPR. 
 
Secondly, the UN guidelines are the only instrument that deals with data protection 
specifically under the auspices of the UN. However, the guidelines are mere 
recommendations, and hence do not legally bind any nation. As a result, the instrument 
receives little attention compared to other legally binding instruments on privacy and 
data protection. This implies that under the auspices of the UN, privacy protection is 
not given its due weight regarding the development of technology such as cloud 
computing which increases threat to informational privacy and security. 
 
Thirdly, the task of coming up with a truly global legal binding privacy convention or 
treaty is a dream yet to come true. However, initiatives for creating that kind of 
instrument are going on and the task of drafting proper rules intended to be applicable 
internationally is also going on. In addition, regardless of the fact that there is a dire 
need for the international legal intervention in the field, realistically, there are minimal 
possibilities of having a convention made under the auspices of the UN being adopted 
in the near future. This is mainly caused by differences in culture, history as well as 
legal orientations in relation to data protection.489The following part discusses privacy 
and data protection in regional systems. 
 
 




Europe is the leader and hence at the forefront of privacy and data protection initiatives 
in the world.490Privacy and data protection regimes in Europe are said to be the oldest 
and more advanced with reference to others.491 Other scholars regard it as the gold 
standard in the world.492Data protection regimes in Europe grew under the initiatives 
of three regional organisations, which are the OECD,493 the Council of Europe494 and 
the European Union.495Moreover, some of the instruments made under the auspices of 
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491 European Data Protection Supervisor, The History of the General Data Protection Regulation, 2018. 
Accessed from https://edps.europe.eu/legislation/history-general-data-protection-regulation_en, on 10th August 
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493OECD is an international Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. It was 
established in 1961 with the mission of promoting policies that are going to improve the economic 
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Chile, Czech Republic, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, German, France, Hungary, Iceland, 
Greece, Ireland, Japan, Italy, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Latvia, Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, 
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established with the intentions of achieving greater unity among its members as well as promoting 
human rights, democracy, cultural co-operation and the rule of law among others. To realize its aims 
it has adopted more than 200 different treaties and many recommendations and declarations. Yet, it 
is still adopting others.    Its headquarters is in Strasbourg France. It brings together 47-member states. 
These are Austria, Albania, Armenia, Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark, France, Georgia, 
German, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Turkey, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, 
Serbia, San Marino, Russian Federation, Portugal, Norway, Romania, Poland, Netherlands, 
Montenegro, Moldova, Lithuania,  Malta, Monaco and Luxembourg.  Accessed from 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-organizations/council-
europe.html, on 15th August 2019. 
495 EU is a supranational and intergovernmental union made up by 28 members states from Europe, 
created in 1993 following the Maastricht Treaty. The member states share economic as well as 
political relations. The main focus of the union is to create a single market through a standardized 
system of laws which are applicable to all member states. It also intends to enable free movement of 
goods and services, people and capital within the boundaries of all member states. The unions history 
can be traced back to the aftermath of the second World war, which led to the establishment of 
cooperation as a way of preventing future wars in Europe. These include European Economic 
Community (EEC) of 1957 and European Community (EC) in 1967. The EC was renamed in 1992 
to become EU and later a treaty was signed in Maastricht in 1993 and hence the birth of EU. Its 
 104 
the above organisations follow the footsteps of the UDHR and the ICCPR in 
addressing privacy issues. These instruments include the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR),496 the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004497 and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2010 (CFR).498 It is worth noting that 
in all the above-named instruments, privacy protection issues are not the main 
concerns, yet they are dealt with remotely.499 Hitherto, they are important as they 
provide a firm legal foundation for growth of privacy and data protection law regimes.  
 
Additionally, some agreements stemming from the above-named regional 
organisations are of more practical importance in determining national laws on privacy 
and data protection.500The noteworthy ones are the OECD guidelines on the Protection 
of Privacy and Trans-border Data Flows of Personal Data of 1980,501the Council of 
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (CoE Convention 108/1981)502 and Directive 95/46/EC, 
which is recently repealed with effect from 28th May, 2018 by the EU General Data 
Protection Regulations (GDPR).Since their coming to force to date the instruments 
                                                          
member states include France, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, German, Luxembourg, Greece, 
Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Croatia, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia. However United Kingdom is not a member any more to the EU. Accessed from     
https://europarlamentti.info/en/European-union/history/, on 15th August 2018. 
496The treaty was opened for signature on November 4th, 1950, came into force in September 3rd, 1953. 
Accessed from https://www.europewatchdog.info/en/international-treaties/convention-on-human-
rights/, on 16th August 2018. 
497O.J. C310/01, 16 December 2004, pp.1-474. 
498The treat came into force in March 2010.  
499Makulilo, note 477, supra. 
500 Bygrave, note 472, supra. 
501OECD Doc. C (80)58/FINAL; adopted 23rd September 1980; hereinafter also termed ‘OECD 
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502ETS No. 108 opened for signature 28th January 1981, in force 1st October 1985; hereinafter also 
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have greatly influenced non-European nations to adopt privacy as well as data 
protection regulations in line with the European style. Their impact has also been 
widely expounded in some influential scholarly works like ‘The EU Data Protection 
Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime.’503The European Union Data Privacy 
Directive and International Relations’,504The Long Arm of the EU Data Protection 
Law: Does the Data Protection Directive Apply to Processing of Personal Data of EU 
citizens by Websites World Wide?’505 and ‘The Influence of European Data Privacy 
Standards Outside Europe: Implications for Globalizations of Convention 
108’.506Regardless of the fact that Directive 95/46/EC is repealed, articles that make 
it to have global impact are incorporated in the GDPR. As a result, the new law obliges 
non-European nations to adopt privacy and data protection laws and regulations in the 
European standard.507The following section presents contemporary agreements and 
treaties with regard to security and privacy in cloud. 
 
                                                          
503Birnhack, M., D., The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime. Computer Law 
& Security Review, 2008, Vol 24, Issue 6, Pp 508-520. Accessed from 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/SO267364908001337, on 16th August 2018. 
504Salbu, S., R., The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International Relations. Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, 2002, Vol 35, Pp 595-655.  Accessed from 
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4.3.1 Council of Europe Initiatives 
The Council of Europe is one of the first international organisations to initiate the 
practice of regulating privacy so as combat privacy threats raised by development in 
information technology, particularly the use computer technology.508It is the leading 
international organisation that has drafted a binding multilateral instrument that is 
specifically regulating the protection of privacy and personal data.509 In 1981, it 
adopted Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data.510 It entered into force on 1st October 1985.511 Since 28th 
January 1981, the Convention 108 is open for signature by the member states as well 
as accession by non-members. Presently, all 47 member states of the CoE have signed 
and ratified the treaty.512 It is also ratified by six non-members of the Council of 
Europe including four states from Africa.513 
 
The history of the Convention 108 can be traced back to late 1960s and early 1970s 
Councils’ resolutions and recommendations. Most important, resolutions espoused by 
the CoE Ministers Committee. These are Resolution (73)22 on the Protection of 
Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector,514 and 
Resolution (74)29 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individual vis-à-vis Electronic 
                                                          
508The Council of Europe, note 495, supra. 
509Bygrave, note 500, supra. 
510The Convention is also known as Convention 108 or ETS No. 108. 
511Council of Europe, Details of the Treaty No. 108, 2018. Accessed from 
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512Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 108, 2018. Accessed from 
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Data Banks in the Public Sector in 1973 and 1974 respectively.515The annexes to the 
resolutions generally comprise comparable sets of principles for personal data 
protection, drawing motivation from successful countries in that area such as Sweden, 
Belgium, German, and US legislative initiatives.516 
There are different reasons that necessitated the adoption of the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of personal Data. The 
first one is the gaps that were found in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 1950.517 Though the ECHR 
protected Human Rights and other fundamental rights, it did not provide for protection 
of privacy of a person when personal data is computer processed, especially in private 
sector, such as banking and insurance sector.518Likewise, most member states of the 
CoE lacked proper laws for privacy and personal data protection.519Apart from the 
absence of data privacy laws, there was no harmonisation in national laws for 
enhancing free flow of data across national borders. To combat the above-named 
challenges, it was found necessary for the CoE to adopt the resolutions embodied with 
data protection principles.  
 
Primarily, the Convention was envisioned to provide for computerised processing of 
personal data in private and public sectors, including state security agencies and police 
as well.520 The Convention also allows member states in some exceptional situations 
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to provide in their laws and apply its principles in corporate and collective entities 
(which are also known as juristic or legal persons).521The permit also encompasses  
personal data processed manually.522 Moreover, the Convention is flexible enough to 
allow the member states to provide higher standard of personal data protection to its 
citizens than it stipulates.523 It is worth keeping in mind that in contrast with the OECD 
guidelines, the Convention is an international treaty that is legally binding its members 
on matters relating to personal data production.  
 
In addition, Convention 108 requires member states to enact domestic laws which 
incorporate its data protection principles.524However, of itself, it does not provide 
precise package of rights to be directly enforceable in domestic courts.525Moreover, it 
is important to note that while the Convention was intended to be a catalyst and a basis 
of domestic legislation in member states, it did not want to foil those efforts by 
dictating a set of rules to be applicable in domestic courts of the member states.526 
 
The core of the Convention is found in the second chapter, where the general principles 
for processing personal data are provided. It provides for eight basic principles, which 
are identical to the ones promulgated in the OECD Guidelines as well as in laws of 
different member states. Nevertheless, the fact that they are provided for in the 
Convention, gives them the status of being a point of reference in questions regarding 
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these principles at the national as well as international level. In a nutshell, these 
principles may be discussed as follows:  
 
Fair and lawful processing is the first principle which maintains that personal data 
should be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully.527 The principle requires among 
other, things transparency in processing personal data as well as using the data only 
for specified purposes known to the data subject prior to the collection. Similarly, it 
states that processing should as well be authorised by law or consent of the data 
subject.528Purpose specification is the second principle enshrined in the Convention.  
This principle presupposes that ‘personal data shall be stored for specified and 
legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes.’529 This 
principle is to the effect that data controllers are prohibited from storing in their 
custody data without defined and legitimate purposes.530Minimalism is the third 
principle, which advocates that personal data collected and stored should be adequate, 
relevant, only limited to what is required for attaining the purpose for data collection 
or storage.531 
 
In addition, adequate information quality is the fourth principle. It enunciates that 
personal data ‘shall be adequate, accurate, and relevant in relation to the purpose for 
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which they are processed.’532 The limitation factor implied from this principle plays 
an important role in enhancing the functioning of other personal data protection 
principles such as minimalism, fair and lawful processing as well as purpose 
specification principle. Sensitivity is another personal data processing principle. It is 
to the effect that some types of personal data particularly those concerning someone’s 
political opinions, religious or other beliefs, racial origin, health or sexual life, criminal 
convictions and other sensitive data should be subjected to more rigorous protection 
due to their sensitive nature.533It is important also to note that the article prohibits 
automatic processing of sensitive data unless the domestic law provides explicitly for 
proper safeguards.  
 
Data security is the sixth principle which provides that proper security measures shall 
be taken to protect personal data stored in computerised data files against unauthorised 
or accidental destruction, unauthorised access, accidental loss as well as alteration or 
dissemination.534The spirit of this principle is to protect computerised personal data 
files against intentional or accidental unauthorised destruction, access, loss and 
alteration, or dissemination. It is worth noting that security measures referred to in this 
principle must match with the types of data stored, purpose of data in the file and the 
risk involved while processing the data.535 
 
Furthermore, transparency is the seventh principle. This principle has two sides. First, 
it establishes that any interested person shall be granted the opportunity to determine 
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the existence of a computerised personal data file, its main purposes, as well as usual 
residence or principle place of business of the controller of the file.536 Secondly, it also 
states that such a person shall at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay and 
expense granted an opportunity to obtain confirmation of whether personal data 
relating to him are stored in the computerised files as well as communication to him 
of such data in an intelligible form.537 Rectification is the eighth principle provided in 
the Convention. It is of the effect that any interested individual shall be allowed to 
request and afforded the opportunity to verify that data about them are erased or 
rectified, if such data have been processed in breach of the provisions of domestic laws 
which uphold the general principles established by Article 5 and 6 of the 
Convention.538Likewise, this principle states that the interested person shall be able to 
have a remedy when the request for erasure, rectification, communication, or 
confirmation is not adhered to.539  
 
It is important to highlight that the principles as stated in the Convention are not 
absolute. The Convention also provides for some exceptions to the basic principles. 
Member states to the Convention are allowed to depart from the basic principles only 
when the derogation is provided for in the member states domestic law and it 
constitutes an obligatory measure in a democratic society in protecting state security, 
public safety and monetary interests of the state or suppression of criminal offence.540 
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It is also allowed if it is necessary for protecting the data subject or the rights and 
freedom of others.541 
 
Nevertheless, Bygrave criticises the effectives of the principles of data protection as 
provided in the Convention 108 on the ground that they are broadly formulated in an 
abstract way and most of the key words lack definitions.  Equally, the Conventions’ 
tendency towards diffusion robs the principles their ability to harmonise domestic laws 
of the member states. Moreover, feebleness of the Convention is fuelled by the 
presence of derogation articles in the Convention.542 As a result, the power or authority 
of the Convention is undermined and hence fails to stand as applied ‘rules of the road’ 
in particular circumstances.543 Regardless of the criticism, the Convention stands as 
an international treaty that is legally binding to member states, and hence persuaded 
the growth and adoption of robust privacy and data protection legislation in and 
outside Europe.  
 
Together with the general principles, the Convention also provides for the rules of 
trans-border data flow under the title of chapter three. It is one of the main objects of 
the Convention to guarantee the flow of personal data among member states. The basic 
rule is provided under Article 12 which states that a member state shall not restrict the 
free flow of personal data to the jurisdiction of another member state unless the latter 
fails to provide equivalent protection for the data.544However, the Convention is silent 
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on the situation where personal data flows from a member state to a non-member 
state.545  
 
Nevertheless, the anomaly was remedied by the adoption of an Additional Protocol, 
which provides for trans-border data flow from a member state to non-member 
state.546Those provisions are nearly identical to the provisions providing for the same 
in the then Directive 95/46/EC, which was repealed by the General Data Protection 
Regulation, 2016.547 It is worth highlighting that the convention applies different 
standards in dealing with trans-border data flow. The first one is equivalent protection, 
which is applicable when personal data are transferred from one member state to 
another.548  
 
The second one is adequate level of protection, which is invoked when personal data 
are transferred from a member state to a non-member state.549Arguably, the 
application of double standard is a weakness of the Convention, which distorts the 
Councils intention in upholding privacy and data protection rules. Nevertheless, 
Convention’s remains potential as a universal standard. Its open nature, in particular, 
serves as a base of encouraging the growth of data protection regime at the global 
arena.550 It is still relevant in shaping the privacy and data protection regime not only 
in the CoE but also around the world.  
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4.3.2 OECD Initiatives 
The OECD guidelines on Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal 
Data (1980) signify international accord on overall guidance regarding the collection 
and handling of personal data.551However, the guidelines are just an annex to the 
OECD Council of 23rd September 1980, regarding Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data.552It represents the first international wise towards 
privacy and personal data regulation.553The guidelines were drafted to attain an 
international coordination of principles as well as providing minimum standards of 
personal data and privacy protection.554The emergence of the OECD guidelines was 
necessitated by mainly three factors.555 The first one is the international character of 
trans-border data flows which called for an intercontinental determination, which only 
the OECD could provide in that time.556 
 
Secondly, it was necessitated by the emergence and spread of technology, which is 
fast changing with huge capacity to amplify and accelerate the analysis of personal 
data, with huge capacity of storing information. The development means that personal 
data and privacy issues as well as other cross-border problems that could not be solved 
by local laws.557The last but not least the changing nature of the law in the last quarter 
of the 20thcentury from law of nation states with territorial application in states to law 
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with international impact and policy necessitated it.558Faced with the above challenges 
the OECD had no option than developing the guidelines to balance the protection of 
privacy and free flow of information which were published in 23rd September 1980.559 
 
The history of the OECD guidelines can be traced back to the creation of the OECD 
itself. As pointed out earlier (under Section 4.3.1. of this work), it was founded in 1961 
to stimulate economic growth as well as world trade. It was created after the 
recognition of economic interdependence between states. The organisation was thus 
part of the initiatives to reconstruct the economy that was badly hit by the Second 
World War. It is of importance to highlight that the OECD is made up of European 
nations as well as non-European nations.560  
 
The unifying factor between member states is economic cooperation. This is clearly 
supported by Kirby, who postulates that generally the OECD is not dealing with 
human rights protection but economic cooperation.561This contention is supported by 
Cate and his fellow authors, who contend that one of the original goals of the OECD 
guidelines is protecting and providing balance between privacy as well as free flow of 
information.562It is in the same vein that Bing posits that the OECD guidelines 
concentrate on privacy and data protection in line with their impact on economic 
cooperation and international trade.563 
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The main thrust of the guidelines lies on the eight privacy and personal data protection 
principles it provides for. The objectives of the guidelines among other things are 
clearly summarised in the explanatory memorandum 25 to include attaining 
acceptance by the state members, principles for minimum standard protection of 
privacy, and individual liberties with respect to personal data.564 Additionally, it 
intends to clear the contradictions and differences between domestic laws and 
practices that occur within state members to a minimum.565 Similarly, it aims at 
making sure that personal data protection accorded in one state furthers the interest of 
other member states and hence deter the use of undue influence that can be coupled 
with the flow of personal data to other member states.566 
 
Last but not least, it intends to eradicate reasons that may tempt member states to 
restrict flow of data to other territories due to risks associated with the flow of the 
same.567It is worth noting that the guidelines are technological neutral on the fact that 
their principles are applicable to both automated as well as manual processing of 
personal data. The guidelines are also applicable for data in public such national 
security agencies and the police.568 Nonetheless, the guidelines are mere 
recommendation and hence are not legally binding to member states.569 However, they 
recommend to member states to take data privacy principles into account when 
enacting privacy laws in their territories.570Correspondingly, they recommend that 
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member states should try to eliminate all unjustifiable hindrances to trans-border data 
flow that can be raised as part and parcel of privacy protection.571 
 
The OECD guidelines consist of eight principles of data protection. They include 
collection limitation principle, data quality principle, purpose specification principle, 
use limitation principle, security safeguard principle, openness principle, individual 
participation principle, and accountability principle.572 In spite of differences in 
orientation of the OECD and privacy principles, they largely advocate for the same 
thing.573The most notable difference between the two is found in terms of content and 
not status, especially on the provisions that deal with privacy implementation as well 
as international cooperation.574 Those provisions are broader and more elaborate in the 
CoE Convention than in the OECD guidelines. Similarly, Bygrave posits that data 
protection principles, as provided in CoE Convention, afford more protection to 
personal data than provided in the guidelines.575 This is supported by the fact that the 
guidelines do not provide for anonymization or destruction of personal data after a 
lapse of a particular time, as well as the need to have special protection or safeguards 
for data regarded as sensitive.576 
 
Regardless of the weaknesses of the guidelines shown above in some points, they are 
stronger than the Convention. For instance, the ambits of the guidelines are broader 
enough to; cover not only electronic but also manual processing of personal 
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data.577Additionally, they exemplify openness principle (para 12) in a more boarder 
way compared to the way it is embodied in Article 8 of the Convention.578Moreover, 
they embody principles for trans-border data between member states.579These 
principles are identical to the equivalent provision provided in the Convention. 
However, the guidelines go further and highlight their objective of promoting 
commerce through para 18. They provide that: 
“Member countries should avoid developing laws, policies and practices 
in the name of the protection of privacy and individual liberties, which 
would create obstacles to trans-border flows of personal data that would 
exceed requirements for such protection”.580 
 
 
It is worth keeping in mind that though the guidelines have some weaknesses and are 
not legally binding, still they have huge impact in the development of data privacy 
framework and data protection laws in different nations i.e. Canada, Australia, Japan, 
Hong Kong, and Australia to mention just a few.581They are also the basis of the APEC 
Privacy Framework.582 
 
4.3.3European Union Initiatives 
The European Union together with its predecessors (European Economic Community 
and European Community) lagged behind in regulating privacy when compared to the 
Council of Europe as well as the OECD.583 It was not until 1995 when the first 
instrument known as Directive 95/46/EC was adopted in the EU for regulating 
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privacy. Since its adoption, it established a comprehensive as well as detailed data 
protection framework and played a crucial role as a changing point for privacy and 
data protection initiatives in and outside of the EU.584It is noteworthy that the EU legal 
system requires directives to be transposed into domestic laws of its member states to 
apply.585 This led to confusion as the directive was transposed differently by different 
states, and hence varied data privacy rules and regulations across the EU territory.586 
 
That is, there were different levels data protection rules, enforcement as well as varied 
severity of sanctions across the EU.587 Additionally, there were rapid changes in 
information technology which affected personal data.588 The above reasons instigated 
the need for reform of data protection legislation in the EU.589 Finally, the reform 
resulted in repealing Directive 95/46/EC and adopting of the General Data Protection 
in 2016, which came into force in 25th May 2018.590 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the EU’s binding law which 
oversees privacy as well as data protection not only for residents but also for citizens 
of the EU and European Economic area.591The GDPR is adopted to harmonise data 
privacy laws in EU, to eliminate legal fragmentation, intricacies and uncertainties that 
                                                          
584 Bygrave, note 582, supra. 





590Regulation (EU) 2016/6979 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27th April 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/45/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).  
591Gilliland, A., T., Issue Brief: The General Data Protection Regulation: What does it Mean for 
Libraries worldwide? 2018. Accessed from https://library.educause.edu/resources/20185/the-
general-data-protection-regulation-what-does-it-mean-for-libraries-worldwide,  on 25th Sept 2018. 
 120 
were caused by the Directive.592Likewise, it strengthens privacy rights and data 
protection laws for all the EU citizens and residents in digital as well as evaluative 
environment, so that they can be empowered to control their personal data.593 
 
Additionally, the new law considers current technological developments, together 
with implementations on personal data as well as online security.594 Furthermore, it 
reshapes the way organisations approach data privacy in the sense that it applies to 
organisations established in and outside the EU, if they are processing personal data 
of EU citizen and residence.595It is noteworthy that the regulation establishes a single 
set of rules applicable in all the state members across Europe and hence creates 
consistency.596 Additionally, globally the regulation is regarded as the gold standard 
in the protection of privacy information.597 
 
The objectives of the GDPR are clearly stipulated in Article 1 of the regulation which 
provides that it “lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing personal data and rules relating to the free movement of 
personal data”. It is worth noting that the term processing is defined widely to include 
whatever relates to personal data. This includes activities such as collecting, 
transferring, storing, using as well as destroying personal data. Moreover, in order to 
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realise its objectives, it comprises seven key principles which one should adhere to 
when processing personal data. The first one is lawfulness, fairness, and transparency. 
This principle advocates that personal data should be processed lawfully, fairly, and 
in transparency manner in relation to the data subject.598 
 
Purpose limitation is the second principle with the effect that personal data ought to 
be collected for specified, explicit as well as legitimate purposes only.599 Moreover, 
the latter should be determined at the time personal data is being collected.600Data 
minimisation is the third principle which outlines that personal data collected should 
be adequate, relevant, and limited to what is required in relation to the processing 
purposes.601Accuracy is another principle which provides that personal data collected 
and processed should be kept accurate and up to date.602 This principle entails erasure, 
removal, or rectification of personal data that are incorrect with regard to the purpose 
for which they were collected and processed.603 
 
Another important principle is storage limitation principle. The principle is to the 
effect that personal data which are no longer necessary in relation to the purpose for 
which they were collected or processed must be deleted.604 However, the principle 
also allows the retaining of personal data for a longer time if they are processed only 
for archiving purposes in the public interest, research, and statistical purposes.605 
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Additionally, the regulation provides for integrity and confidentiality principle.606 This 
principle advocates for the processing of personal data in a manner that guarantees 
proper security as well as confidentiality of the data, together with averting unlawful 
access or use of personal data as well as of equipment used for such processing.607 The 
last but not least is the accountability principle. This puts the burden of compliance 
with the regulation upon the data controller.608 He or she is not only responsible with 
compliance but also demonstrating his or her compliance. This can be demonstrated 
through documenting the manner in which he or she complies with the provisions of 
the GDPR.609 
 
In addition to the data protection principles, the GDPR has a wider scope to the extent 
of providing for higher standards as well as considerable fines. In the same vein, it 
provides for remedies, liability, and penalties under Chapter Eight. This entails 
effective judicial remedies, which include compensation to individuals who suffered 
material as well as non-material damages.610 Moreover, the penalties imposed by the 
regulation are attention grabbing to the management because they are very hefty. For 
instance, it provides that in case there is a breach of the GDPR, an organisation can be 
fined up to 4 percent of its annual global turnover or 20million Euros.611It intends to 
make penalties effective, proportionate as well as dissuasive and hence make the 
management keen on data protection.612 
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Similarly, it provides for trans-border data transfers, except the transfer of personal 
data to third party countries without an adequate level of protection.613It is in the same 
line that the regulation provides for its extraterritorial application. Arguably, the 
jurisdiction of the GDPR has been extended to have universal applicability.614 It is to 
the effect that it applies to entities processing personal data of EU residents 
irrespective of companies’ location.615 It is also applicable to the processing of 
personal data of EU residents by controllers and processors not established in EU if 
the activities relate to selling of goods or services to Union citizens and the monitoring 
of conduct, which takes place within the EU member.616It is worth noting, that with 
this extraterritorial jurisdiction, it will continue to be relevant in the United Kingdom 
despite the outcome of the Brexit.617 
 
Furthermore, it reforms or strengthens conditions of consent. The latter is intended to 
be given through a statement or by a clear affirmative action and must be 
unambiguous. It is worth highlighting that the regulation provides more rights to data 
subjects. These include right of access, right to be forgotten, right of notification, right 
of data portability, right to object the processing of personal data.618In addition, the 
regulation importantly advocates for technological design that will enhance privacy 
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protection.619 It also calls for default settings which will enable personal data to be 
restricted and accessed to a particular number of people.620 
 
In addition, the regulation obliges the controllers to enter into contract with vendors 
or processors who are trustworthy and monitor them for compliance.621 It also imposes 
obligation to controllers and processors to designate a data protection officer, if a 
public authority or body does the processing.622 Indeed, the GDPR is the most 
comprehensive privacy law for of age. It is extraordinary in purview and purpose. It 
is a huge achievement and a key step toward privacy protection. The EU Directive as 
well as other legislation on data privacy provide a road map and act as a signboard for 
the robust data privacy regulations in the world. For instance, the POPI Act of South 
Africa and the Data Protection bill of Tanzania have been developed in line with the 
EU Directive. 
 
4.4 Asia – Pacific (APEC) Initiatives 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an economic forum which 
consists of 21member economies from Asia, Australia, North and South America.623It 
was established in 1989 to develop and strengthen multinational trade relationships, 
increase the interconnection and affluence of the member economies and encourage 
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sustainable, inclusive and innovative economic development in the region.624The 
member economies of the APEC agreed on the need to have a set of mutual principles 
to guide them on approaching privacy regulations. The agreement is known as the 
APEC Privacy Framework. It was adopted as a complete version in 2005.625This is a 
set of common principles and implementation guidelines, which, to a large extent, 
follows the spirit of the OECD. The agreement is known as the APEC Privacy 
Framework to create operative privacy protections, and hence eliminate barriers to 
information flows and enhance sustainable trade and economic development in the 
APEC region.626 
 
According to the preamble of the Framework, it intends to promote electronic 
commerce. It also aims at ensuring free flow of information while at the same time 
encouraging the development of appropriate information privacy protections within 
the Asia Pacific region. Additionally, in its wording, the Framework, implicitly does 
not regard privacy as a fundamental right, but it regards privacy as important for 
enabling the growth of e-commerce.627 
 
The central theme of the Framework is found in the nine Information Privacy 
Principles (IPPs) it provides. These are preventing harm principles which advocate for 
the protection of persons against unauthorised collection as well as misuse of their 
personal data.628 Secondly, there is notice principle which imposes an obligation on 
                                                          
624APEC, (2011) APEC at Glance. Accessed from https://www.publications.apec.org/publication-
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the data controller to give notice to an individual whenever the data relating to him are 
collected and processed.629 Collection limitation is another principle to the effect that 
only relevant information, for specified purposes should be collected through lawful 
and fair means.630 Further, important to this is the use of personal information principle 
which entails that personal information should be used to fulfil the intended purpose 
of collection and other related and compatible purposes.631 Additionally, choice is 
another principle, which requires that individuals ought to have choice regarding their 
personal data with reference to collection, use, disclosure, and transfers.632 
 
Moreover, integrity of personal information is another principle, which requires that 
the information controller should keep records of personal information, which is 
accurate, complete, and up-to-date as needed with regard to the purposes of use.633 
Similarly, security safeguard is a principle which imposes obligation upon the 
information controllers to protect personal information against risks such as 
unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification, disclosure, loss, or any other 
misuse. Access and correction are also important principles which require that data 
subjects should have the right to access the data relating to them and to challenge their 
accuracy and if feasible demand deletion, rectification, completion, or amendment of 
it.634Accountability is the last principle, which imposes obligation to the data 
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controllers to comply with the measures that give effect to the principles of the 
Framework.635 
 
The rules create a protective mechanism for trans-border data transfer within the 
APEC region as well as providing a pattern for a more wide-ranging global scheme. 
The above reasons have been a basis of criticising the APEC Framework by different 
scholars such as Greenleaf636, Waters,637 Tan638 and others. Nonetheless, despite 
following the spirit of the OECD guidelines, the IPPs as established by the APEC are 
arguably of lower standard compared to its European counterparts. The main reason 
for this conclusion is the fact that from the European perspective, privacy protection 
originates from human right, while from the APEC perspective privacy protection 
originates from economic relations (for promoting e-commerce and trans-border data 
flow). This is clearly supported by the fact that the Framework does not include the 
sensitivity principle like the European instruments. Moreover, the Framework requires 
adherence to the principle of fair and lawful in the collection stage of personal data 
but not in processing and further procedures as provided in the European 
counterparts.639Similarly, the Framework does not suggest the way of implementing 
the principles but left it to the discretion of the member economies.640 
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 Furthermore, with regard to trans-border data flow the Framework is silent on whether 
data should be transferred or not to territories without adequate or equivalent privacy 
protection like the APEC economies. Nonetheless, it imposes liability to controllers 
who export data to other territories.641However, it is important to note in order to cub 
the gap left by the Framework in cross-border data flow issue and hence realise the 
goals of the Privacy Framework, the APEC economies adopted and endorsed the 
APEC Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPR).642 
 
Overall, it is worth noting that nevertheless, the framework initiative is commendable 
as an important step in achieving a consensus in privacy protection in Asia Pacific 
region. It is of global importance for representing the readiness of the member 
economies to devise their own mundus operandi to privacy regulations separate from 
the ones developed in Europe. It is also inspired Tanzania and south Africa, in Africa, 
to enact data privacy legislation  
 
4.5 African Initiatives 
Like in any other parts of the world, internet penetration and the spread of ICTs have 
raised concerns on data protection in Africa. However, until recently, African 
governments were not in the forefront as policy entrepreneurs in privacy and data 
protection field. Nevertheless, the situation has changed, currently. That is, Africa now 
is at the forefront and has become the hub of robust and ambitious privacy and data 
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protection initiatives, both at regional and sub-regional levels.643It is worth 
highlighting that currently, 25 countries in Africa have adopted privacy framework 
legislation or have some established sort of data protection authorities.644Apart from 
the 25 countries, there are also seven countries with data protection bills in place.645 
 
Further, the African Union (AU) adopted Convention on Cyber security and Personal 
Data Protection in 2014646 to address electronic transaction, personal data protection, 
and cyber criminality.647 Developed in line with data protection principles found in 
the OECD guidelines, the GDPR and other alike international instruments, the 
Convention provides minimum standards and stands as reference framework for AU 
member states when formulating data protection legislation.648 
 
The scope of the Convention extends generally to private and public sector as well. It 
also includes computerised and manual processing of personal data.649Processing of 
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personal data in relation to research, public security, state security, defence and 
criminal prosecution are within the scope of the Convention but subject to some 
exceptions provided by extant law.650 In addition, the Convention provides for the 
basic principles of data protection in Article 13 to 23, with which compliance is 
mandatory by the data controllers. Likewise, it also provides for data subjects’ rights 
in the likeness of the EU approach.651 These principles include: lawful and fair 
processing of personal data, processing for specific purpose, legitimacy of processing 
data based on consent, adequate data collection, collection of relevant data to the 
purpose only, limited time of data retention, keeping data up to date and accurate as 
much as possible, and maintaining transparency, security and confidentiality.  
 
Moreover, data subjects’ rights include but not limited to access, rectification and 
blocking, objection of processing and notification. In the same line, the Convention 
provides for trans-border data flows.652It states that data controllers should not transfer 
personal data outside AU unless the recipient provides adequate level of protection.653 
However, the Convention has not entered into force because it still awaits the 
ratifications of 15 member states out of 54. In addition, even if the Convention comes 
into force, before long, it is not going to have any legal force until it is transposed into 
the domestic legislation of the member states. Likewise, Convention neither provides 
the definition of the term adequacy, which is one of its principles, nor defines criteria 
for determining adequacy.  
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Additionally, processing of personal data entirely for private use or household 
activities is not within the ambit of the Convention, except where the data are for 
regular dissemination or communication to third parties.654Moreover, any processing 
for artistic or literary expression, research or journalistic reasons are exempted. 
However, this is only if they are conducted solely for literary and artistic expression, 
research activities or for professional journalism and while adhering to the 
professional codes of conduct.655 
 
Moreover the adequacy criterion does not apply when personal data are transferred to 
other AU member states regardless of whether they ratified the Convention or not.656 
This might imply that the AU member states who are members of the Convention may 
assume a provision of their choice. That is when they are required to transfer personal 
data to other AU member states. Arguably, this may mean that there are no export 
restrictions or the same adequacy standard as applicable to non-member states.657 Yet, 
in some circumstances, it may also be understood to imply that transfer of personal 
data to other AU member states necessitates approval from the DPA as provided under 
Article 12 of the Convention. Likewise, the Convention is contrary to the GDPR as 
well as the CoE Convention 108, which does not advocate free flow of data within 
member states of the Union and the Convention respectively.658 
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Ultimately, these gaps that may slow down the ratification and accession to the 
Convention. Nevertheless, it furnishes the AU member countries with a framework 
for personal data protection, which may be transposed to their domestic legislation in 
near future. Furthermore, it instigates African states to recognise, protect personal data 
and encourages the free movement of such data.659 If the Convention is ratified by the 
member states and enter into force in near future, it will have gigantic impact in 
developing privacy legislation in African countries. This is due to the fact that the 
Convention is geared to stand as the reference framework in the quest of developing 
privacy legislation to the member states. 
 
At sub-regional level, the first initiatives come from the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS).660This is in the form of a supplementary Act, 
annexed to the ECOWAS treaty and hence become an integral part of it.661The 
supplementary Act, A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS was 
adopted in 2010. It legally binds and hence imposes obligation on member countries 
to enact data protection legislations in their respective jurisdiction.662 In addition, it is 
the first binding agreement at regional or international level on data protection in 
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Africa. The agreement is developed following the spirit of the repealed EU Data 
Protection Directive.663 Besides, two third of the ECOWAS member states have 
enacted data protection laws664 and bills for the same are in the process in Niger. 
Hitherto, six ECOWAS states have not taken notable initiatives in developing data 
protection regulations at domestic level.665 
 
In addition, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)666 has developed 
a Model Law on Data Protection (here in referred as the law) in 2012 for the southern 
African countries.667 The law is made in line with the then European Directive 
95/46/EC, which is now repealed and replaced by the GDPR, 2016. Correspondingly, 
its contents are developed largely, in line with the AU Convention on Cyber Security 
and Personal Data Protection, as well as the supplementary Act, A/SA.1/01/10 on 
Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS. The law was intended to establish 
uniformity in the protection of individual rights and freedoms with reference to the 
processing of personal data throughout SADC region. As its preamble shows, the law 
intends to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and promote trans-border data 
flows within SADC Region. With this rationale in mind, Article 2 of this law was 
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adopted to settle which rules applies when and to whom and to harmonise the 
application of rules and regulation in relation to data protection across SADC region. 
Besides, similar to the EU Directive, AU Convention and the Supplementary Act of 
the ECOWAS, the law is not applicable to any processing of personal data by an 
individual in the course of doing personal or household activities.668 
 
Structurally, this law is made up of a preamble and fourteen chapters, but without 
recitals like other privacy legislations such as the EU Directive. Although the law does 
not precisely define its objectives, these can be generally inferred from the wording of 
the preamble. The scope of the Model-Law set in chapter 2 that the law applies to 
automated, partly automated as well as manual processing of personal data.669 
Similarly, it applies to public as well as private data controllers.670In addition, the 
scope of the Model-Law encompasses territorial applicability. The law has a wide 
scope as the then EU Directive.671 This is evident under Article 2 (2) of the law, which 
provides that his Model-Law is applicable: - 
(a) to the processing of personal data carried out in the context of the effective 
and actual activities of any controller permanently established on [given 
country] territory or in a place where [given country] law applies by virtue 
of international public law; 
(b) to the processing of personal data by a controller who is not permanently 
established on [given country] territory, if the means used, which can be 
automatic or other means is located in [given country] territory, and is not 
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the same as the means used for processing personal data only for the 
purposes of transit through [given country] territory. 
 
It worth noting that Article 2, cited above comprises two different sets of rules of laws 
applicable. First, are the rules applicable to SADC member states and secondly, are 
those relating non-SADC member states.  
 
Furthermore, the law contains seven basic principles or conditions accepted for the 
processing of personal data. The principles adopted in the law are similar to those 
established in EU Directive, AU Cyber Security Convention, the supplementary Act 
as well as other international instruments on privacy and data protection. The 
principles include fair and lawful processing,672 purpose specification,673 
legitimacy,674 sensitivity,675 accountability,676 security677 and data quality.678 Apart 
from the data processing principles, the law also establishes the data protection 
authority. It is empowered to supervise and control the Model-Law as well as the 
privacy rights in the national territory.679 
 
Likewise, the law imposes some obligations to the data controllers. The law obliges 
the data controller to provide information to the data subject before processing data 
about him/her.680 Moreover, the data controller is required to take reasonable technical 
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and organisational measures to safeguard security of the data.681 Other obligations 
include accountability,682 confidentiality, to maintain openness of processing683 and 
notifying the data protection about the processing of personal data.684 
 
In addition, the SADC Model-Law provides for the rights of the data subject in part 
seven.685 Like the obligations of the data controllers, the rights of the data subjects are 
in line with the EU Directive, the AU Convention on Cybersecurity as well as the 
ECOWAS Supplementary Act. These include the right of access, rectification, 
deletion, temporary limitation of access, right of objection and the right of 
representation if the data subject is a minor. Moreover, the Model-Law encompasses 
the rules of trans-border data flow. However, the rules provided differ from what other 
instruments such as EU Directive and the AU Cyber Convention and others on the fact 
that it prohibits transfer of personal data not only the third-party countries without 
adequacy level of protection but also to SADC members who have not adopted the 
Model-Law. Arguably, the provision above defeats the object of the law, which is 
harmonization. Yet, the provision has some merits that it may compel or motivate 
SADC member states to develop and adopt privacy regulations that that in the same 
line with the Model-Law. 
 
Therefore, regardless of the fact that though SADC Model-Law is a soft law, upon 
ratification it is likely to influence the development and enactment of data privacy 
laws in Tanzania and South Africa respectively. This is mainly aggravated by its 
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requirement of prohibiting transfer of personal data to SADC member states, which 
has not adopted data privacy laws in line with the Model-Law. Moreover, due to the 
fact that the Model-Law was made in line with EU Directive, which is now repealed, 
there is a dire need of the SADC to revisit the law so that it can be amended and bridge 
the gap that is bridged by the GDPR to its predecessor the Directive. 
 
In the same line, the East African Community (EAC)686 like other regional blocs had 
its own initiatives to ensure protection of personal data and privacy in its region. 
However, unlike its counterparts of ECOWAS and SADC the EAC did not adopt 
legislation for data protection and privacy but issued a legal Framework for Cyber 
Law in 2008. The framework was adopted in 2010, with the intention of calling its 
member states to adopt legislation protecting personal data in line with international 
standards and the best international practice.687 
 
The main thrust of the EAC Legal framework for Cyber Law is to harmonise the 
policies and regulation in the East African Community. Indeed, the framework is 
developed in response to the challenges brought by the development of ICTs and the 
increasing reliance to it in doing day to day activities be it commercial or 
administrative, especially the use of internet.688Further, as pointed out above, the EAC 
framework differs from other Frameworks, especially in privacy and data protection 
field. It is argued by travauxpreparatoires that the Framework is not a model law but 
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rather A sheer recommendation to the EAC member states to refer to them when 
developing domestic cyber laws, and hence not intended to be binding.689 
 
Similarly, in the data privacy field the travauxpreparatoires recommended the 
imposition of two obligations that regulate processing of persona data. First, it 
recommends that in processing personal data, member states should ensure 
compliance with some principles relating to good practice. The term good practice, as 
used here, entails accountability, transparency, fair and lawful processing of data, data 
security, data accuracy and processing limitation.690Second, it recommends to  
member states to furnish the data subject with a copy of their personal data collected 
and processed, as well as an opportunity to correct any incorrect data held about 
them.691 
 
Likewise, the Cyber Framework encompasses a recommendation that due to the 
significance of privacy and data protection, among other things, member states should 
fully take into account the existing international best practices in processing personal 
data.692 However, the Framework did not go further to mention any of such best 
practices. In addition, the Framework did not attach any annex of such best practice 
or any international code of data privacy as it is generally done to other Frameworks. 
Arguably, the omission may defeat the object of the Framework, that is the 
harmonization of data privacy regulation in the region. This is because it may lead the 
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member states to adopt and follow some international best practices of their choice 
and hence differ with the other. 
 
It suffices to say that though EAC adopted the Cyber Framework Phase I in 2008 and 
Phase II in 2011, which addressed several issues data protection inclusive, the 
Framework has yielded some minor tangible results in data privacy protection in EAC 
eight years since the adoption. That is, only the country of Uganda in the EAC has 
developed data protection legislation since then. Other visible efforts are the data 
protection bills in place in some countries. The main reasons include non-binding 
nature of the Framework, lack of clearly stipulated minimum standards of data 
protection principles for the member states to stick to. Tanzania being one of the 
member states in EAC has not progressed towards the enactment of data privacy 
regulation. There is only a draft bill of the same that has been pending since 2014.  
 
Regardless of the common and divergent approaches to privacy, the regional, sub-
regional and national initiatives for privacy embody almost some common privacy 
principles. The principles originate from European instruments. These include choice 
and consent, notice, data quality and integrity, data security, data retention and 
destruction, data access and correction, cross border data transfer, personal data breach 
notification, registration with the DPA, and lastly appointment of the Data Protection 
Officer (DPO). However, not all the instruments provide for all the principles 
mentioned above.  
 
To sum this section, it is worth noting that cross-border trade and advancement of 
technological innovation have transformed Africa in many ways and made the claim 
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of privacy imperative. The African initiatives for privacy protection are evidence that 
this is an evolving concept. It affirms that privacy concept, to a large extent, acquires 
the status of a human right in Africa. However, regardless of all the efforts, there is a 
problem of harmonisation of privacy laws in Africa. This is due to the fact that there 
are disparities in policies and regulations adopted for privacy protection at the 
regional, the sub-regional and at the national level. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Cloud computing technology is a recent development, which postdates all the 
international instruments discussed in this part. As a result, the available international 
instruments suffer limitation of addressing privacy and security issues in the cloud. 
That explains why within EU new initiatives of repealing old laws and coming of new 
laws such as the GDPR. In the same line, COE has been revised and OECD Guidelines 
has been revised as well. The main reason is that these instruments had a very huge 
limitation in drafting and hence the instruments were not technological neutral. 
Moreover, the AU Convention though enacted in 2014 lacks a lot compared to other 
international instruments in content. Further, the instrument has not even come into 
force so it limits in highlighting the privacy and security challenges in the Cloud. 
 
Similarly, review of the international benchmarks for privacy portrays some shared 
and disparate trends. Firstly, the majority of the international human rights instruments 
provides for the privacy right. Nonetheless, that right is framed very widely to the 
extent that it fails to provide proper protection of privacy and personal data. Yet, it has 
provided a firm foundation for the emergence and growth of privacy laws in the world. 
Secondly, there are different approaches for protection of data privacy. For instance, 
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the European approach originates from human right and a comprehensive approach is 
more favoured, coupled with a data protection framework and unified supervisory 
authorities. Yet, in other areas like the APEC region, the approach is more business 
oriented, while the industry self-regulation is more preferred in the USA. Similarly, in 
Africa, privacy is still in nascent stage, and the favoured approach is mainly the 
European model, as privacy concept is imported from Europe.   
 
Thirdly, the presence of international, regional, and sub-regional commitments 
accepted by different nations raises some multi-sectoral effect of the privacy policies 
and frameworks. They compel those relying on industry self-regulation to be 
influenced by the principles applied in comprehensive approach mode. Fourthly, 
regardless of having international instruments on privacy and data protection, the 
GDPR and its predecessor, the Directive 95/46/EC of the EU prove to be the most 
significant catalyst for the growth of privacy and data protection regulation in the 
world. This is mainly due to its extraterritorial application through the adequacy 
requirement before transferring personal data to non-member states. Thus, countries 
wishing to engage in transaction involving personal data transfer are indirectly 
compelled to adopt comprehensive privacy regulation to meet the European standards. 
Indeed, the GDPR and its predecessor have a global impact and can be rightly regarded 




PRIVACY AND SECURITY REGULATION IN THE CLOUD IN TANZANIA 
5.1 Introduction 
The need to provide legal protection for security and privacy of personal data in 
international regulation cannot be overstressed. In the same line, Tanzania is a 
signatory of international human right treaties such as the ICCPR, 1966; the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and a member of SADC with its Model 
Law of Data Protection, 2012, which is relevant to privacy and data protection. This 
implies that Tanzania is bound to implement the international Human rights treaties 
above as well as the SADC Model Law of Data Protection at domestic legislation.  
 
In this chapter, the researcher analyses the system of security and privacy regulation 
and protection available in Tanzania. It is worth noting that the thesis mostly uses the 
term privacy instead of privacy in the cloud because there is no clear demarcation 
between the terms. The decision has also been informed by the fact that the term 
privacy in the cloud is rather new in the privacy discourse in Tanzania. Similarly, 
whereas, intellectuals and non-intellectuals struggle to understand what is meant by 
privacy in the cloud, the term privacy is more comprehensive to both intellectuals as 
well as non-intellectuals. Secondly, despite being significant for global audience, the 
thesis specifically focuses legal reform agenda in Tanzania. With this idea in mind, it 
is not proper to employ a term that is unfamiliar to many Tanzanians. Thirdly, privacy 
in the cloud is a subset of privacy right in general. This implies that protection of 
privacy in general is a prerequisite for protection of privacy in the cloud. The latter 
cannot exist without the former.  
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5.2 Privacy and Security Regulation 
Tanzania has had complicated and difficult journey in protecting privacy right of its 
residents and citizens. This includes deterring the inclusion of bill of rights in its 
constitution soon after independence to futile attempt of enacting data privacy 
legislation in the draft of freedom of information bill in 2006.693 This implies that 
privacy regulation in Tanzania is undeveloped, regardless of the fact that the ICT has 
deluged Tanzania as most people use ICT in everyday life. Currently, Tanzania has no 
comprehensive privacy protection regulation. That, it only has a draft Data Protection 
Bill, but which has been pending since 2014.694In the absence of legislation, it protects 
privacy of its citizens through the constitution, statutory legislation, and somewhat 
through common law.695 
 
The main source of privacy right in Tanzania is its 1977 Constitution as amended from 
time to time. Other sources are several statutory provisions in various pieces of 
legislation which when the need arises provides for privacy issues.696Case law is 
regarded as the third source. Nevertheless, it is undeveloped and hence of slight 
significance at present.697This part appraises the above-named sources and how they 
provide the basis of privacy protection in Tanzania at present. Nonetheless, more 
emphasis is placed on communication, health, and national security sectoral laws. This 
is because these sectoral laws, largely extent, in an ad-hoc style, provide for privacy 
                                                          
693Boshe, P., Data Privacy Law Reforms in Tanzania in Makulilo, A., B., (ed) African Data Privacy 
Laws, Switzerland, Springer, International Publishing AG,2016, Pp 161-187.   
694 Ibid. 





5.2.1 Privacy, the Constitutional Right 
Privacy is a right recognised and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
Republic of Tanzania in Article 16. It provides inter alia that, “every person is entitled 
to respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his own person, his family, and 
of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his residence and private 
communications”698Nevertheless, privacy right as provided in the Constitution is not 
absolute. Like any other fundamental rights, it is limited by other articles from the 
same Constitution.   
 
Article 16 (2) provides specific restrictions of that right when it states that “for the 
purpose of preserving the person’s right in accordance with this Article, the state 
authority shall lay down legal procedures regarding the circumstances, manner, and 
the extent to which the right to privacy, security of his person, his property, and 
residence may be encroached upon without prejudice to the provisions of this Article. 
This implies that the implementation of privacy right may depend upon other 
legislation to give effect and state its enforcement mechanisms.699 Furthermore, its 
enforcement is embedded to the other fundamental rights and can be contravened in 
favour of public safety and national security.700It is worth of note that the Constitution 
gives a room to other laws to encroach privacy right. 
 
                                                          
698The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. Article 16 (1). 
699Boshe, note 694, supra. 
700 Ibid. 
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In addition to the specific limitation to the privacy right as provided in article 16 (2), 
there are also general restrictions which are applicable to the bill of rights as enshrined 
in the Constitution. These are conditions provided under Article 30(2) through which 
any provision in the bill of rights may be limited. The Article provides that: 
“It is hereby declared that the provisions contained in this Part of this 
Constitution which set out the principles of rights, freedom and duties, does not 
render unlawful any existing law or prohibit the enactment of any law or the 
doing of any lawful act in accordance with such law for the purposes of: -    
(a)ensuring that the rights and freedoms of other people or of the interests of 
the public are not prejudiced by the wrongful exercise of the freedoms and 
rights of individuals; (b) ensuring the defence, public safety, public peace, 
public morality, public health, rural and urban development planning, the 
exploitation and utilization of minerals or the increase and development of 
property of any other interests for the purposes of enhancing the public benefit; 
(c) ensuring the execution of a judgement or order  of a court given or made in 
civil or criminal matter; (d)protecting the reputation, rights and freedoms of 
others or the privacy of persons involved in any court proceedings, prohibiting 
the disclosure of confidential information or safeguarding the dignity, authority 
and independence of the courts; (e)imposing restrictions, supervising and 
controlling the information, management and activities of private societies and 
organizations in the country; or (f) enabling any other thing to be done which 
promotes or preserves the national interest in general.” 
 
In the spirit of Article 30 (2), the Court of Appeal of Tanzania has established through 
case law, the legal standards which must be met when any other law seeking to restrict 
or contravene the fundamental rights of an individual. In Christopher Mtikila versus 
The Attorney General, the court held that “a law which seeks to limit or derogate from 
the basic right of the individual on grounds of public interest will be declared 
unconstitutional unless it satisfies two requirements: that it is not arbitrary and that the 
limitation imposed by laws is no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve the 
legitimate objection.”701 These requirements entail that the law should be accepted to 
                                                          
701Christopher Mtikila v Attorney General, Miscellaneous Cause No.10 of 2005, High Court of 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam (Unreported). Accessed from http://www.elaw.locusattorneys.co.tz/ 
content/christopher-mtikila-versus-attorney-general, on 10th November 2018. See also,Kukutia Ole 
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be lawful. This implies that the law should establish proper safeguards and control 
against arbitrary decisions as well as abuse of the law by the authority when applying 
the law.  
 
Moreover, the limitation imposed to the basic right should be proportional to what is 
required to achieve the legitimate results. The High Court of Tanzania has adopted the 
same position in Jackson Ole Nemeteni and 19 Others versus the Attorney General, 
when it established that in the need of a procedure set by law, the application of a 
provision of any law that intends to limit the fundamental rights of an individual is 
prone to abuse, and hence cannot fall within the ambit of Article 30(2) of the 
Constitution.702Regardless of the constitutional limitations to the right of privacy, it 
establishes a normative basis for privacy regulation in Tanzania.  
 
5.2.2 Draft Data Protection Bill 
Despite the fact that there is no comprehensive data protection legislation in Tanzania 
to date, there is a draft Data Protection Bill, which is pending since 2014. With the 
help from  the Support to the Harmonization of the ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(HIPSSA) the Ministry of Communication drew the Draft Bill.703 Further, the Draft 
Bill was communicated to a limited number of stakeholders only not the general 
public.704 Likewise, Tanzanian Law Reform Commission initiated a consultation with 
the public in 2016 so as to collect public opinions to inform the proposal on data 
                                                          
Pumbuni and Another v Attorney General and Another (1993) TLR 159 at p.167, See also, Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Daudi Pete [1993] TLR 22; Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo v Attorney General (2004) TLR 
14.  
702Misc. Civil Cause No. 117 of 2004, High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam (Unreported). 
703Boshe, note 700, Supra. 
704 Ibid.  
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protection legislation.705 However, to date, the status of that initiative remains 
unknown to general public. The Draft Bill though is yet to be passed as a law; is 
discussed at this part because changes recommended may possibly be made to the final 
text of the legislation. 
 
The Draft Bill proposes a wide-ranging framework for data protection, which intends 
to regulate processing of personal data by private and public sectors irrespective of 
whether the processing is through automated means or not. The bill is applicable to 
personal data regardless of the format or media used: it can be in electronic means, 
printed document, filmed, taped, or otherwise.706 It does not encompass, any 
processing of personal data for by or on behalf of the state, which may include 
processing for public safety, defence, or national security, or for the purpose of 
preventing, investigating, or proof of offences.707This necessarily implies that 
principles and other provisions of the bill are not applicable to the in law enforcement 
and criminal law filed of law.  
 
The draft Data Protection Bill establishes the Data Protection Authority (the Data 
Protection Commissioner) responsible with the implementation of the 
bill.708Correspondingly, the draft bill provides for the data protection principles, also 
known as the conditions for the lawful processing of personal data. These include 
lawful purposes for collection of personal data, with transparency and lawful means 
                                                          
705Makulilo. A., B., and Boshe, P. Consultation on the Commission’s Comprehensive approach on Personal Data 
Protection in Tanzania, 2016, submitted on 31st August 2016.  
706Boshe, note 703, supra. 
707 Draft Data Protection Bill, S, 5, (3), (b). 
708 Ibid, s.20. 
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of collection.709 Equally, use limitation is another principle with the effect that data 
should be used for the intended purpose of collection only.710 Similarly, there is 
purpose specification,711 data retention, data security,712 data accuracy,713 
accountability714 and data subject participation.715 
 
Although the draft bill provides for the data protection principles as well as 
establishing the office of the Data Protection Commissioner, it does not stipulate other 
necessary conditions to be adhered to before processing personal data. For instance, 
the condition of giving notice to the data protection Commissioner is not explicitly 
stipulated. The bill is also silent with regard to consent requirement while it is a 
prerequisite condition to be met for the processing of personal data to be lawful. 
Arguably, if the draft bill is passed into law without any substantial change, it will 
offer only minimum data processing conditions and principles. Nevertheless, with the 
current operation of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, (GDPR) 
with its universal applicability, the draft bill might not attain the adequacy requirement 
of the EU law. The GDPR restricts transfer of European personal data to third 
countries (non-EU member states) unless they attain the adequate standard of data 
protection in relation to the GDPR. 
 
                                                          
709 Ibid, s, 6, (1). 
710 Ibid, s, 9. 
711 Ibid, s, 10. 
712 Ibid, s, 12. 
713 Ibid, s. 8. 
714 Ibid, s.15. 
715 Ibid, s. 7 and 14. 
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5.2.3 Privacy and Security Protection in Communication Sector 
Despite the general understanding that a comprehensive privacy regulation is missing 
in Tanzania, to some extent, privacy is protected through some sector specific 
regulations.716 Communications sector is among the sectors with laws and regulations 
with some provisions for protecting privacy.  One of those is the Electronic and Postal 
Communication Act, 2010, (EPOCA). This Act was enacted not only with the aim of 
addressing the challenges that came with modern technologies, but also harmonising 
and consolidating communication related laws so as to enhance their 
implementation.717 More so, it was also intended to introduce the registration of sim 
cards as well as Central Equipment Identification Register (CEIR).718The law requires 
every person who owns or intends to own and use a mobile telephone in the country 
to register his or her sim card.719 
 
Similarly, it requires all the service providers to collect for registration purpose 
information which identify all the buyers of sim cards before activating the same in 
their networks.720 Likewise, the Act stipulates specific information that a potential 
customer should submit to the service provider. A natural person ought to give his or 
her full name, proved by a copy of the identity card or any other accepted documents 
in proving the identity of an individual, together with residential, business, or 
registered physical address.721 Correspondingly, a legal person is required to submit 
any of the following: certificate of registration, business license, Tax Payer 
                                                          
716Makulilo, note 695, supra. 
717Electronic and Postal Communications Bill, 2009, ‘Objects and Reasons’ at p.115. 
718Ibid. 
719 EPOCA, 2010, section 93(1.) 
720 Ibid, section 93(2). 
721 Ibid, section 93(2)(a). 
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Identification Number Certificate, or a Value Added Tax Registration Number if 
applicable.722 
 
The service provider is duty bound to verify the accuracy of collected information 
before registering the subscriber.723 The Act stipulates that the register should be 
retained either in hard copies or electronically.724Additionally, the law requires that 
the personal information collected by the services provided be submitted to the 
Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) for safekeeping in the 
subscribers’ database.725 
 
EPOCA places a duty of privacy protection upon the service providers owing the fact 
that the data subject loses control over his her data once collected and stored in the 
database.726It provides that “a person, who is a member, employee of application 
service license, or its agent, shall have a duty of confidentiality of any information 
received in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”727 Furthermore, it states, “no 
person shall disclose the content of the information of any customer received in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act, except where such person is authorized by 
other written law.”728Arguably, this duty intends to make sure that personal 
information collected are secure, confidential and intact.  
 
                                                          
722 Ibid, section 93 (3)(b). 
723 Ibid, section 93(3)(b). 
724 Ibid, section 93 (4). 
725 Ibid, section 91 (1), (2), (3). 
726 Ibid, section 98. 
727 Ibid, section 98 (1). 
728Ibid, section 98 (2). 
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As shown above, the provision applies only to members, employees and agents,as the 
TCRA remains to be the custodian of the personal information collected, according to 
section 91. Nonetheless, EPOCA is silent on the TCRA’s duty on privacy protection. 
Similarly, although Section 99 may be impliedly applicable to the TCRA, it does not 
sufficiently bring it within its domain.729Moreover, Section 98 (2) of EPOCA 
authorises disclosure of information, if the individual disclosing the information is 
authorised by any other written law. However, the phrase “any other written law” is 
very wide to the extent of jeopardising privacy of personal data collected under this 
law. Additionally, EPOCA permits interception through Article 99, which allows 
interception as well as disclosure if the information is needed for use by the court of 
law, law enforcement agency, or a tribunal.730The section also allows disclosure of 
information by an authorised person to another law enforcement officer so as to enable 
them to perform their official duties properly.731 
 
Similarly, EPOCA criminalises unlawful interception, disclosure, or use of 
information obtained unlawfully.732 More so, the criminality character is also 
                                                          
729 Section 99 of EPOCA states, A person shall not disclose any information received or obtained in 
exercising his powers or performing his duties in terms of this Act except (a) where the information 
is required by ant law enforcement agency, court of law and other lawfully constituted tribunal; (b) 
Notwithstanding the provision of this section, any authorized person who executes a directive or 
assist with execution thereof and obtains knowledge of information of any communication may- (i) 
disclose such information to another law officer to the extent that such disclosure is necessary for the 
proper performance of the official duties of the authorized person making or the law enforcement 
officer receiving the disclosure; or (ii) use such information to the extent that such use is necessary 
for the proper performance of official duties.    
730 Ibid. 
731 Ibid. 
732 Section 120, EPOCA states; Any person who, without lawful authority under this Act or any other 
written law  (a) intercepts, attempts to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or attempt 
to intercept any communications; or (b) Discloses, or attempts to disclose to any other person the 
contents of any communications, knowingly or having reason to believe that the information was 
obtained through interception of any communications in contravention of this section; or (c) Uses, or 
attempts to use the contents of any communications, knowingly having reason to believe that the 
information was obtained through the interception of any communications in contravention of this 
 152 
applicable when an authorised person lawfully intercepts the contents of 
communication and eventually discloses them unlawfully.733 However, the possibility 
of enforcing these provisions is very minimal considering that the provisions are 
drafted very broadly and loosely. Arguably, assessing these provisions while referring 
to the constitutional right of privacy as provided in the Constitution, clearly implies 
that EPOCA does not properly protect personal data held in the service providers’ 
database and those in the TCRA’s database. Similarly, the flimsy protection of data 
privacy accorded by EPOCA does not apply to the cloud. Though the Act stipulates 
that data may be stored electronically, it does not categorically provide for the cloud 
environment.  
 
In the same line, the Electronic and Postal Communications (Consumer Protection) 
Regulations contain some conditions and principles for processing personal data in 
communication sector.734The Regulations are applicable only to those entities 
registered to offer postal services and electronic communication services.735The 
regulation permits the licensee to collect and maintain personal data of his or her 
customers where necessary for business purposes only.736 In so doing, the collection 
                                                          
section, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine of not less than five million 
Tanzanian shillings or to imprisonment for a term not less than twelve months, or to both.  
733 Section 121, EPOCA states; (1) Any person who is authorized under this Act intentionally discloses, 
attempts to disclose, to any other person the contents of any communications, intercepted by means 
authorized by this Act; (a) knowing or having reason to believe that the information was obtained 
through the interception of such communications in the connection with a criminal investigation, (b) 
having obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal investigation; or (c) 
improperly obstructs, impedes, or interferes with a duly authorized criminal investigation, commits 
an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine of not less than five million Tanzanian shillings 
or to imprisonment for a term not less than twelve months, or to both. 
734Electronic and Postal Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, 2018, R.6, Accessed from 
https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/regulations/10._GN._61__The_Electronic_and_Postal_Communicat
ios_Consumer_Protection__Regulations_2018.pdf, on 21 November 2018. 
735 Ibid, Regulation 2. 
736 Ibid, Regulation 6 (1). 
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and maintenance must comply with the general data processing principles. These 
include the principle that personal data should be fairly and lawfully collected and 
processed.737 
 
Secondly, any processing of personal data must be for the identified purposes only.738 
Thirdly, the processing of data should be accurate and should be based on accurate 
information.739 Fourthly, any processing of personal data should be done in agreement 
with other consumer’s rights.740 Fifthly, the personal information collected should be 
protected against improper or accidental disclosure.741 Lastly, personal data should not 
be transferred to any party except as permitted by the terms and conditions agreed with 
the consumer, as permitted by any permission or approval of the TCRA, or is 
otherwise permitted or required by other applicable laws.742 
 
It is worth noting that the regulation provides a basis of personal data protection in 
communication sector. However, the protection of personal information in other 
divisions is not within the ambit of the regulation. Similarly, the regulation does not 
provide for consent, which is a very important prerequisite for the processing of 
personal data. More so, the regulation does not provide for period within which 
personal data can be retained in the database of the service provider be it public or 
private entity. The lack of retention period provision poses a risk of personal data 
being retained for an indefinite time. Likewise, the regulation is silent on the rights 
                                                          
737 Ibid, Regulation 6 (2), (a). 
738 Ibid, Regulation 6 (2), (b).  
739 Ibid, Regulation 6 (2), (c). 
740 Ibid, Regulation 6 (2), (d). 
741Ibid, Regulation 6 (2), (e). 
742 Ibid, Regulation 6 (2), (f). 
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accorded to the data subjects. These include rights such as right of rectification, right 
to access personal data, right of erasure, and the right to be informed about the data 
that different entities have about them. 
 
Similarly, the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations 
establish some regulations which help in boosting privacy and data protection in 
communication sector.743The regulations are applicable only to the online content. 
They regulate the online services offered by the application services licensees, 
bloggers, internet cafes, online content hosts, online forums, online radio, or 
television, social media, subscribers, users of online content, and any other related 
online contents.744Moreover, the regulations vest powers upon the TCRA to regulate 
the online content.745 This is accomplished through registering users as well as 
platforms of online content and through actions such as ordering the removal of 
prohibited content or removal of contents that violate specified obligations and 
running a public awareness in relation to proper and safe use of online content.746It is 
in the same line that Part 3 of the Act provides for specific obligations of the service 
providers and the users of online services and platforms, including the discussion 
forums, social media and online broadcasts, which include radios and television. 
 
                                                          
743The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations Act, 2018. Accessed from 
https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/regulations/SUPP_GN_NO_133_16_03_2018_EPOCA_
ONLINE_CONTENT_REGULATIONS_2018.pdf, on 12th December 2018. 
744 Ibid, Regulation 2 (a)-(i). 
745 Ibid, Regulation 4. 
746Ibid, Regulation 4 (a), (b) and (c). 
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Additionally, the regulation enhances privacy and data protection initiatives in the 
country through, prohibiting unlawful disclosure of any information collected or 
obtained by the TCRA and any of its employees while performing their lawfully duty 
or while exercising their powers.747However, this prohibition is subject to exception 
when any law enforcement agency, court of law, or any other lawful constituted 
tribunal necessarily needs the information.748Nevertheless, the regulation restricts the 
processing of the information only to the extent that is required for the proper 
performance of the lawful duties.749 
 
Despite the fact that the Act promotes privacy and data protection initiatives, its 
applicability to the online content only, is a grave limitation. This is because it cannot 
be applied to offline data irrespective of their sensitivity. Moreover, the applicability 
of the Act to all online data content is very broad in the sense that not all online data 
qualifies as personal data. Furthermore, the Act is silent on the retention time of an 
online content. This implies that data, personal data inclusive, may be retained for 
unlimited time contrary to data protection principles. Arguably, the Act does not 
provide for data subject rights whenever personal data is processed by the TCRA or 
in the online content. These include rights such as right to rectification, access, right 
to be forgotten, and many others. 
 
                                                          
747 Ibid, Regulation 11 (1). 
748 Ibid. 
749 Ibid, Regulation 11 (2). 
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5.2.4 Health Sector 
The growth of electronic health records under the umbrella of health information 
technology is being promoted all over the world.750 The Tanzania National Health 
Strategy 2013-2018, among other strategic principles provides that e-Health should 
uphold integrity, patient data privacy and confidentiality.751Regardless of the fact that 
there are neither specific e-health regulations nor comprehensive data privacy 
legislation in the country, there is some legislation in the health sector with some 
provisions relating to privacy protection in the health sector. 
 
HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2008 is one of the legislations in the 
health sector that provides for privacy protection. The Act criminalises some actions 
and practices of health workers. Subjecting a person to the testing of HIV without his 
or her consent or knowledge is among the practices criminalised by the Act.752In 
establishing criminal liability under this Act, consent and knowledge are two separate 
elements but inseparable ones. This is due to the fact that there is no consent without 
knowledge, and knowledge alone without agreement does not justify HIV testing. 
Ultimately, any testing with knowledge but without agreement amounts to testing 
without informed consent and hence a crime on the part of health practitioner.  
 
                                                          
750Verhenneman, G., &Dumortier, J., Legal Regulation of Health Records: A Comparative Analysis of 
Europe and the US in George, C., Et al, eHealth: Legal, Ethical and Governance Challenges. 
Springer, Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/ London,2013, Pp 25-56, at p.25.  
751Tanzania- Ministry of Health and social Welfare Tanzania National eHealth Strategy 2013-2018, 
2013, p 7 Accessed from 
http://ihi.eprint.org/3727/1/ehealth_strategy%20august%2029th/20sept%202013, on 25th 
November 2018. 
752Section 15(7) of the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act which states, ‘Any health 
practitioner who compels any person to undergo HIV testing or procures HIV testing to another 
person without the knowledge of that other person commits an offence’. 
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Similarly, the Act also requires confidentiality in communicating HIV test results. It 
states “the results of an HIV test shall be confidential and shall be released only to the 
person tested.”753 In the same line, the law requires medical practitioners to observe 
confidentiality while handling medical information and documents. It states that “all 
health practitioners: workers, employers, recruitment agencies, insurance companies, 
data recorders, sign language interpreters, legal guardians, and other custodians of any 
medical records, files, data or test results shall observe confidentiality in the handling 
of all medical information and documents particularly the identity and status of 
persons living with HIV and AIDS.”754 The major limitation of the Act is the fact that 
it protects privacy in the context of HIV and AIDS only. 
 
Similarly, Human DNA Regulation Act, 2009 is another piece of legislation with some 
provisions regulating privacy right in the country. It provides for collecting, packing, 
storing, transporting, analysing and disposal of human DNA samples.755 Moreover, it 
regulates the disclosure of all genetic information, access to genetic records, 
confidentiality, and research of the same in Tanzania.756However, privacy protection 
accorded by these few provisions of the Human DNA Act, 2009 are unlikely to be 
adequate in protecting privacy right in a setting where the protection of the right to 
privacy generally is missing such as in the cloud.757 
 
Additionally, the Medical Practitioners and Dentist Act, Cap 152, of 2002 is also a 
                                                          
753The HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control), 2008. Section 16 (1). 
754 Ibid, section 17 (1). 
755The Human DNA Act, 2009, Section 23-37. 
756 Ibid, section 52-65. 
757Ubena, J., Privacy: A Forgotten Right in Tanzania, the Tanzania Lawyer, 2012, Vol.1, No.2, pp. 72-
114.  
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piece of legislation in the health sector with some implication for protecting privacy 
right. Under this Act, Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct for Medical and Dental 
Practitioners in Tanzania, was established in 2005. It provides for different principles 
and two among them are important for the protection of privacy right. Autonomy (self-
determination) is the first principle, which requires inter alia that health practitioners 
should offer treatment and other forms of health interventions to a patient only when 
he or she gives an informed consent. Privacy is the second principle. This advocates 
that any information about a patient is private property, i.e. records, interests,the body 
(corpus) of the patient and all the affairs relating to the patient’s conditions. The 
information should thus be restricted to the medical practitioner only. 
 
5.2.5 Privacy Protection and National Security Sector 
Despite the constitutional protection of privacy right in Tanzania under Article 16 (1), 
the same Constitution under Article 16(2) provides for a leeway of other pieces of 
legislation to impinge privacy right. According to the article, the law marker may enact 
a law to provide on how the right to privacy may be protected, pursued, or intruded by 
government authorities and its agents.758As a result, there are some laws in place with 
some inferences to privacy protection. These laws fall under peace and security sector. 
We discuss them in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
The first of these laws is Prevention of Terrorism Act. This is an Act, which was 
                                                          
758The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. Article 16(2), It provides that ‘…For the 
purpose of preserving the person’s right in accordance with this Article, the state authority shall lay 
down legal procedures regarding the circumstances, manner and extent to which the right to privacy, 
security of his person, his property and residence may be encroached upon without prejudice to the 
provisions of this Article.   
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enacted in 2002 to provide for comprehensive measures of dealing with terrorism, to 
prevent and to cooperate with other states in the suppression of terrorism and to 
provide for related matters.759The Act authorises police officers responsible with 
terrorism offences investigation to intercept communication.760 However, the law 
requires the interference with someone’s privacy to be lawful. The interception is 
regarded to be lawful only if before the interception, the officer applies “ex parte” to 
the High Court of Tanzania and acquires warrant authorising interception.761 
 
Moreover, the law requires the police officer to make an application for the 
communication interception order after Attorney General Consent is granted.762After 
the application, if the Court satisfies itself that there are judicious grounds to believe 
that some information that relates to the commission of terrorism offence or about a 
person suspected of committing a terrorist offence is in the communication 
communicated or about to be communicated, the Court may order the service provider 
to intercept and retain that particular communications.763Conversely, the Court can 
issue an order authorising the officers of the police force to enter premises and install 
devices for intercepting and retaining of such particular communications, and 
afterwards to remove and retain the devices.764 
 
However, the Act does not provide for the limitation period of the order that the Court 
may issue. This may result in the continuous interception of the targeted persons’ 
                                                          
759 Act, No. 21 of 2002. 
760 Section 31, Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. 
761 Ibid, section 31(1). 
762 Ibid, section 31 (2). 
763  Ibid, Section 31 (3), (a). 
764Ibid, Section 31 (3), (b). 
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communication under the umbrella of the Courts’ authorisation. This is applicable 
even if the investigation does not link the targeted person to the suspected offence. In 
the same vein, the Act does not provide for the erasure or deletion of the tapped 
communication, if it is not satisfactory enough to warrant prosecution of the suspected 
individual. Principally, from the gaps discussed above, though the Act seems to have 
met the procedural requirements as provided under Article 16 (2) of the Constitution 
of Tanzania, it is uncertain if it passes the proportionality test as provided under Article 
30 (2) of the same Constitution. 
 
Tanzania Intelligence and Security Act, 1996 is another legislation with an implication 
to privacy protection. This Act allows interception of private communication for the 
sake of state security.765 The Act authorises Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service 
(TISS) to investigate any individual or a body of persons if it has any probable cause 
to consider him or her a risk or a cause of risk of a threat to the state security.766 
 
Besides, according to this Act, TISS has the power to institute surveillance of some 
individuals or a category of individuals.767 It is important to underscore that this Act 
defines the term intercept in relation to any communication lawfully obtained by the 
person making the interception to include hearing, listening to, recording, monitoring, 
or acquiring the communication, or acquiring its substance, meaning or 
purport.768More so, the term intercept has the same meaning with the term 
                                                          
765 Cap 406, R. E. 2002. 
766 Ibid, section 15(1). 
767 Ibid, section 5(1), (d) and (2), (d). 
768 Ibid section 3. 
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interception.769  However, the term intercept is found only at the definition section but 
not in the provisions provided for in the Act.  
 
Similarly, it is important to highlight that the Act uses the term surveillance instead of 
the term interception, though the term surveillance is not defined in the Act. 
Principally, although the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Act, 1996 evaded the use 
of the term interception, it authorises, its uses in disguise of the term surveillance. It 
is worth noting that though the Act provides for surveillance and interception, it 
defines the grounds that authorise its uses very loosely and broadly.770 It merely 
mentions state security as a blanket reason for interception and surveillance. Likewise, 
the Act does not provide for the procedures for surveillance and interception. As a 
result, the surveillance and interception are conducted without the need of a warrant 
or any prior authorisation. This implies that TISS Act when weighed against the 
Constitutional right of privacy as provided under Article 16, falls far below the mark 
of privacy protection accorded by the Constitution. 
 
Furthermore, the Cyber Crime Act, 2015 is another law, which has some elements of 
privacy protection in Tanzania. The Act was made to protect information stored in the 
computer, and these may include personal information. Section 4 of the Act states: 
(1) “a person shall not intentionally and unlawfully access and cause a computer 
system to be accessed. 
(2) a person who contravenes subsection one commits an offence…….” 
                                                          
769 Ibid. 
770Makulilo, note 716, supra. 
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Moreover, section 7 of the same Act states: 
“a person who intentionally and unlawfully damages or deteriorates computer 
data, deletes computer data, alters computer data and renders computer data 
meaningless, useless or ineffective, commits an offence……..” 
 
The above provision simply that the Act criminalise unlawfully access to computer 
and hence provides protection to any data stored in the computer network. Similarly, 
it also criminalises any act, which constitutes illegal data interference.  However, 
despite the fact that the Act purports to protect all the data stored in the computer, 
personal data inclusive, these provisions are very broad and widely constructed. 
Indeed, they do not specifically protect privacy of the personal data stored in the cloud. 
Consequently, privacy protection provided by this Act, when measured against the 
constitutional privacy stated in the constitution, is unsatisfactory. 
 
Equally, the Registration and Identification of Persons Act, is another law in Tanzania 
with some implication to privacy protection.771The Act in intended to regulate all the 
matters relating to registration of persons and the issuance of national identity cards 
(National IDs) in the country.  Since 2011, all Tanzanian citizens and residents are 
being registered and furnished with national IDs under this law. Among other things, 
the law prohibits the disclosure of information that is collected from different persons 
for registration purposes except in specific situations stipulated by the same law. This 
is clearly provided for under Section 19 which states: 
“subject to section 18, the Registrar and any registration officer and any 
immigration officer performing functions under this Act shall not-  
                                                          
771Cap 36, R. E. 2002. 
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(a) produce for inspection, or supply a copy of, the photograph of any person 
registered under this Act or his fingerprints, or   
(b) disclose or supply a copy of the particulars furnished under section 7 or 9, 
except and unless with the written permission of the Minister which may-  
(i) refer to a person or category of persons by name, office or description; and  
(ii) contain such terms and conditions as the Minister may deem fit to impose.” 
 
The disclosure provisions above seem to be protecting privacy and personal data. 
However, vesting the discretionary powers over personal data upon the Minister 
makes the provision to be very widely and broadly constructed. This is because the 
Act is silent on how the Minister’s discretion powers can be checked against any 
probable abuse. In the same vein, the law on registration and identification of persons 
becomes uncertain by leaving the task of imposing the terms and conditions on each 
case on its own merit that would necessitate disclosure at the discretion of the Minister. 
Even more, the discretionary powers vested to the Minister lacks proper safeguards 
and controls that could enhance the protection of personal data in the database of the 
National ID Authority. This implies privacy protection as provided in this Act, is still 
at infancy stage when measured against the Constitution. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
In summing up this part, it is imperative to highlight that there is no data privacy 
regulation in Tanzania, regardless of the fact that it is a member of the AU, SADC and 
EAC, which are the regional and sub-regional groups with some initiatives for data 
privacy protection. It is also absurd to find that there are no general public or 
parliamentary debates and discussions with the ultimate goal of adopting an omnibus 
data protection law. Further, it is worth noting that regardless of coming into force of 
the GDPR in May 25, 2018, the government has not felt the compulsion brought by 
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the requirement of Article 45 of the GDPR, to ensure an adequate level of protection 
of personal information in its domestic legislation. Probably, the exceptions stated in 
Article 49 of the GDPR are working efficiently for Tanzania at present. 
 
Moreover, the presented analysis and examination of privacy and security issues in 
the cloud in Tanzania has revealed the lack of data privacy law to protect privacy and 
security in the cloud regardless of a constitutional right to privacy. Feeble protection 
provided by the constitution and the sectoral laws fall short of expansively protecting 
privacy in the cloud. Cloud computing technology being a new paradigm post-dates 
the constitution as well as sectoral laws with the elements of protecting privacy. As 






PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROTECTION REGULATION IN THE CLOUD  
IN SOUTHAFRICA 
6.1 Introduction 
South Africa is regarded as one of the major ICT markets in African continent by 
value.772 It demonstrates technological headship in the mobile software category, 
electronic banking amenities and security software.773 Moreover, the general adoption 
rate of cloud computing services has increased; and South Africa now is considered a 
cloud evolving territory.774 It is also regarded as a cloud computing technology hub, 
which is very important for access for sub-Saharan countries.775 However, the degree 
of cloud computing adoption is low compared to the expectation due to a variety of 
constraining factors and trepidations that lead to the mistrust of the cloud.776 
 
Major concerns identified are privacy and security in the cloud environment.777 This 
chapter offers an outline of the context of cloud computing in South Africa, and 
assesses how it is regulated. It also provides an overview of the development of 
privacy legislation in the country. At the same time, it evaluates whether the existing 
privacy regulation is tailored to address cloud-computing technology. The strengths 
and the weaknesses of the current privacy regulation are provided as justification for 
                                                          
772The Department of Communications in South Africa, South Africa Information Technology, 2018. 
Accessed from https://www.export.gov/article?id=South-Africa-information-technology, Accessed 
on 7th January 2019. 
773 Ibid. 
774Crowe, D., Cloud Adoption in South Africa. 2017. Accessed from 
https://www.shapeblue.com/cloud-adoption-in-south-africa/ on 7th January 2019. 
775 Ibid. 
776Skolmen, note 52, supra. 
777 Ibid. 
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proposing the quick coming into force of a robust omnibus data protection law in 
South Africa. 
 
6.2 Context of Cloud Computing in South Africa 
Cloud computing is a new paradigm in computing technologies and is at present 
extensively accepted and used worldwide for its numerous benefits.778In recent years, 
migrating to the cloud has become prevalent all over the world due to its capacity, 
efficiency, cost effectiveness and simplified access.779Gillwald and Moyo are of the 
view that provision of cloud computing services in most of the African states is supply 
oriented especially in public sector rather than demand oriented.780 However, South 
Africa seems to be an exceptional case because its adoption of cloud computing is 
demand driven through corporate sector.781 
 
Putting it differently, one can say that demand of cloud service from private sector in 
South Africa stimulates the growth of cloud computing and technology is expansively 
used all over the nation.782It is used in private and public sector including e-
government as well.783 Currently, cloud computing global players, including the 
Microsoft, AWS and Google, are operating in south Africa. Google and Microsoft are 
                                                          
778Gebers, J., &Ophoff, J., Exploring Cloud Computing Legal & Privacy Issues in South Africa. A 
Conference Paper Presented in World Wide Web Applications Conference in Cape Town, on 10th to 
13th September 2013. Accessed from https://www.academia.edu/Exploring_cloud_computing_ 
legal_and_privacy_issues_in_south_africa, on 9th January 2019. 
779Mzekandaba, S., Security Concerns Hold Back South Africa Cloud Adoption. 2014 Accessed from 
Http://www.itwebafrica.com/m/news/A69k9JN8V7nd, on 9th January 2019. 
780Gillwald, A, et.al., note 70, supra. 
781Ibid. 
782Ibid. 
783Mvelase, P. et.al. Towards a Government Public Cloud Model: The Case of South Africa. A 
Conference Paper presented in the Second International Conference on “Cluster Computing “in 
L’viv, Ukraine on 3rd to 5th June 2013. Accessed from https://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/237077704_Towards_a_Government_Public_Cloud_Model_The_Case_of_South_Afri
ca, on 10th January 2019. 
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ambitiously marketing cloud computing services while competing with local 
companies like Internet Solutions. At the same time, the AWS provides massive 
shared computing capacity while competing with local establishment such as the 
MTN, Telkom, and Internet Solutions respectively.784 Due to security and data 
protection concerns, cloud type preferred in South Africa is private cloud.785 
Nevertheless, many companies are migrating to public cloud so as to get the benefit 
of the economies of scale.786 
 
It is worth highlighting that cloud computing is regarded as an extension of hosting 
and data centres, and hence a logical next step up the value chain.787 It is remarkable 
that cloud computing in South Africa is applicable in health sector and is progressively 
gaining acceptance as an effective way of enlightening health care delivery.788. 
Despite the enormous benefits of cloud computing that fuel its acceptance, cloud 
technology and architecture give rise to inherent legal and regulatory concerns. This 
is because cloud computing generally shifts the data beyond the physical borders of 
the company. Consequently, issues such as privacy and security of data arises.789 The 
privacy and security issues calls for regulatory intervention for cloud computing. The 
                                                          
784Gillwald, A., & Moyo, M. Prospects, Challenges and Impacts of Cloud: Perspectives from (South) 
Africa.  A Presentation to UNCTAD Workshop on Cloud Economy, Geneva, February 2013. 
Accessed from https://researchictafrica.net/research/research-presentations, on 10th January 2019. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Ibid. 
787Gillwald, et al., Understanding what is happening in ICT in South Africa-a Supply- and demand -
side analysis of the ICT sector, 2012. Accessed from 
http://www.researchictafrica.net/publications/Evidence_for_ICT_Policy_Action/Policy_Paper_7_-
_Understanding_what_is_happening_in_ICT_in_South_Africa.pdf, on 10th January 2019. 
788Mgonzi, T., & Weeks, R., The Impact of Cloud Computing on the Transformation of Healthcare 
System in South Africa. A Conference Paper Presented in 2015 ITU Kaleidoscope: Trust in the 
Information Society. Accessed from 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/304295616_The_impact_of_cloud_computing_on_the_tra
nsformation_of_healthcare, on 10th January 2019.  
789 Sotto, L., et. al, Privacy and Data Security Risks in Cloud Computing, 2010. Electronic Commerce 
& Law Report. 
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following part provides an assessment of how security and data privacy is regulated 
in the cloud in South Africa. 
 
6.3 Regulation of Cloud Computing in South Africa 
Despite the fact that South Africa is regarded as cloud evolving nation and the ICT 
hub for sub-Saharan Africa, cloud computing is not systematically regulated. This 
implies that there is no sector specific regulation for Cloud Computing, and the 
existing data protection law (POPI) suffers some limitations in protecting security and 
privacy of data in the cloud.790Jaeger is of the view that there are some key issues in 
cloud computing which needs regulation.791 These include privacy and personal data, 
anonymization, government surveillance, and telecommunication capacity.792 
Moreover, Muyinga, establishes that regulating cloud computing in South Africa 
among other things, implies regulating privacy.793 The need of privacy regulation is 
evidenced by low adoption rate of cloud computing.794 Putting it differently, privacy 
and security issues in South Africa leads to low cloud adoption rate, hence there is the 
need for privacy regulation so as to cure the anomaly. 
 
In spite of not having a sector specific regulation for privacy in cloud environment in 
South Africa, still privacy is to some extent protected through general laws and 
                                                          
790Crowe, note 784, supra.  
791Jaeger, P., T., et al., Cloud Computing and Information Policy: Computing in a Policy Cloud. Journal of 
information Technology and Politics, 2008: 5: 209-283. 
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793Muyinga, M., Privacy and Legal Issues in Cloud Computing. The SMME Position in South Africa. A Conference 
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statutes.795 The general law includes the South African Constitution and the common 
law, while, the statutes are sector specific in nature.796 Arguably, privacy protection 
provided by those sources is not considered as satisfactory as the one accorded by the 
data privacy legislation.797 There are propositions that inadequacies and the limitation 
experienced to some extent necessitated the adoption of an omnibus data privacy law 
known as Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. Nevertheless, since its 
adoption in November 2013 to date, it has not come into force, except for some few 
provisions that are intended to establish the office of the regulator.798 This part assesses 
the responsibilities of the above-named sources in data privacy in South Africa. It also 
demonstrates strengths or weaknesses of the sources in data protection. It worth noting 
that more emphasis has been placed on Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 
2013, because it is an omnibus data protection law that awaits full implementation in 
a near, but unknown future.  
 
6.3.1The Constitution of South Africa 1996 
South Africa protects privacy as a constitutional right. Since the coming into force of 
the Interim Constitution in 1994, this right has been protected as a fundamental 
right.799 Article 13 of the Interim Constitution stated that, ‘every person shall have the 
right to his or her personal privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to 
                                                          
795Burchel, J., The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable Hybrid. Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law, 2009, Vol 13.1. Accessed from http://www.ejcl/org/131/art131-2.pdf, on 10th January 2019. 
796Gebers, note 778, supra. 
797Makulilo, note 770, supra. 
798The Government Gazette 37544 of April 11, 2014 the following sections came into force: s 1 (definitions); Part 
A of Chapter 5(establishments of Information Regulator); S 112 (grants the Minister the authority to adopt 
regulations); s 113 (procedures for making regulations), in Roos, A., Data Protection Law in South Africa, in 
Makulilo, A. B. (ed) African Data Privacy Laws, Switzerland, Springer International Publishing AG, 2016, pp. 
189-228. 
799Roos, A., Data Protection in Dana, M., et al. (2008) Information and Technology Law. LexisNexis, Durban, 
2008, pp 313-392, at p 360. 
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searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or 
the violation of private communications’.800Moreover, the same provision is 
reproduced in the final Constitution of South Africa in Article 14, which states that: 
‘Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have- 
(a) their person or home searched;  
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possession seized;  
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.’801 
 
The scope of protection that the article above provides is evidently narrow. The reason 
for this is that it warrants only a general right to privacy coupled with explicit 
protection against searches, seizures as well as communication infringement.802  
Nevertheless, there are arguments that the listing of privacy situations bequeathed in 
Article 14 is not comprehensive. Consequently, the protection accorded under this 
article is extending to other methods of collecting information or making unlawful 
disclosure.803 
 
Moreover, although privacy instances reckoned in Article 14 of the South African 
Constitution refers to information aspect of the privacy right, the Constitutional Court 
has extended it to substantive privacy rights.804 These are rights which empower an 
                                                          
800The interim constitution is the constitution towards the majority rule in South Africa, which marked the end of 
apartheid era. It was assented on 25th January 1994 and commence to apply on April 1994, Act 200 of 1994. 
801The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
802Roos, note 799, supra. 
803McQupid-Mason, D., J., Privacy in Chaskalson, M., et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa, JUTA, 
Kenwny, 1996. Cited in Makulilo A., B., p 396, note 797 supra. 
804De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2005 (1) SA 406 (CC). 
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individual to make decisions about their home, sexual life, and family in general.805 In 
Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa, the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa established some principles or factors to be considered in assessing 
whether the violation of the information aspect of privacy right has occurred.806 These 
include the manner through which information was collected, whether intrusive or not, 
the nature of the information, whether intimate information or not, the initial purpose 
of collection, the manner and nature of the dissemination (to whom and how the 
information is communicated).807 
 
As well, the decision of cases such as Media 24 (Pty) Ltd and other v Department of 
Public works and others,808 and Craig smith and Associates v Minister of Home Affairs 
and others,809the Constitutional Court stated that in establishing whether the right to 
privacy has been violated or not, the right to privacy should be assessed against all 
other contending interests. However, in Minister of Police and Others v Kunjana the 
Court took a different stance but with the same intention of protecting privacy right. 
It stated that warrant less searches conducted by police officials in terms of the Drugs 
and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, where no urgency exists, breaches the right to 
                                                          
805Neethling, J., et al., Neethling’s Law of Personality. 2nd ed, LexisNexis, Durban. 2005. 
8061998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) 1145. See also Ross, A., Data Privacy Law, pp 363-487 in Van der Merwe, 
D., et al, Information and Communications Technology Law, 2016, at p 417. 
807Ross, note 802, supra. 
8082016 (3) ALL SA 870 (KZP). In this case the applicants were media houses who sought access to 
the disciplinary proceedings instituted by the first respondent against eleven of his employees in 
relation to the upgrades made to the President’s Nkandala residence. The Court had to weigh the 
applicants right to freedom of expression against the privacy rights of the respondent and its 
employees. The court held that the right to freedom of expression, in this particular instance was a 
justifiable limitation placed on the right to privacy.     
8092015 (1) BCLR 81 (WCC). The applicants in this case were a law firm suspected of committing 
fraudulent activities and the respondents were acting based on warrants obtained to search the 
applicant’s premises for evidence in that regard. It was held that the applicant’s right to privacy had 
to be weighed against the respondents right to search and seize evidence. An orderwas crafted to 
allow the applicants premises to be searched in compliance with their right to privacy which 
simultaneously satisfied the need for justice. 
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privacy of an individual and accordingly declared Section 11(1)(a) and (g) of the Act 
to be unconstitutional.810These decisions clearly cement the concept that privacy right 
is jealously protected by the Constitution and the court and hence, is not to be 
overridden in the absence of proper justification.811 
 
Correspondingly, the constitutional right of privacy as provided in South African 
Constitution is considered as right that lies in the continuum state by the Constitutional 
Court.812This is to the effect that personal intimate domain is afforded higher level of 
protection while as an individual moves away from the most intimate domain he or 
she receives less privacy protection.813Moreover, the courts uphold the constitutional 
right of privacy by extending the aspects of human life in which an individual has a 
legitimate anticipation of privacy.814This was established in Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smith815 where the court stated that wherever an 
individual has a capability to choose what he or she wishes to reveal to the general 
public, with reasonable expectation that the same will be respected, the right to privacy 
is invoked.  
 
Nevertheless, privacy right as protected in the South African Constitution is argued to 
be very comprehensive. First and foremost is the phrase “everyone” which introduces 
                                                          
8102016 (9) BCLR 1237 (CC). 
811Rasool, Y., An Examination of how the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (POPI) 
will Impact on Direct Marketing and the Current Legislative Framework in South Africa. Masters of 
Laws Dissertation submitted at University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2017. Accessed from 
http://www.researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmului/handle/10413/15029, on 11th January 2019.   
812Ibid. 
813Bernstein v Bester NO1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
814Ross, note 807, supra. 
8152001 (1) SA 545 (CC) para 16. 
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Article 14 of the Constitution; it implies that privacy right protected through this 
article encompasses citizen as well as non-citizen of South Africa. The only 
prerequisite is the physical presence of an individual in South Africa. This is the 
analogous to the GDPR and its predecessor Directive 95/46/EC, whose applicability 
is tied to the physical presence in the European Union irrespective of residence, 
nationality, or the reason of being present in the union.816 
 
Secondly, the constitutional right of privacy is regarded to be wide-ranging on the 
ground that it is applicable to both natural and juristic persons. Article 8(2) provides 
that a provision of the bill of rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, considering the nature of the right and the nature of any 
duty imposed by their right.’ This implies that data controllers who, in most cases, are 
corporations enjoy the protection of privacy right offered by Article 14 of the South 
African Constitution. Yet, privacy right attributed to juristic persons is limited by 
Article 8(4) of the South African Constitution when it provides that ‘a juristic person 
is entitled to the rights in the bill of rights to the extent required by the nature of the 
rights and the nature of that juristic person.’ This was also upheld by the Constitutional 
Court when it held that: 
‘Juristic persons are not bearers of human dignity. Their privacy rights, 
therefore, can never be as intense as those of human beings. However, 
this does not mean that juristic persons are not protected by the right to 
privacy. Exclusion of juristic persons would lead to the possibility of 
grave violations of privacy in our society, with serious implications for 
the conduct of affairs....’817 
 
 
                                                          
816Gilliland, note 595, supra. 
817Investigating Directorate Case, note 819, supra. 
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While there is a general argument that constitutional protection of privacy is not as 
effective as the one provided by the data protection laws, the recognition of privacy as 
part of the fundamental rights in South African Constitution serves a very important 
role.818First and foremost, it thwarts the executive and the legislature from enacting 
any law or taking any action which may infringe or limit privacy right 
unreasonably.819Secondly, it gives privacy a higher status above all other laws and 
court decisions, state actions and above the conduct of legal and natural person 
alike.820 That said, it must be noted that constitutional protection of privacy does 
suffice in protecting privacy in the cloud. 
 
6.3.2 Common Law 
Common law is the foundation of privacy protection in South Africa.821 Most of the 
South African scholars agree that today’s privacy protection as accorded in the 
Constitution has its origin from the common law, though now it is codified and some 
amendments have been made.822 By using the common law, the South African 
government recognises privacy as personality interest of individuals.823 These 
interests are protected by granting individuals subjective or personal rights over such 
interests, and hence protected through the law of delict.824 
 
                                                          
818Gorska, Z., M., Privacy, Surveillance and HIV/AIDS in the Work Place: A South African Case Study. 
M. A. Thesis, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2008, p. 36. Accessed from 
https://www.wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitsrteam/handle/10539/6762/1.07.pdf on 11th January 2019.    
819 Neethling, note 805, supra. P. 17. 
820 Ibid. p. 75 
821Makulilo, note 797, supra. 
822 Neethling, note 820, supra, see also Ross, note 814, supra.  
823 Burchell, note 795, supra. 
824Loubser, M., et al, The Law of Delict in South Africa. Oxford University Press of Southern Africa, Cape 
Town, 2010. 
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The interests referred to above are non-patrimonial in nature, in the essence that they 
cannot occur separately from an individual.825In addition, various personality interests 
are recognised. These include but not limited to privacy, identity, body, good name, 
dignity, physical liberty, and feelings.826 It is noteworthy that these personality 
interests originate from Roman law. In fact, they are the advancements of the 
expansive triad of Roman law, generally known as corpus (physical integrity), fama 
(good name) and lastly, dignitas(a collective term for all personality aspects apart from 
fama and corpus.)827 
 
Noteworthy, a delict is defined as an act of an individual that in an unjust or in the 
wrong way causes harm to another.828 Generally, infringement of privacy occurs when 
true private facts of an individual are exposed to others against his or her will.829  
However, under the law of delict to succeed in a claim of privacy breach, five delict 
ingredients must be proved by the claimant. These include wrongfulness, act or 
conduct, causation, fault, and harm.830The contravention of a personal interest is 
regarded as an iniuria and the loss is only recovered through instituting the 
actioiniuriarum.831 Moreover, the institution of actioiniuriarum is justified by the 
intentional breach of the personality interest in a wrongful manner.832Judging the 
conduct in question according to boni mores standard is the only means of establishing 
                                                          
825 Neethling, note 820, supra. 
826 Ibid.  
827Roos, note 814, supra. 
828Neethling, J, et al, Neethling-Potgieter-Visser Law of Delict, 6th Edition, LexisNexis, Durban, 
2010. 
829 Ibid, p, 347. 
830 Ibid.  
831The Roman law concerning liability for injury to personality has been adopted in South Africa. See 
Neethling, et al., Law of Delict, 7th ed, 2015, p 12. 
832Roos, note 827, supra. 
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the wrongfulness.833 Any conduct that is proved to be unreasonable against the boni 
mores standard is established as wrong. As a result, violation of any subjective right 
such as privacy right is regarded as an unreasonable and hence wrongful.834 
 
Equally, the law of delict just like the English common law seeks to compensate the 
injured party for the harm caused, though this is not the only function.835 However, 
under the law of delict, liability is established using general principles while the 
English law focuses on specific torts.836Arguably, the law of delict is more flexible 
than the English common law on the ground that it can accommodate varying 
situations and new emerging circumstances without establishing new delicts, which is 
a long, slow, and cumbersome legislative process.837 As a result of its flexibility, the 
law of delict recognises and protects personal interests including but not limited to 
privacy and goodwill of even cooperation, which are created in post-modern era.838 
 
Notably, the processing of personal data threatens personality interests of individuals 
such as privacy and identity.839Accordingly, in Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger, the 
Constitutional  Court established that the actioiniuriarum (a legal action for violation 
of a personal interest) protects a person’s dignitas.840 This implies that these 
personality interests are regarded as part of the dignitas concept.841 As alluded to, 
privacy is breached when true personal data are processed, while identity is said to be 
                                                          
833 Ibid. 
834Neethling, note 828, supra. 
835Neethling, note 825 supra. 
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infringed if personal data processed happen to be untrue.842Moreover, personality 
interests of privacy and identity are also recognised in case law. This was clearly 
shown in O’Keefe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd843a landmark case that 
established that privacy right is a recognised in South African common law. 
 
Similarly, Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk844 is classical 
case that recognised identity as an independent right to be protected for the first time. 
The same was recognised in Grutter v Lombard.845 In addition, the common law as 
practiced in South Africa protects some personality rights attributed to the juristic 
persons in line with the Constitution. These include the right to identity, good name, 
and privacy.846 Regardless of the general understanding that privacy is protected 
through common law in South Africa, the protection provided by the law of delict is 
too broad. Its applicability is extended to every individual who resides in South Africa 
regardless of their citizenship.847 Moreover, the protection afforded by the traditional 
common law principles is not applicable to legal challenges and issues created by the 
processing of personal data in more advanced technology such as cloud computing.848 
Notably, it lacks data protection principles.849 
 
6.3.3 Statute Law 
Prior to the adoption of the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI Act) in 2013, 
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8441977(4) SA 376 (T) 386. 
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South Africa did not have omnibus data protection legislation.850 Even, the 
promulgation of POPI Act did not bring gigantic changes on data privacy protection 
due to the fact that only few sections of the Act have come into force to date.851 As a 
result, privacy in South Africa is still protected through the common law, Constitution 
and some sectoral laws containing some data protection provisions, as pointed above. 
Notwithstanding, the current protection is inadequate in the light of data protection 
laws. These statutes are discussed hereunder clusters of financial sectors, health sector 
and communication sector. It is worth noting that more emphasis is on the Protection 
of Personal Information Act, 2013. 
 
6.3.3.1Security and Privacy Protection in Financial Sector 
Information technology and commercial activities are becoming inseparably 
interwoven to the extent that business that falls short of some level of technical savvy 
is probable going to fail.852 Information technology brings enormous benefits in 
businesses. Meanwhile, it is a fertile ground for threat to privacy and data protection 
in the absence of robust data protection regulation. In this realization, South Africa 
has some laws in financial sector for protecting privacy. Consumer Protection Act 
(CPA) is one of such laws.853This Act protects privacy and confidentiality of 
individuals in respect to unsolicited or unwanted communication.854 It gives the 
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customer the right to refuse unsolicited telephone calls, spam emails, messages, and 
letters.855 
Correspondingly, the National Credit Act (NCA) is another law, which contains some 
provisions that protects privacy under commercial sector.856The Act protects privacy 
by the provision which stipulates that organisations/entities or persons who compile, 
retain, report, or receive confidential information about individuals should protect that 
information.857 In doing so, they must use that information only for the purposes in 
which the consumer consented or the ones authorised by the law.858 The Act further 
states that an entity or persons holding confidential personal information of the 
customers may release the information only under the order of the court or with the 
authorisation of the customer.859 
 
In addition, the Act provides for the right to access and challenge credit records 
information.860This implies that the consumer has the right to access the information 
about himself or herself that is in the custody of the credit bureau and challenge or 
request the proof of its accuracy.861 The law compels the credit bureau to provide the 
proof of accuracy and to remove the disputed data from the records if it fails.862 In the 
same vein, the Code of Banking Practice issued by the Banking Association in South 
Africa, the financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act provides for similar 
                                                          
855 Ibid. 
856 Act No 34 of 2005. 
857 Ibid, section 68. 
858 Ibid. 
859 Ibid, section 1, defines “confidential information as personal information that belongs to a person 
and is not generally available to or known to others”. 




provisions requiring clients’ personal data to be treated as confidential and as private 
as possible.863 The only exception allowed is where there is a legal duty to disclose or 
to the protection of its interest.864 Nevertheless, these Acts are limited in their 
protection of privacy considering that they only apply to the specific sector. 
 
6.3.3.2 Security and Privacy Protection in Health Sector 
Health sector is among the sectors where protection of privacy is crucial. 
Consequently, the National Health Act of South Africa has some provisions for 
privacy protection (albeit limited).865 The Act requires that all information relating to 
health status, types of treatment and stays in a health establishment of the patient to  
kept confidential.866 It prohibits any disclosure of personal data by the medical 
personnel except with explicitly written consent of the patient, or under the 
compulsion of the law or order of the court or if the information represents a serious 
threat to public health.867 The Act also criminalises failure in protecting health records, 
which leads to divulgences of information.868Besides, the Children’s’ Act869and the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,870 contain some provisions which provide 
for the confidentiality of information, though in limited circumstances. Nevertheless, 
the provision applies only to privacy protection in health sector and does not have the 
general application. 
                                                          
863Issacs, R, et al., Data Protection Law in South Africa: Overview, 2018. Accessed from 
http://www.uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-5003-0787, 0n 15th January 2019. 
864 Ibid. 
865 Act No 61 of 2003. Accessed from http://www.gov.za/documents/national-health-act-pdf, on 16th 
January 2019. 
866 Section 14 (1), ibid. 
867Section 14 (2), ibid. 
868 Section 17. Ibid. 
869 Section 13 (d), Act no 38 of 2005. 
870 Act no 92 of 1996. 
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6.3.3.3 Security and Privacy Protection in Communication Sector 
As alluded to, privacy is protected through some sector specific laws in 
communication sector too (albeit limited). Promotion of Access to information Act 
(PAIA) is one of those laws.871 This Act was enacted with the intention of giving effect 
to the constitutional right of access to any personal information in the custody of public 
or private sector.872 The Act provides for the protection of privacy by addressing some 
general data protection principles.873 First, it provides that individuals should have an 
access to information records, which contain information about them in both private 
and public bodies, personal information inclusive.874Equally, the Act prohibits 
disclosure of personal information records if it will lead to an unreasonable disclosure 
of the information relating to a third party.875 However, the Act applies only to access 
of information and prohibition of disclosure in some situations only. 
 
Similarly, Electronic Communication Act (ECA) is another Act providing for data 
protection.876 It is a law regulating among other things all telecommunication service 
providers. The Act requires all telecommunication service providers to be licensed. 
Moreover, the Electronic Communication Regulation obliges all licensed service 
providers to keep their clients’ personal data confidential.877 In addition, the 
Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-
                                                          
871 Act No 2 of 2000. 
872 Ibid, preamble of the Act. 
873 Naude, note 850, supra. 
874 PAIA, section 11. 
875 Ibid Section 34.  
876Act no 36 of 2005. Accessed from 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/936-050.pdf, on 15th January 2019.  
877Issacs, note 863, supra. 
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Related Information Act (RICA) provides for the protection of privacy.878 The Act 
provides for the interception of communication as well as prohibiting 
telecommunication service providers from disclosing information obtained in the 
course of their work except in some exceptional circumstances as provided by the 
law.879 The prohibition is applicable to both fixed line and mobile network operators.  
Indeed, the Acts are limited in their application as they are applicable to their 
respective assigned sector only. They have no general applicability. 
 
In the same line, Electronic Communication and Transactions Act(ECTA) is another 
Act which protects privacy though in a limited way.880The Act regulates e-commerce 
in South Africa.881It is applicable only to personal data obtained through electronic 
transactions such as e-mail, internet, and short messages.882It governs a range of 
services such as e-government services, protection of personal information, consumer 
protection, electronic transactions, cryptography and authentication service 
providers.883 
 
Chapter VII of the Act comprises two provisions which provide for data protection 
principles applicable to protect personal information in electronic transactions.884It 
                                                          
878Act no 70 of 2002. Accessed from https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2002-070.pdf, on 15th 
January 2019. 
879Section 42, ibid. 
880Act no 25 of 2002. 
881Michalsons, Guide to ECT Act in South Africa, 2018. Accessed from 
https://www.michalsons.com/blog/guide-to-the-ect-act/81, on 14th January 2019.  
882Section 50 of ECTA. 
883Muyinga, note 783, supra. 
884Section 1 of ECTA provides a wide definition of the term transaction. It means “a transaction either 
of a commercial or non-commercial nature, and includes the provision of information and e-government 
services.” 
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provides that personal data should be processed lawfully with the consent of the data 
subject.885 It also advocates that personal data should be collected and processed for a 
lawful purpose only.886 The law requires that data subject should be fully informed 
and hence knowledgeable of the purposes for which his or her personal data are being 
processed.887 The law entails that if the data controller wants to process the data for 
any other purposes than the one consented to by the data subject, they should seek for 
consent again or do it under the compulsion of the law.888 
 
In addition, the law requires the data controller to keep a record of the personal data 
and the specific reasons for data collection as long as the data are in use and one year 
thereafter.889Moreover, the law seeks to ensure that personal data in the custody of the 
data controller should not be disclosed to the third party without specific written 
permission from the data subject or unless permitted or required by the law.890 In the 
same vein, the law requires that if the data were disclosed to a third party, the records 
of the third party and the dates of the disclosure to be kept as long as the data are in 
use and one year thereafter.891 Similarly, the law entails the data controller to delete 
or destroy any personal data in his custody once they become obsolete.892In addition, 
ECTA provides for the principle of anonymity by allowing the data processor to 
                                                          
885 Section 51 (1) of ECTA. 
886 Ibid, section 51(2). 
887 Ibid, section 51 (3). 
888 Ibid, section 51 (4). 
889 Ibid, Section 51(5).  
890 Ibid, section 51(6). 
891 Ibid, Section 51(7). 
892 Ibid, section 51(8). 
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compile profiles for statistical purposes but to make sure that profiles or statistical data 
cannot be linked to any data subject by the third party.893 
 
Largely, the ECTA echoes the general data protection principles. However, the 
applicability of these principles in data protection in electronic transaction is 
voluntary. It entails that the data controller may subscribe to those principles by 
recording that fact in any agreement entered into with the data subject.894 Moreover, 
if the data controller decides voluntarily to subscribe to the data protection principles, 
the law requires him or her to comply with all in its entirety.895 Equally, in the event 
of breach of data protection principles, the rights and obligation of the parties are 
regulated by the terms of any agreement between them.896 
 
Arguably, the voluntary nature of these principles is the glaring deficiency of the 
Act.897 The same goes to the fact that the law does not establish a regulatory authority 
to oversee compliance. In addition, the Act is limited by the fact that it applies only to 
personal information collected through electronic transactions. Nevertheless, the 
provisions for data protection in the ECTA will be repealed as soon as the POPI Act 
comes into force.898 
 
                                                          
893 Ibid, section 51(9). 
894 Ibid, section 50(2.) 
895 Ibid, section 50(3). 
896 Ibid, section 50(4) 
897 Naude, note 873, supra. 
898Issacs, note 877, supra. 
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6.3.3.4The Protection of Personal Information Act of 2013 
Almost forty years after the enactment of the first comprehensive national data privacy 
law in the world, South Africa adopted its own.899The shortcomings of the above-
discussed statutory and general laws in South Africa necessitated an overhaul of the 
statutory framework so that the laws will provide acceptable level of data protection 
in the digital era.900Moreover, the pressure exerted by the EU through  the then, EU 
Directive which obliged non-EU member states to adopt laws which are in compliance 
with the EU Directive and hence meet the EU adequacy standard, forced South Africa 
to enact specific privacy and data protection law.901The initiatives towards the 
enacting of this law were first taken by the South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) in 2001.902 
 
The first bill (the Protection of Personal Information Bill) was introduced in 2009.903 
Since the initiatives started, it took thirteen years until the Act was adopted.904 It 
adopted an EU model of data privacy legislation.905The Protection of Personal 
Information Act (POPI), a comprehensive legislation regulating personal data in South 
Africa was signed into law in November, 2013.906 April, 2014 is a noted date, in which 
                                                          
899Sweden enacted its first Data Act in 1973. In Greenleaf, G., Global Data Privacy Laws: Forty Years 
of Acceleration. Privacy Laws and Business International Report no 112, 2011, pp 11-17. Accessed 
from http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1946700, on 16 January 2019. 
900Naude, A &Papadopoulos, S., Data Protection in South Africa: The Protection of Personal 
Information Act 4 of 2013 in Light of Recent International Developments, (Part 1), THRHR Journal, 
2016, 51-68. Accessed from http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2835387, on 17th January 2019.  
901 Article 25 and 26, Directive 95/46/EC. 
902 Ibid.   
903 Bill 9 of 2009, in Ross, note 851, supra. 
904 Ibid. 
905Abdulrauf, L., A., Legal Protection of Data Privacy in Nigeria: Lessons from Canada and South 
Africa. LLD Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2016, Pp 255. 
906 Act No 4 of 2013, in Issacs, note 898, supra.  
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few sections of the Act came into force.907 These sections aimed at the establishing of 
the information regulators’ office and issuing the Act’s Regulation.908 The office 
bearers were appointed and the information regulator assumed the office from 1st 
December 2016.909 Moreover, the first of the draft regulations were issued in 
September 2017, and final regulations were published by the information regulator in 
September 2018, yet the Act did not come into force.910 
 
Formerly, it was assumed that the POPI Act would come into force fully after the 
establishment of the office of the information regulator and the issuance of the 
regulation. Material aspects of the POPI Act are not yet enforceable and have no 
probable operative date. Arguably, as the long waited POPI regulations have been 
released, it is expected that the commencement date of the full Act will be announced 
soon. It is worth noting that once the Act enters into force, parties who process 
personal data will have a grace period of one year in which they are required to comply 
with provisions of the Act.911The rest of the chapter discusses the provisions of the 
Act. However, considering that the Act is voluminous only the most important aspects 
are going to be discussed. Further, reference to GDPR and its predecessor, the EU 
                                                          
907Pillay, L., South Africa: Data Protection Legislation, Hogan Lovells Global Media and 
Communications Quarterly, 2014.  Accessed from 
http://www.lecology.com/library/detail/aspx.?g=09cbc4c1-1825-431e-b180-08e006ed2cb1, on 20th 
January 2019. 
908 According to the Government Gazette 37544 of 11th April 2014 the following sections came into 
force: sect 1 (definitions); Part A of Chapter 5 (establishment of information Regulator); Section 112 
(grants the Minister the authority to adopt regulations); and sect 113 (procedures for marking 
regulations). In Ross, note 902, supra. 
909Michalsons,Information Regulator in South Africa, 2017. Accessed form 
https://www.michalsons.com/blog/information-regulator-in-south-africa/13893, on 20th January 2019 
910Vyver, et al, POPI: Final Regulation Published. South Africa Financial Regulation Journal, 2019.  
Accessed from https://www.financialregulationjournal.co.za/2019/01/24/popi-final-regulations-
published, on 26 January 2019. 
911Section 114 (1), POPI 
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Directive is made from time to time, because the two are the basis of POPI Act. 
Moreover, since the Act is yet to be fully implemented, no case law discussed in 
interpreting the Act.  
 
First, the main objective of the POPI Act is to give effect of the constitutional right of 
privacy, by protecting personal information whenever it is processed by the data 
controller both in private or public sector and in line with international benchmark 
standards.912According to the Act, personal information implies any information 
relating to an identifiable, natural living person, and an identifiable, existing juristic 
person.913 The Act also provides a list of information qualifying to be termed as 
personal information.914 However, the list is not comprehensive to the effect that every 
case should be judged on its own merits. Notably, information such as genetic 
                                                          
912Act 4 of 2013, Section 2, the preamble of the Act provides for the purpose of the Act to include (a) 
giving effect to the Constitution right of privacy by safeguarding personal information when 
processed by a responsible part, subject to justifiable limitations that are aimed at (i) balancing the 
right to privacy against other rights, particularly the right to access of information and (ii) protecting 
important interests, including the free flow of information within the Republic and across 
international borders; (b) regulate the manner in which personal information may be processed, by 
establishing conditions, in harmony with international standards, that prescribe the minimum 
threshold requirements for the lawful processing of personal information; (c) provide persons with 
rights and remedies to protect their personal information from processing that is not in accordance 
with this Act; and (d) establish voluntary and compulsory measures, including the establishment of 
an information Regulator, to ensure respect for and to promote and fulfil the rights protected by this 
Act. 
913Section 1, ibid. 
914Personal information includes (a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, national, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-
being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of persons; (b) information 
relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history of a person; (c) 
any identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, telephone number, location 
information, online identifier or other particular assignment  to the person; (d) the biometric 
information of a person; (e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person; (f) 
correspondences sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature 
or further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the originalcorrespondence; (g) the views 
or opinions of another individual about the person; and (h) the name of the person if it appears with 
other personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure of the name itself would reveal 
information about the person. 
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information, the IP addresses and other information that closely relate to a person may 
also be considered as personal information.915It is worth noting that in defining the 
data subject, the Act includes the juristic person, which is contrary to the GDPR and 
its predecessor, the EU Directive (its model) and other international instruments.916 
 
The scope of the Act is also very broad. That is applicable to both automated and non-
automated processing of personal data that are entered into record by or for the 
responsible party (data controller) from either public or private sector as well.917It 
requires that if the processing is through non-automated means, it should form part of 
the filling system or it is intended to form part of it thereof.918Similarly, the term 
responsible party is also extensively defined to mean a public or private body or any 
other person which alone or in conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and 
means for processing personal information.919 
 
Likewise, it applies to natural person and juristic persons as well.920Correspondingly, 
it is applicable only when the responsible party is a citizen of South Africa or non-
citizen using equipment in South Africa.921However, the Act is not applicable if the 
data controller uses the equipment in South Africa just as a conduit for forwarding 
personal information through the country.922However, any processing of personal data 
in the course of a purely personal or domestic activity is not within the ambit of the 
                                                          
915Roos, note 861, supra. 
916Ibid. 
917POPI, Section 3 (1), (a).  
918Ibid.  
919Ibid, section 1.  
920Ibid. 





An example of this is when an individual collects and keeps telephone numbers and 
addresses of his friends then processes them for purely domestic or personal use, the 
risk posed to third parties privacy is very minimal hence it needs not to be 
regulated.924However, according to Ross, this exception is applicable only when the 
person collecting the personal data does not place it on the internet and expose or make 
it accessible to different people, other than his or her family.925 
Correspondingly, processing of personal information that has been anonymised by 
eliminating any identifiable features (de-identified) to the extent that it cannot be 
linked to a certain individual again (re-identified) is excluded.926In addition, excluded 
from the application of the Act is the processing of personal data by or on behalf of 
the public body involving national security, defence, public safety of for the purpose 
of preventing and detecting an unlawful activities, combating money laundering, 
prosecution, and execution of sentences or security measures.927 Nevertheless, the 
exclusion is allowable provided that respective laws regulating public bodies in those 
specific areas establishes adequate safeguards for the protection of such personal 
information.928 
 
Additionally, any processing of personal data by the cabinet, its committees and the 
                                                          
923 Ibid, section 6 (1), (a). 
924 Ross, note 916, supra. P 371. 
925 Ross, A., Personal Data Protection in New Zealand: Lessons for South Africa. Potchefstroom 
electronic Law Journal, 2008, vol 11, no 4, pp 61-109, at p 92. Accessed from 
https://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/42243, on 20th January 2019.   
926 POPI, section 6, (1), (b). 
927 Ibid, section 6 (1)(c). 
928 Ibid. 
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executive council of the province is excluded from the ambit of the Act.929 The same 
applies to any processing of personal information by the court of law in the course of 
fulfilling its judicial functions.930Likewise, the Act excludes from its ambit the 
processing of personal data done exclusively for the journalistic, literary, or artistic 
expression purposes.931 Yet, the exclusion is permissible to the extent that it is 
necessary to reconcile as a matter of public interest, the right to privacy with the right 
to freedom of expression.932 Moreover, any processing of personal data that is in 
breach of the Act, which are exempted by the regulator subject to reasonable 
conditions are not within the ambit of the Act.933It is notable that most of the 
exemptions to the general rule in the POPI Act are fairly similar to those found in EU 
regulation.934 
 
Arguably, the language used in Section 37 with the word “may” implies that the duty 
to publish the notice is not mandatory. The regulator may not publish the notice and 
yet be in compliance with the Act.935 In addition, the section infers that it is wholly 
upon the regulator to determine the reasonable conditions in any particular case, and 
this does not provide proper safeguards. Moreover, it also implies that it is not 
obligatory to impose the reasonable conditions; the regulator is free to do it at his or 
her own discretion. It can be submitted that the exceptions provided under Section 36 
and 37 of the Act in relation to the regulator’s power to provide exception might not 
                                                          
929 Ibid, section 6 (1), (d). 
930 Ibid, section 6 (1), (e). 
931 Ibid, section 7 (1). 
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid, Section 37. 
934 Ross, note 925, supra. 
935Makulilo, note 821 supra. 
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satisfy the data protection standard set in the GDPR, and hence negatively affect the 
general assessment of adequacy according to the GDPR standards.936 
 
Similarly, the Act establishes the office of the information regulator, headed by a 
juristic person.937The Act also provides for the powers, duties and functions of the 
regulator, which includes providing education, monitoring and enforcing compliance, 
consulting with the interested parties, handling the complaints, researching on 
instruments relating to personal information of the data subject and reporting to the 
parliament and facilitating cross-border cooperation in enforcing privacy laws.938 
 
The core of the Act is found in Chapter Three, where the eight conditions for lawfully 
processing of personal data are provided for. These conditions are imperative in any 
data protection instrument as they intend to ensure fair and lawful processing of 
personal data.939These conditions need to be viewed holistically due to the fact that 
they cannot stand in isolation and often times they interact and overlap with another.940 
The conditions are similar but not exactly identical to the data protection principles 
found in the Council of Europe Convention, the OECD guidelines and the GDPR.941 
Ross posits that POPI provides heightened protection for delicate or sensitive personal 
data, which are regarded as special personal information, and personal information of 
                                                          
936Ibid. 
937 POPI, section 39. 
938 Ibid, section 40. 
939Abdulrauf, note 905, supra. 
940Heyink, M., Protection of Personal Information for South African Law Firms. LSSA Guidelines, 
SALRC Report, 2011, p. 161. Accessed from http://www.jaa.org.za/doc-manager/protection-
personal-information-law-firms-lssa-guidelines-2011, on 20th January 2019. 
941Ross, note 934, supra. 
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children.942 The conditions provided in the POPI for lawfully processing of personal 
data includes accountability, processing limitation, purpose specification, further 
processing limitation, information quality, openness, security safeguards and data 
subject participation. Briefly, these are going to be discussed as follows: 
 
Accountability is the first condition used as an umbrella to cover a myriad of 
responsibilities.943 It requires the responsible party to ensure that all other conditions 
for the lawful processing of personal data provided in the Act are complied with.944 It 
also specifies the time for its compliance, which is the time for determining the 
purpose and means of processing and during actual processing.945 This section implies 
that compliance with these conditions is not intended to be done retrospectively. It is 
noteworthy that in terms of this condition, it is the responsible party who is eventually 
held responsible for compliance irrespective of whether the data were processed by 
the operator for or on behalf of the responsible party.946 Furthermore, this condition 
seeks to strengthen trust in data processing environment and to empower the data 
subjects (individuals) to enforce their rights given that current data processing 
activities are conducted behind closed doors.947 
 
                                                          
942 Ibid. 
943Sloot, B., Do Data Protection Rules Protect the Individuals and should They? An Assessment of the 
Proposed General Data Protection Regulation. International Data Privacy Law, 2014, vol 4, Issue 
4, pp. 307-325, at pg 309. Accessed from https://www.academic.oup.com/idpl/article-
abstract/4/4/4307/2569055?, on 20th January 2019. 
944 POPI, section 8. 
945 Ibid. 
946Heyink, note 940, supra. 
947De Hert, P &Papakonstantinou, V., The Proposed Data Protection Regulation replacing Directive 
95/46/EC: a sound system for the protection of Individuals. Computer Law & Security Review, 
2012, vol 28, issue 2, pp 130-142. Accessed from 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364912000295, on 1st February 2019. 
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Processing limitation is the second condition which upholds four aspects limiting the 
processing of personal data to assure that processing is done within the ambit of the 
law.948 The first aspect entails that data processing should be done lawfully and 
reasonably, to the extent that it does not infringe privacy of the data subject.949 The 
second aspect is minimalism, which intends to limit the processing of personal data to 
the purposes, which are adequate, relevant, and not excessive.950 However, terms such 
as adequate, relevant, and not excessive are prone to different interpretations.951 Yet 
they are not defined in the Act. 
 
Consent, justification, and objection provide a third aspect of the processing limitation 
condition under the POPI Act. This is to the effect that processing of personal 
information is lawful only when there are grounds justifying the processing.952 
Consent of the data subject is part of the grounds mentioned above.953 However, at 
any time, the data subject may withdraw his or her consent without affecting the 
lawfulness of the processing done before the withdrawal.954 It is upon the responsible 
party to prove that the consent was given by the data subject.955 Likewise, at any time, 
                                                          
948 Neethling, J., Features of the Protection of Personal information Bill, 2009 and the Law of Delict, 
Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, 2012, vol 75, pp241-255. Accesses from 
http://www.papers.ssrn.com/so13/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1635090, on1st February 2019. 
949 POPI Act, Section 9. 
950 Section 10 ibid. 
951Abdulrauf, note 939, supra. 
952POPI Act, Section 11 provides for the grounds which makes the processing of personal data lawful. 
These includes a) that data subject or a competent person where the data subject is a child consents 
to the processing, b) Processing is necessary to carry out actions for the conclusion or performance 
of a contract to which the data subject is party, c) Processing complies with an obligation imposed 
by law on the responsible party, d) Processing protects legitimate interest of the data subject. e) 
Processing is necessary for the proper performance of a public law duty by a public body, or f) 
Processing is necessary for pursuing the legitimate interests of the responsible party to whom the 
information is supplied.      
953Section 1 defines consent as any voluntary specific and informed expression of will in terms of which 
permission is given for the processing of personal information. 
954 Section 11 (2) (b). 
955 Section 11 (2) (a). 
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the data subject may also object the processing of his personal information, unless the 
processing is under the compulsion of the law.956 However, the objection must be on 
reasonable grounds.  
 
Equally, the fourth aspect requires direct collection of personal information from the 
data subject.957According to Ross, this requirement is very crucial as it enables the 
data subject to be conversant with the processing of his or her personal 
data.958Nevertheless, this stringent requirement is subject to a list of exception 
especially for public and legitimate interest purposes, which ultimately dilute its effect 
considerably.959 
 
The third condition is purpose specification. This requires that personal information 
should be collected for specific, explicitly defined and lawful purposes relating to the 
activities or functions of the responsible party.960This is an indispensable condition in 
privacy legislation as it determines the scope of data processing and underpinning all 
other aspects relating to data processing under the ambit of the Act.961Moreover, the 
Act obliges the responsible party to take reasonable measures to ensure that the data 
                                                          
956 Section 11(3) (a). 
957 Section 12 (1).  
958 Ross, note 941, supra. 
959 POPI Act, Section 12 (2)(a)-(f) Provides some examples of situations in which information need not 
be collected directly from the data subject to include, when information is contained in or derived 
from a public record or has deliberately been made public by the data subject, data subject has 
consented to the collection of the information from another source, collection of the information from 
another source would not prejudice a legitimate interest of the data subject, or is necessary to avoid 
prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public body including the prevention, detection, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of offences, comply with obligation imposed by the law, 
in the interest of national security or compliance is not reasonable practicable in the circumstances 
of the particular case(to name but a few). 
960POPI Act, Section 13. 
961 Neethling, note 948, supra. 
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subject is informed of the purpose when personal information is collected,962 unless 
the former is exempted.963In the same vein, the condition requires that information 
should not be retained for a longer period than is required for realising the purpose for 
which it was collected and subsequently processed.964 However, for research, 
historical, and statistical purposes, the condition allows the records to be kept for a 
longer period if there are appropriate safeguards in place.965 
 
Further processing limitation is the fourth condition. This provides that any further 
processing of personal information should be compatible with the collection 
purposes.966It is submitted that further processing includes both the use and disclosure 
of personal information, and hence the applicability of this principle is more on use 
and disclosure of the collected information.967 Compatibility is assessed by taking into 
account the relationship between the initial purpose of data collection and the purpose 
of the envisioned further processing, the nature of the information, the consequences 
of the further processing upon the data subject, the manner in which the information 
was collected and any contractual rights or obligations between the 
parties.968However, any further processing of personal data is not considered as 
                                                          
962 Section 18(1)(a)–(h) requires the responsible party to ensure that that data subject is aware of the 
information being collected, the name and address of the responsible party, the purpose for which the 
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voluntary or mandatory, the consequences of failure to provide the information, whether any 
particular law authorizes the collection of the personal information, the fact that the responsible party 
(where applicable) intends to transfer the personal information to another country and any other 
relevant information. 
963 Ibid, section 18 (4).  
964 Ibid, section 14 (1). 
965 Ibid, section 14 (2). 
966 Ibid, section 15 (1). 
967 South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC), Privacy and Data Protection Report, 2009, para 
4.2.174. Accessed from http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpaper/dp109.pdf, on2nd February 2019. 
968 POPI section 15(2). 
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incompatible with the initial purpose of collection if the data subject has consented the 
further processing. Also, if the information is a public record or is made public by the 
data subject himself or herself; further processing is necessary for national security, 
for court proceeding, maintenance of the law, and preventing a threat to health and if 
the information is used for research or statistical purposes.969 
 
Information quality is the fifth condition. The condition entails the responsible party 
regarding the purposes for the collection and further processing of personal 
information to ensure that the information collected is complete, accurate, updated, 
and not misleading where necessary.970 This condition has no exceptions and intends 
to obviate presenting misleading personal information, which may lead to 
discrimination or loss of benefits.971 
 
Similarly, openness is the sixth condition. It requires the responsible part to keep a 
record of all processing operations under its responsibility.972It puts obligation upon 
the responsible part to ensure that the data subject is informed about collection of his 
personal data, collection source, the name and address of responsible party, the 
purpose of the collection and whether giving information is mandatory or voluntary. 
The information given to the data subject should contain the consequences in case of 
a failure in giving information of whether the collection of information is authorised 
by the law, whether the responsible party anticipates to transfer the personal 
                                                          
969 Ibid, section 15(3). 
970 Ibid, section 16. 
971 Neethling, note 961, supra. Pp. 251-52. 
972 POPI Act, section 17. 
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information to a third country or international organisation and the level of protection. 
Moreover, responsible part is duty bound to provide any other relevant and necessary 
information that the data subject needs to know so that the processing of his or her 
personal data becomes reasonable.973 
 
The seventh condition provides for security measures on integrity and confidentiality 
of personal information.974 It obliges the responsible party to ensure that personal data 
under its custody and control are safe and secure. He or she is required to apply 
reasonable and appropriate technical and organisational measures to secure, not only 
the confidentiality, but also the integrity of personal data.975 The information is 
protected against risks such as loss, destruction, unlawful access, or processing of 
personal information.976 
 
Furthermore, identifying the risk, establishing the appropriate safeguards, maintaining 
them, verifying the implementation of the safeguard frequently, and updating the 
safeguards whenever necessary are among the specific measures to be taken by the 
responsible party while adhering to this condition.977 Accordingly, if the operator 
processes information on behalf of the responsible party, he or she will do so under 
lawful authorisation of the responsible party.978 The relationship between them is 
established by concluding a written contract with the effect that the latter ensures that 
the former establishes and maintains the security measures.979 
                                                          
973 Ibid, section 18(a)-(h), then exceptions are listed in 18(4), (a)(f).  
974 Ibid, section 19. 
975 Ross, note 958, supra. 
976 POPI Act, section 19 (1). 
977 Ibid, section 19 (2). 
978 Ibid, section 20 (a). 
979 Ibid, Section 21 (1). 
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The processer is also obliged to ensure confidentiality of the information that comes 
to his or her knowledge.980 Likewise, he or she is required to notify the responsible 
party, if the information is accessed or acquired by an unauthorised person.981In the 
same vein, the responsible party is required by the law to notify not only the regulator 
but also the data subject in case personal data have been accessed or acquired by 
unauthorised person.982This obligation is generally known as data breach notification; 
and it is among the contemporary features of data privacy laws.983 
 
Data subject participation is the eighth condition, which gives the data subject active 
control over the processing of their personal information held by the responsible party. 
It confers various rights to the data subject. Firstly, it grants him or her right to access 
and view his or her personal information after providing an acceptable proof of 
identity. Under this right, the data subject is entitled to obtain information of whether 
the responsible party holds information about him or her in his or her custody or not 
and to be given a record content of that information.984 
 
Secondly, it gives the data subject the right to request for correction or deletion of any 
personal information about him or her that is held by the responsible party. The 
deletion or correction is justified only when the data is inaccurate, irrelevant, 
excessive, out of date, misleading or that is obtained unlawfully.985The same right 
allows him to request the responsible party to delete or destroy any record of his or 
                                                          
980 Ibid, section 20 (b). 
981 Ibid, section 22 (2). 
982 Ibid section 22(1). 
983Wong, R., Data Security Breaches and Privacy in Europe. (E-book) Springer London, 2013. Accessed from 
https://www.rd.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-1-4471-5586-7, on 3rd February 2019. 
984 POPI, Section 23(1)(a) and (b). 
985 Ibid, section 24(1)(a). 
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her personal information because the latter is no longer authorised to retain it because 
the data are no longer required-for the purpose for which they were collected.986In 
terms of this section, the responsible party is obliged to inform the data subject if the 
correction requested is effected and whether the statement is attached.987 
 
However, the section also gives the responsible party the right to refuse the requested 
deletion or correction. Conversely, he/she has to give a statement explaining that the 
requested deletion or correction was denied.988Moreover, if it is reasonably 
practicable, third parties to whom the information that is misleading, inaccurate, or 
incomplete has been disclosed to, should be informed of the steps taken.989This 
condition trails from the openness condition. However, unlike the openness condition, 
the former requires not only that the data subject be aware of his or her personal data 
being processed but also to be able to access and view such data.990 
 
Besides the personal information conditions explained above, it is worth noting that 
the Act also provides for trans-border data flow. Under this heading it prohibits the 
responsible party from transferring personal data of a South African resident to other 
countries.991 However, this prohibition is subject to several exceptions. The first 
exception is to the effect that personal data may be transferred if the recipient is subject 
                                                          
986 Ibid, section 24(1)(b). 
987 Ibid, section 24(4). 
988 Ibid, section 24(2). 
989 Ibid, section 24(3). 
990Abdulrauf, note 951, supra. 
991POPI, chapter 9. 
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to a law, binding corporate rules,992 or a binding agreement providing an adequate 
level of personal data protection.993 
 
According to the law, the level of protection required should be substantially similar 
to the condition of the lawfully processing of personal data as provided in the POPI 
Act.994 This implies that personal data may be transferred outside of South African 
border only if it will be subject to satisfactory data protection principles in a similar or 
stringent standard than South Africa’s. Secondly, the prohibition is not applicable if 
the data subject consents to the transfer.995 Further, it is not prohibited to transfer data 
to third party country if it is essential for the implementation of a contract between the 
data subject and the responsible party.996 
 
Similarly, the prohibition does not apply when the transfer is necessary for the 
conclusion or implementation of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject 
between the responsible party and the third party.997 Similarly, it is not prohibited to 
transfer personal data to a third party country if it benefits the data subject and it is not 
reasonably practicable to get his or her consent and if it could have been practicable 
possible, he or she would have given it.998Most importantly, these provisions are 
necessary to comply with the GDPR, which prohibits member states from transferring 
                                                          
992Section 72(2) defines binding corporate rules as personal information processing policies, within 
group undertakings, which are adhered to by a responsible party or operator within that group of 
undertakings when transferring personal information to a responsible party or operator within that same 
group of undertakings in a foreign country.  
993 Section 72(1)(a). 
994 Ibid, section 72(1)(a)(i). 
995 Ibid, section 72(1)(b). 
996 Ibid, section 72(1)(c). 
997 Ibid, section 72(1)(d). 
998 Ibid, section 72(1)(e). 
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personal data to third countries which does not provide adequate level of data 
protection.999 
 
Apart from the privacy protection principles, the Act also provides for the conditions 
for the processing of special categories of personal data. It prohibits the processing of 
this kind of information unless general and specific exemptions are applied. It provides 
for four categories of this kind of information. The first category listed is sensitive 
personal information, which includes any information concerning person’s religious 
or philosophical beliefs, race, or ethnic origin, trade union membership, political 
persuasion, health or sex life, biometric information or criminal behaviour.1000 
 
The second category provided is relating processing of personal information of 
children. The Act prohibits the responsible party from processing such information 
unless authorised by the Act.1001However, these prohibitions are to the effect that if 
the exemptions are provided for, the special personal information can be processed 
subject to the other conditions of data processing already discussed above. It is 
noteworthy that the prohibition imposed on processing these categories of information 
is subject to general exemptions applicable to all special personal information and 
specific exemptions applicable to particular types of sensitive information only. It is 
important to highlight that the GDPR does not provide for special provision regulating 
                                                          
999 Article 45 of the GDPR. 
1000 POPI Act, Section 26. 
1001 Ibid, section 34. 
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the processing personal information relating to children. This implies that the POPI 
Act provides stronger protection to vulnerable class of individuals than GDPR.1002 
 
Furthermore, direct marketing is the third category of processing personal data in 
specific context provided in the Act. Generally, the Act prohibits processing of data 
subject’s personal information for direct marketing.1003 The prohibition entails but not 
limited to any form of electronic communication such as automatic calling machine, 
facsimile machine, SMSs and email.1004However, there are exceptions to this 
provision. These are to the effect that processing of personal information for direct 
marketing can be carried out if the party responsible has consented the processing or 
if he or she is a customer of the responsible party.1005 
 
Moreover, the fourth category provided for special processing context is fully 
automated decision making.1006The Act prohibits profiling of individuals for the 
intention of making automated decisions about them relying on those profiles.1007The 
Act provides that the data subject may not be subject to a decision which results in 
legal consequences for him, her, or it, or which affects him or her to substantial degree, 
which is based solely on the basis of the automated processing of personal information 
intended to provide a profile of such person including his or her performance of work, 
                                                          
1002Makulilo, note 935, supra. 
1003 POPI Act, section 69 (1). 
1004 Ibid. 
1005 Ibid, section 69(1)(a) - (b). 
1006 Automated decision making occurs where information which relates to the individual is structured 
in such a way that it can begin to answer questions about that person, so as to put his or her private 
behavior under surveillance. South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) (2009), Privacy and 
Data Protection Report. Para 5.2.1. Accessed from 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpaper/dp/109.pdf, on 5th February 2019. 
1007 Ross, note 975, supra.  
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or his or her credit worthiness, reliability, location, health, personal preferences or 
conduct.1008This implies that the Act prohibits the act of subjecting the data subject to 
an automated decision that has its basis from their own personality profile.  
 
However, automated decision making is allowed by the law if it is for the intention of 
concluding a contract and the request of the data subject in the terms of the contract 
has been met and if proper measures have been taken to protect the data subject’s 
lawful interests.1009 In addition, it is also allowed if the decision is governed by a code 
of conduct in which appropriate measures are laid down for protecting the lawful 
interest of data subjects.1010 This is in line with Article 21 and 22 of the GDPR that 
provide for the automated individual decision-making including profiling.   
6.4 Conclusion 
The presented scrutiny and examination of security and privacy issues in South Africa 
reveals that privacy concerns are relatively higher than in other African countries. 
There are a number of reasons which justify the concerns. First, the fresh memories of 
the trauma caused by the past injustice of the apartheid regime are argued to be among 
the main catalysts influencing these concerns. It is also maintained that due to this 
background, privacy has been protected through the common law of delict since a long 
time. This is supported by the decision of O’Keeffe, the first landmark case of privacy, 
decided in 1954.  
 
Secondly, the recognition of privacy right in the Interim Constitution of South Africa 
                                                          
1008 POPI Act, section 71(1). 
1009 Ibid, section 71(2)(a). 
1010 Ibid, section 71(2)(b). 
 204 
in 1994 became the driving force of the acceptance of this right. The right gained its 
current status in 1996 when it was incorporated in the Constitution of the land. Thirdly, 
the adoption of IT technology (cloud computing inclusive) is higher in South Africa 
than in other parts of Africa and hence higher concerns of privacy. Thirdly, the 
pressure from EU through the repealed Directive 95/46/EC, articles 25 and 26, which 
called non-EU member states to adopt data protection legislation that would attain the 
EU adequacy standard. Due to the fact that South Africa engages in many commercial 
activities with the EU, it felt the compulsion to adopt data and privacy protection Act 
of 2013. Currently, it is in the verge of enforcing an omnibus privacy protection Act.  
 
Besides, regardless of the fact that privacy is protected through general laws as well 
as through statutes, there is inadequacy of law in protecting privacy and security in the 
cloud. Indeed, privacy and security are to some extent, protected through other laws 
as well as through the constitution and the common law. Nonetheless, those laws are 
faced with some limitations. First, they are sector specific and hence protect privacy 
in that sector only. Secondly, and most importantly, they are not technological 
neutral1011 and hence not applicable to cloud technology. These limitations are likely 
to hinder South Africa’s desire of protecting privacy and security in the cloud. 
Likewise, while POPI Act is a specific law regulating the privacy, it has not entered 
into force except for some of its sections for the establishment of the office of the 
regulator. 
                                                          
1011The term technologial neutral defines the scope of the regulation.  It means that the same principles 
of regulation should apply despite the type of technology used. This means that the same principles of 
regulation should be applied whether in automated or non untomated means of communication, or 
whether in cloud computing or traditional computing technology. See Maxwel, W., and Bourreau, M., 
Technology Neutrality in Internet, Telcoms and Data Protection Regulation. Accessed from 
http://www.papers.ssrn.com, on 20th September, 2019. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMPERATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter sums up the main insights and key findings of the study and provides 
conclusion of the study. It also provides the recommendations and suggests niches for 
future research agenda.  
 
7.2 Key Findings and Main Insights of the Study 
The present study was done through a systematic investigation and analysis of the 
legal challenges involved in the use of cloud computing. With regard to this, the study 
established that until recently African states were not in the forefront data security and 
privacy in data protection field. However slowly the trend is changing and today 
Africa is striving to enact or adopt privacy and data protection regulations, both at 
regional and sub-regional level. The review revealed that currently 25 African 
countries have data protection legislations and 7 have data protection bills in place. It 
was noted that international instruments under the auspices of UN provided a 
normative basis of privacy protection in many countries regardless of the fact that UN 
guidelines were not legally binding. These instruments include the UDHR, ICCPR 
and UN guidelines. 
 
The study also found that international agreements influence security, privacy and data 
protection regulations in Africa. Examples are agreements under the auspices of the 
OECD such as Council of Europe, European Union, the OECD guidelines, Council of 
Europe Convention 108, and Directive 95/46/EC, which is recently repealed by the 
GDPR. In addition, GDPR and its predecessor (the EU 1995 Directive) were found to 
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be the catalyst for the growth of the current data protection regime in Africa. 
 
Overall, the study found a number of flaws in privacy and security in the cloud despite 
the shown efforts. Using Tanzania and South Africa, the study examined the 
appropriateness, adequacy, and relevancy of the existing legal framework in regulating 
privacy and security issues in the cloud in Tanzania and South Africa. It also analysed 
the relevance and adequacy of the international benchmarks in regulating and 
protecting privacy and security in the cloud in the selected countries. To achieve the 
intended overall objectives, three specific research questions guided the study: - 
(i) what are the legal challenges emanating from the use of cloud computing? 
(ii) how do the existing legal and regulatory framework and the practices 
protect privacy and security in the cloud in Tanzania and South Africa? 
(iii) to what extent are the general principles and guidelines of the best practices 
relevant in protecting privacy and security in the Cloud Tanzania and South 
Africa? 
 
In examining these research questions, the traditional doctrinal research methodology 
was used. It was supplemented by historical and comparative legal research methods. 
Tanzania and South Africa were used as case studies. Meanwhile, international 
benchmarks regarded as best practices as well as regional model laws were also 
included in the analysis. The study, particularly in the literature review, disclosed that 
there is a dearth of literature on cloud computing as well as security and privacy of 
data in African perspective. 
 
Accordingly, the conceptual and theoretical analysis as well as discussion of cloud 
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computing, privacy and security made in chapter two, three and four, exposed that the 
adoption of cloud computing has given rise to a number of legal challenges relating to 
security and data privacy. First, the study found that while the protection of privacy is 
provided in Tanzanian constitution, the constitution is very narrow in scope such that 
it does not accommodate protection of security and privacy in the cloud. Likewise, the 
study established that the then existing laws and regulations besides the constitution, 
were not technological neutral and hence, did not encompass technologies such as 
cloud computing.  
 
Tanzania sectoral laws, for example have some elements of privacy protection. 
Examples of these include EPOCA, Human DNA Regulation Act, Identification of 
Persons Act, Cyber Crime Act, Tanzania Intelligence and Security Act, HIV and AIDS 
(Prevention and Control) Act, to mention just a few. However, privacy protection 
accorded by these sectoral laws in Tanzania was found to be very limited in scope. 
The laws in health sector, security sector and the communication sector, for instance, 
protected privacy in an ad hock style: and only in those specific sectors. Similarly, 
most of the laws were not technological neutral and hence could not provide for cloud 
computing. 
 
Likewise, the study establishes that South African Constitution also provide for the 
right of privacy. However, the right provided therein is too broad in interpretation, 
which limited its applicability. The study found that the court had from time to time 
to intervene and interpret its applicability to suit the issue as hand, which is a stern 
challenge in protection of security and privacy in the cloud. Further, it was established 
that South Africa has also sectoral laws with some elements of privacy protection. 
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These includes laws such as CPA, NCA, National Health Act, Children’s Act, the 
Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act, PAIA, ECA, ECTA and RICA.  
 
Nonetheless, most of the laws were not technological neutral and hence did not apply 
to cloud computing privacy and security. Equally, the laws have no general 
application, they are applicable to the specific sectors only. Indeed, South Africa had 
omnibus data privacy protection law, known as POPI Act, geared toward privacy and 
security holistically. Nonetheless, it had not entered into force since its adoption: 
except some few sections that established the office of the regulator. Moreover, POPI 
was not in line with technology, and thus could not protect security and privacy in the 
cloud even if it were to come into force. 
 
The findings generally implied that the then existing laws in Tanzania and South 
Africa respectively did not holistically protect privacy right. In other words, security 
and privacy of data in the cloud was inadequately protected by the existing legal 
frameworks and legislation regardless of the initiatives and campaigns of cloud 
adoption in the countries. The second legal challenge found was the lack of integration 
between technology and regulation in protection of security and privacy in general and 
in the cloud. It was revealed that although legislation and regulation are effective 
techniques for protecting security and privacy, they are not enough.  
 
In order to have a proper protection of security and privacy in the cloud, there should 
be an integration of regulation and technology. The regulation side should entail laws 
and regulations, likewise, technology aspect should include designing for privacy or 
coding for privacy. This involves the use of technical and administrative actions in the 
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information systems to deter invasion of security and privacy of personal data in the 
cloud.  
 
In addition, the analysis and discussion of the general principles and guidance of the 
best practice and its relevance to Tanzania and South Africa in protecting privacy and 
security in the cloud in chapter four, five and six revealed the that: General principles 
of data protection included lawfulness, fairness and transparency, purpose limitation, 
data minimization, accuracy, storage limitation principle, security and confidentiality 
principle and accountability principle. These principles were found to be very relevant 
to Tanzania and South Africa in protecting security and privacy protection in the 
cloud. This was justified by the fact that the same principles had been incorporated in 
the draft bill of data protection in Tanzania as well as in POPI Act in South Africa.  
 
However, the fact that the draft bill had not been made into law derogated the 
relevancy of these principles in Tanzania. The same applied to South Africa, as the 
POPI Act had not yet come into force.  Similarly, the relevancy of these principles 
was depicted from the fact that the same principles were, to some extent, in an ad hock 
style, incorporated in the sectoral laws for privacy protection in both countries. 
However, their relevancy and applicability were limited to specific sectors alone and 
thus did not protect privacy holistically. That being said, it is clearly established that 
as of the time of study, the principles had limited relevancy to Tanzania and South 




Cloud computing is currently the technology that is revolutionising our world. 
However, to be able to tap all its potentials, among other things, there is the dire need 
to have proper legal and regulatory framework that regulates privacy and security in 
the cloud. Consequently, the thesis recommends the following measures in addressing 
privacy and security issues in the cloud: 
First, Tanzania should enact data protection regulation which will regulate the 
processing personal data and hence protect privacy right. The law should be 
technologically neutral so that it can encompass cloud computing and other 
technological developments. The proposed robust omnibus data protection regulation 
should reflect all universally accepted data protection principles as promulgated in the 
best practices. This is imperative in this era of the GDPR so that the law can meet the 
adequacy standards as provided in GDPR. Being in line with the adequacy standard 
enables the country to transfer personal information to other jurisdictions and hence 
facilitating trade and other relations. 
 
Secondly, Tanzania should amend or substantially overhaul the draft bill before it is 
passed into law. This is because the draft bill, as it stands, has many flaws that if it is 
passed into law as it is, can water down its effectiveness in protection of privacy. For 
instance, the bill has not provided for the administrative conditions to be adhered to 
before processing personal data. This includes the need of giving notice to the data 
commissioner before processing personal data. Further, the bill does not provide for 
the requirement of obtaining data subjects’ consent before data collection. 
Considering, that the consent is essential factor in assessing the legality of data 
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processing in international instruments and the draft bill needs to accommodate it. Its 
omission, suggests that the law that will follow will be incompetent. 
 
Thirdly, together with the initiatives of protecting security and privacy in the cloud 
through legislation and regulation, there is the need for integrating technological and 
legislative means of data protection in Tanzania and South Africa respectively.  This 
is because regulations and legislation alone are not enough in protecting security and 
privacy in the digital age (albeit in the cloud). This is supported by the concept that 
legislation evolves as a function of years while technology develops as a function of 
weeks and months. Therefore, to keep abreast with changes in technology, law and 
technology need to be integrated. This is known as privacy by design and default or 
privacy by code. This implies that computer scientist and engineers are to be trained 
to design and develop information and communication systems that will minimize 
access to data and hence control processing of personal data in the cloud. 
 
Fourthly, it is recommended that Tanzania should learn and emulate South Africa in 
relation to preparation of the data protection legislation. It goes that there is the need 
for Tanzanian policy makers to comprehend that preparation of data privacy 
legislation is not a task that should be done in a rush. This does not mean that the task 
should take excessively long time such as POPI Act of South Africa. Besides, the task 
calls for vigilant deliberations of law, which is necessitated by the complexity of 
different matters intricate in the making of data privacy laws. This implies that it 
should not simply be a task of ‘cut’ and ‘paste’ of an alien data privacy law.  It is also 
imperative that institutions such as the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (LRCT) 
should be given the task of preparing data privacy law. The above recommendation 
 212 
has its basis in South Africa, where the SALRC was given the task of preparing the 
POPI Act and it did a good job. This implies that this noble task should be assigned to 
a special task force established for that purpose only. 
 
Fifth, the LRCT should work together with a team of specialists in privacy laws. These 
may include renowned experts of data privacy laws. This is because it is a specialised 
area, which requires in-depth research in drafting the legislation. Furthermore, the 
committee should learn from the SALRC team for privacy to devote adequate period 
of time. Adequate time should be set aside for analysing and evaluating privacy 
legislations from other countries to tap meaningful lessons to be applicable in their 
home countries. This is justified by the necessity of comparative study as discussed in 
Chapter One of this work. 
 
Sixth, it is recommended that the proposed data privacy law be in line with 
international data privacy legislations. This implies that the latter should be a basis for 
vigorous interaction with the international data privacy rules, to reflect the new 
developments in the international sphere. A lesson can be learnt from South Africa 
where POPI Act obliges the Regulator to constantly monitoring new developments in 
the international sphere. In addition, Section 40 and 44 of the Act assigns an 
ambassador role to the Regulator, to interact with other regulators in the world. 
Tanzania should emulate the South African approach by incorporating in the proposed 
law provisions, which will oblige the Regulator to interact with other regulators/DPAs 
and monitor the development in data privacy spheres at the international level. 
Seventh, it is recommended for South Africa that POPI Act should be amended or 
overhaul substantially before it enters into force so that it can accommodate changes 
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and development in technology. This is because it was enacted after the EU Directive 
of 1995, which is now repealed by the GDPR for the want of among other things to be 
in abreast with technology. Likewise, it is recommended that POPI Act should enter 
into force as soon as it is practicable. This is because enacting an omnibus data 
protection regulation is not enough without enforcing it. That is POPI Act will only 
protect privacy and security in the cloud when it enters into force. 
 
7.4 Future Research Agenda 
The present study has provided general analysis of privacy and security issues in the 
cloud in Tanzania and South Africa only. The findings are slightly similar with some 
idiosyncrasies for individual countries. The differences suggest that the findings 
cannot be applied to other African nations with unlike conditions. This necessitates 
the need to conduct similar research in other African countries. In addition, it is 
necessary to assess the adequacy of emerging legislation in different states in Africa 
in protecting privacy and security in the cloud. Lastly but not least, the coming into 
force of the GDPR in May, 2018, calls for further research to assess how the emerging 








451 Research LLC and Its Affiliates (2015) Data Privacy in the Cloud Report, New 
York, London, San Francisco, Boston, May 2015. 
Abdulaziz, A. (2012). Cloud Computing for Increased Business Value. International 
Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(1). 
Abdulrauf, L. A. (2016). Legal Protection of Data Privacy in Nigeria: Lessons from 
Canada and South Africa (LLD dissertation). University of Pretoria, Pretoria. 
Access now Team. (2014). African Union Adopts Framework on Cyber Security and 
Data Protection.  
Adrian, A. (2013). How Much Privacy do Clouds Provide? An Australian 
Perspective. Computer Law and Security Review, 29(1). 
African Union. (2014). List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the 
African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. 
Ahmed, M., & Hossain, M. A. (2014). Cloud Computing and security Issues in the 
Cloud. International Journal of Network Securities & Its Applications 
(IJNSA), 6(1). 
Alfino, M., & Mayes, G. R. (2003). Reconstructing the Right to Privacy. Social 
Theory and Practice, 29(1), 1-18. 
Allen, A. L. (1988). Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society. Totowa, 
New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Allmer, T. A. (2011). A Critical Contribution to Theoretical Foundations of Privacy 




Allouche, G. (2014). How Safe is your Cloud Data from Service Traffic Hijacking? 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and CICA. (2009). 
Generally Accepted Privacy Principles. 
AN, Y. Z. (2016). Reviews on Security Issues and Challenges in Cloud Computing. 
A paper presented in IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and 
Engineering 160. 
APEC. (2011). APEC at Glance. 
Ardent, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Arutynov, V. V. (2012). Cloud Computing: Its History of Development, Modern State 
and Future Considerations. Scientific and Technical Information Processing 
Journal, 39(3). 
Attaran, M. (2017). Cloud Computing Technology: Leveraging the Power of Internet 
to Improve Business Performance. Journal of International Technology and 
Information Management, 26(1). 
Australian Human Rights Commission. (2018). What is the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights?  
Avizienis, A., Laprie, J., Brian, R., and Landwehr, C. (2004). Basic Concepts and 
Taxonomy of dependable and Secure Computing. IEEE Transactions and 
Dependable and Secure Computing Journal,1(1). 
Barbara, J. J. (2009). Cloud Computing: Another Digital Forensic Challenge.  
Beardsley, E. (1971). Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, (J. R. Pennock, & 
J. W. Chapman, Eds.), Nomos XIII. Atherton Press: New York. 
Bennett, C. J. (1992). Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in 
Europe and United States. Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London.  
 216 
Berkman, B. A. (1971). The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers 
by Arthur R. Miller22 Case W. Res. L. Rev.808.  
Bhawan, L. N. (2013). Legal and Policy Issues in Cloud Computing, a discussion 
Paper based on DSCI-BSA Workshop, Data Security Council of India.  
Bhowmik, S. (2017). Cloud Computing. Cambridge University Press: London. 
Bing, J. (1984). The Council of Europe Convention of the OECD Guidelines on Data 
Protection. Michigan Journal of International Law, 5(1). 
Birnhack, M. D. (2008). The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global 
Regime. Computer Law & Security Review, 24(6). 
Blume, P. E. (2010). Data Protection and Privacy – Basic Concepts in Changing 
World, (P. Blume, ed). Scandinavian Studies in Law Volume 56, ICT Legal 
Issues, Jure Law Books, Stockholm. 
Bobonich. C. (2011). Plato’s Laws: a critical Guide. Cambridge University Press: 
MA. 
Bohm, M., Leimeister, S., Riedl, C., and Krcmar, H. (2011). Cloud Computing and 
Computer Evolution, Cloud Computing Technologies, Business Models, 
Opportunities and Challenges, TechnischeUniversitatMunchen (TUM) 
Germany, Journal.  
Boshe, P. (2016). Data Privacy Law Reforms in Tanzania (A.B. Makulilo, ed) African 
Data Privacy Laws, Springer, International Publishing AG, Switzerland. 
Bratman, B. E. (2002). Brandeis and Warren’s the Right to Privacy and the Birth of 
the Right to Privacy. Tennessee Law Review, Vol 69.  
Burchel, J. (2009). The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable 
Hybrid. Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 13(1).  
 217 
Buyya, R., Yeo, C. S., Venugopal, S., Broberg, J., and Brandic, I. (2009). Cloud 
computing and emerging IT platforms: Vision, Hype, and Reality for 
Delivering Computing as the 5th utility. Future Generation Computer Systems, 
25(6). 
Bygrave L. A. (2010). Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective; 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol 56. 
Bygrave, L. A. (2014). Data Privacy Law- An International Perspective (1st ed.). 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Bygrave, L. A. (1998). Data Protection Pursuant to the Right in Human Rights 
Treaties. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 6(3). 
Bygrave, L. A. (2000). European Data: Determining Applicable Law pursuant to 
European Data Protection Legislation. Computer Law & Security 
Report,16(4). 
Bygrave, L. A. (2008). International Agreements to Protect Personal Data, (J. B. 
Rule, & G. Greenleaf, eds). Global Privacy Protection, The First Generation. 
Cheltenham, UK/ Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Bygrave, L. A. (2008). Privacy Protection in a Global Context- A Comparative 
Overview.  
Bygrave, L. A. (2001). The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. University of 
Wales Law Journal, 24(1). 
Byrne, E. F. (1998). Privacy (R. Chadwick, ed) encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, 
Vol.3. San Diego, CA: Academic Press 
Caithness, N., Drescher, M., and Wallom, D. (2017). Can Functional Characteristics 
Useful Define the Cloud Computing Landscape and is the Current Reference 
 218 
Model Correct? Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and 
Applications.  
Canadian Institute of Health Research (CIHR). (2011). Selected International Legal 
Norms on the Protection of Personal Information in Health Research. 
Casagran, C. B. (2017). Global Data Protection in the Field of Law Enforcement: An 
EU Perspective. Routledge: New York.  
Cate, F. H., Cullen, P., and Mayor-Schonberger, V. (2013). Data Protection Principles 
for the 21st Century, Books by Maurer Faculty 23: Redmond WA.  
Catteddu, D., & Hogben, G. (2009). Cloud computing Benefits, Risks and 
Recommendations for Information Security. In Serrao, C., Aquilera Diaz, V., 
Cerullo, F., (eds) Web Application Security. IBWAS. Communications in 
Computer and Information Science, Vol 72. Springe: Berlin, Heidelberg.  
Chang, H. (2015). Data Protection Regulation and Cloud computing, (Cheung, A. S. 
Y. &Weber, R. H., eds) Privacy and Legal Issues in Cloud Computing. Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited: Cheltenham. 
Chassang, G. (2017). The Impact of EU General Data Protection Regulation on 
Scientific Research. Ecancer Medical Science Journal,11(709). 
Chavan, P., & Kulkarni, G. (2013). PaaS Cloud. International Journal of Computer 
Science and Information Security (IJCSIS, 1(1). 
Cheung, A. S., & Weber, R. H. (2015). Privacy and Legal Issues in Cloud Computing. 
Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Chiueh, S. N., & Brook, J. (2015). RPE Report. 
Ciochon, R. C. (2015). Privacy and Personality (1st ed.), New York: Routledge. 
Citron, D. K., & Henry, L. M. (2010). Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy 
 219 
in the Twenty-one Century. Michigan Law Review, 108. 
Cloud Security Alliance. (2011). Security guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in 
Cloud Computing. 
Council of Europe. (2018). Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 108. 
Council of Europe. (2018). Details of the Treaty No. 108.  
Cousens, A., & Heyder, M. (2015). Apec Privacy Rules for Cross-Border Data Flows-
A Model for Global Privacy Protections. 
Crook, J. R. (2004). Cousens, A., & Heyder, M. (2015). Apec Privacy Rules for Cross-
Border Data Flows-A Model for Global Privacy Protections. North-Western 
University Journal of International Human Rights,1.  
Crowe, D. (2017). Cloud Adoption in South Africa. 
Davis, F. (1959). What do we mean by “Right to Privacy”? San Diego Law Review, 4. 
Davis, S. (2009). Is there a right to Privacy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 9(4). 
De Filippi, P., & Belli, L. (2012). Law of the Cloud V Law of the Land: Challenges 
and Opportunities for Innovation. European Journal for the Law and 
Technology, 3(2). 
De Hert, P., & Papakonstantinou, V. (2012). The Proposed Data Protection Regulation 
Replacing Directive 95/46/EC: a sound system for the protection of 
Individuals. Computer Law & Security Review, 28(2). 
De Cew, J. W. (1997). In Pursuit of Privacy: Law Ethics and Rise of Technology. 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
DeCew, J. W. (2018). the Stanford encyclopaedia of Philosophy. In the Stanford 
encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (Spring Edition, Vol. 1). 
Deloitte. (2017). Privacy is Paramount: Personal Data Protection in Africa. 
 220 
Diggelmann, O., & Cleism, N. V. (2014). How the Right of Privacy Became a Human 
Right? Human Right Law Review, 14. 
DLA Piper. (2017). Data Protection Laws of the World, South Africa. 
Dobinson, I., & Johns, F. (2007). Qualitative Legal Research’ in McConville, M., and 
Wing, H. C., (eds) Research Methods for Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Eberle, E. J. (2009). The Method and Role of Comparative Law. Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, 8(3). 
Elder, T., Yarrison, F. W., & Long, B. L. (2015). An Empirical Investigation of 
Privacy: The Impact of the Multiple Levels of Trust, A paper prepared for the 
American Sociological Association Annual meeting at Kent State University. 
Elgesem, D. (1999). The Structure of the rights in Directive 95/46/EC on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
the Free Movement of such Data. Ethics and Information Technology 
Journal, 1(4). 
Emma, L. (2018). Importance of Technology in the workplace. 
Erl, T., Mahmood, Z., & Puttin, R. (2013). Cloud Computing; Concepts, Technology 
& Architecture. New York: Service Tech Press. 
Esselaar, S., & Adam, L. (2013). Understanding what is happening in Tanzania: 
Evidence of ICT Policy Action, (2nd ed., Vol. 1). Dar Es Salaam. 
European Data Protection Supervisor. (2018). The History of the General Data 
Protection Regulation. 
Handbook for European Data Protection Law. (2018). Handbook for European Data 
Protection Law. Luxembourg. 
 221 
Farber, D. A. (1993). Book Review: Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation by Inness, J., 
C., Constitutional Commentary, 10(2). 
Floridi, L. (2006). Four Challenges for a theory of Informational Privacy. Ethics and 
Informational Technology Journal, 8(3). 
Foye, S. (2008). Book Review on Understanding Privacy by Solove, D., J. Journal of 
High Technology Law. 
Fried, C. (1984). Privacy (a moral analysis), in Schoeman, F.D., (Ed) Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Fried, C. (1968). Privacy. Yale Law Journal, 77. 
Fuchs, C. (2011). Towards an Alternative Concept of Privacy. Journal of Information, 
Communication and Ethics in Society, 9(4). 
Gartner Inco. (2011). Gartner identifies the top 10 strategic technologies for 2011. 
Gartner. (2016). Worldwide Public Cloud Market to Grow for 17 percent. 
Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of the Law. The Yale Law Journal, 89(3). 
Gebers, J., & Ophoff, J. (2013). Exploring Cloud Computing Legal & Privacy Issues 
in South Africa. A Conference Paper Presented in World Wide Web 
Applications Conference in Cape Town, on 10th to 13th September 2013. 
Geetu, G., & Sandhya, V. (2016). A Survey on Issues of Security in Cloud 
Computing. International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer 
Science, 7(6). 
Gerstein, R. S. (1984). Intimacy and privacy, in Schoeman, F.D. (Ed.), Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Giessmann, A., & Stanoevska, K. (2012). Platform as a Service- A Conjoint Study on 
Consumers” Preferences, a paper submitted in 33rd International Conference 
 222 
on Information Systems, (ICIS) Orlando. 
Gilliland, A. T. (2018). The General Data Protection Regulation: What does it Mean 
for Libraries worldwide?  
Gillwald, A., Moyo, M., & Stork, C. (2012). Understanding what is happening in ICT 
in South Africa-a Supply- and demand -side analysis of the ICT sector. 
Gillwald, A., & Moyo, M. (2013). Prospects, Challenges and Impacts of Cloud: 
Perspectives from (South) Africa. A Presentation to UNCTAD Workshop on 
Cloud Economy, Geneva, February 2013.  
Gillwald, A., Moyo, M., Odufuwa, F., & Kamoun, F. F. (2013). The Cloud Over 
Africa. 
Giuseppe, A., Burns, R., Curtmola, R., Herring, J., Kissner, L., Peterson, Z., & Song, 
D. (2007). Provable data possession at untrusted stores. In Proceedings of the 
14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 
Goel, A., & Goel, S. (2012). Security Issues in Cloud Computing. International 
Journal of Application or Innovation in Engineering & Management, 1(4). 
Gorska, Z. M. (2008). Privacy, Surveillance and Hiv/Aids in the Work Place: A South 
African Case Study(dissertation). University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
Greenleaf, G. (2004). The APEC Privacy Initiative: ‘OECD Lite’ for the Asia- Pacific. 
Privacy Laws &Business Journal, 71(5). 
Greenleaf, G. (2011). Global Data Privacy Laws: Forty Years of Acceleration. Wales, 
London: Privacy Laws and Business International. 
Greenleaf, G. (2012). The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside 
Europe: Implications for Globalizations of Convention 108. International 
Data Privacy Law, 2(2). 
 223 
Greenleaf, G., & Georges, M. (2015). The African Union’s Data Privacy Convention: 
A Major Step Toward Global Consistency? Privacy Laws & International 
Business Journal Report, 131(3). 
Greenleaf, G. (2017). Global Data Privacy Laws: 120 National Data Privacy Laws, 
Including Indonesia and Turkey. 145 Privacy Laws & Business International 
Report 10, UNSWLRS, 45. 
Greenleaf, G. W. (2014). Asian Data Privacy Law: Trade and Human Rights 
Perspective. Oxford University Press. 
Griffith, E. (2016). What is Cloud Computing?  
Gutwirth, S. (2002). Privacy and Information Age. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Inc. 
Hashzume, K., Rosado, D., Fernandez-Medina, E., & Fernandez, B. E. (2013). An 
analysis of Security Issues for cloud Computing. Journal of Internet Services 
and Applications, 4(5). 
Heeney, C., & Weigand, H. (2013). Privacy Protection and Communicative Respect, 
Proceedings of the 8th International Working conference on the Language-
Action Perspective on Communication Modelling (LAP), Tilburg, the 
Netherlands. 
Herbst, N. R., Kounev, S., Reussner, R., & Nikolas, E. (2013). Elasticity in Cloud 
Computing: What It Is and what It Is Not? Proceedings for the 10th 
International Conference on Autonomic Computing (ICAC, 2013), San Jose, 
CA, June 24-28, 2013. 
Heyink, M. (2011). Protection of Personal Information for South African Law Firms. 
LSSA Guidelines, SALRC Report. 
 224 
Heyink, M. (2018). Protection of Personal Information Guidelines for South African 
Law Firms. 
Hilberg, R. (1985). The Destruction of the European Jew. Holmes & Meier Publishers. 
Hill, K. (2015). Cloud Computing Emerging in Africa. 
Hofer, C. N. (2011). Cloud Computing Services: Taxonomy and Comparison. Journal 
of International Services Applications, 2(5). 
Hondius, F. W. (1980). Data Law in Europe. Stanford Journal of International 
Law, 16(5). 
Hondius, F. W. (1983). A Decade of International Data Protection. Netherlands 
International Law Review, 30(2). 
Hussein, N., & Abdelbaki, N. (2013). It legal Framework for Cloud Computing. 
Springer-Verlag. 
IBM. (2014). What is Cloud Computing. 
Inness, J. C. (1992). Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation. Oxford University Press. 
Iqbal, S., Kiah, L. M., Anuar, N. A., Daghighi, B., Wahab, A. W., & Khan, S. (2016). 
Service Delivery Models of Cloud Computing: Security Issues and Open 
Challenges. Security and Communication Network Journal, 9(17). 
Issacs, R., Crawford, K., & Fulbright, R. N. (2018). Data Protection Law in South 
Africa: Overview. 
ITU. (2012). Cloud Computing in Africa- Situation and Perspectives. 
ITU. (2012). Privacy in cloud Computing, ITU-Technology Watch Report- Geneva. 
Jaeger, P. T., Lin, J., & Grimes, J. M. (2008). Cloud Computing and Information 
Policy: Computing in a Policy Cloud. Journal of Information Technology and 
Politics, 5(6). 
 225 
Kaubar, C., & Mayers, S. (2013). When the Cloud Disperse: Data Confidentiality and 
Privacy in Cloud Computing. 
Kaur, K. (2016). A Review of Cloud Computing Services Models. International 
Journal of Computer Applications, 140(7). 
Kerry, J., & Teng, K. (2010). Cloud computing: Legal and Privacy Issues. Journal of 
Legal Issues and Cases in Business, 5(7). 
King, N. J., & Raja, V. T. (2012). Protecting the Privacy and Security of Sensitive 
Customer Data in the Cloud. Computer Law and Security Review, 28(3). 
Kirby, M. (2011). The History, Achievements and Future of the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines on Privacy. International Data Privacy Law, 1(1). 
Kiunsi, H. B. (2017). Transfer Pricing in East Africa: Tanzania and Kenya in 
Comparative Perspective(dissertation). The Open University of Tanzania. 
Kleynhans, S. (2012). The New Era, The Personal Cloud. 
Kong, J., Fan, X., & Chow, K. P. (2015). Introduction to Cloud Computing and 
Security Issues, in Cheung, A. S. Y. & Weber, R (eds) Privacy and Legal Issues 
in Cloud Computing. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Elgar Law, 
Technology and Society. 
Konvitz, M. R. (1966). Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude. Law and 
Contemporary Problems Journal, 31(2). 
Kumar, K. V. (2013). Software as a Service for Efficient Cloud 
Computing. International Journal of Research in Engineering and 
Technology, 3(1). 
Kumar, S., & Goudar, R. H. (2012). Cloud Computing- Research Issues, Challenges, 
Architecture, Platforms and Applications: A Survey. International Journal of 
 226 
Future Computer and Communication, 1(4). 
Kuner, C. (2009). An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and 
Prospects. Computer Law & Security Review, 25(1). 
Kwamboka, L. (2018). After the Facebook-Cambridge Analytical Scandal, can we talk 
about data Privacy in Africa now? Quarts Africa. 
Lamba, H. S., & Singh, G. (2011). Cloud Computing-Future Framework for e-
management of NGO's. International Journal of Advancement in 
Technology, 2(3). 
Laurel, D. (2010). 10 benefits of Cloud Computing, (Verio). 
Lavelle, M. (2016). Why the Shift to Cloud Computing Reminds me of the Ford 
Model-T?  
Leavitt, N. (2009). “Is Cloud Computing Really Ready for Prime 
Time?” Computer, 42(1). 
Lessig, L. (2006). Code. Basic Books Publisher. 
Liver, A. (2011). On Privacy. Routledge. 
Lloyd, I. J. (2017). Information Technology Law (8th ed.). Great Clarendon Street: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lord, N. (2018). A Definition of Cloud Account Hijacking. Digital Guardian. 
Loubser, M., Midgley, R., Jabavu, P., Linscort, J., Mukheibir, A., Niesing, L., Wessel, 
B. (2010). The Law of Delict in South Africa (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press 
of Southern Africa. 
Lukas, A. (2016). What is Privacy? The History and definition of Privacy. 
Maaref, S. (2012). ITU, Cloud Computing in Africa: Situation and Perspectives. 
MacKinnon, C. (1989). Towards a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University 
 227 
Press. 
Makulilo, A. B. (2012). Protection of Personal Data in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(dissertation). University of Bremen. 
Makulilo, A. B. (2016). African Data Privacy Laws (1st ed., Vol. 1). Springer 
International Publishing AG. 
Makulilo, A. B., & Boshe, P. (2016). Consultation on the Commission’s 
Comprehensive approach on Personal Data Protection in Tanzania, submitted 
on 31st August. 
Malhotra, R., & Jain, P. (2013). International Journal of Computer and 
Technology. How to Choose an Economic Cloud Deployment Model? 4(8). 
Masoud, B. S. (2012). Legal Challenges of Cross-Border Insolvencies in Sub- 
Saharan Africa with References to Tanzania and Kenya: A Framework for 
Legislation and Policies(dissertation). 
Maxwel, W., & Bourreau, M. (2014). Technology Neutrality in Internet, Telcoms and 
Data Protection Regulation. Computer and Telecommunication Law 
Review, 1(1). 
Mboizi, J. P. (2015). Internet and Data Protection: The African Cybersecurity 
Convention. 
McQupid-Mason, D. J. (1996). Privacy in Chaskalson, M., et al (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa, Juta. Kenwny. 
Meetei, M. Z., & Goel, A. (2012). Security Issues in Cloud Computing, in 2012 5th 
International Conference on Biomedical Engineering and Informatics. 
Mell, P., & Grance, T. (2009). A NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. 
 228 
Mgonzi, T., & Weeks, R. (2015). The Impact of Cloud Computing on the 
Transformation of Healthcare System in South Africa. A Conference Paper 
Presented in 2015 ITU Kaleidoscope: Trust in the Information Society. 
Michalson, L. S. (2013). Data Privacy or Data Protection in South Africa. 
Michalson, L. S. (2017). Information Regulator in South Africa. 
Michalson, L. S. (2018). Guide to ECT Act in South Africa. 
Moerel, L. (2011). The Long Arm of the EU Data Protection Law: Does the Data 
Protection Directive. Apply to Processing of Personal Data of EU Citizens by 
Websites Worldwide? International Data Privacy Law, 1(1). 
Moor, J. H. (1991). The Ethics of Privacy Protection, Library trends. Intellectual 
Freedom, 39(1). 
Moore, A. (2008). Defining Privacy. Social Philos, 39(3). 
Moore, A. (2000). Employee Monitoring & Computer Technology: Evaluative 
Surveillance versus Privacy. Business Ethics Quarterly, 8(4). 
Mukami, S. (2017). Technology: We Need to Embrace Cloud Computing. 
Muyinga, M. (2013). Privacy and Legal Issues in Cloud Computing. The SMME 
Position in South Africa. A Conference Paper presented in the 11th Australian 
Information Security Management Conference, Edith Cowen University Perth, 
Western Australia on 2nd to 4th December 2013. 
Mvelase, P. S., Dlamini, I. Z., Sithole, H. M., & Dlodlo, N. (2013). Towards a 
Government Public Cloud Model: The Case of South Africa. A Conference 
Paper presented in the Second International Conference on “Cluster 
Computing “in L’viv, Ukraine on 3rd to 5th June 2013.  
Myers, J. (2016). Which are Africa’s Fastest Growing Economies?  
 229 
Naude, A., & Papadopoulos, S. (2016). Data Protection in South Africa: The 
Protection of Personal. Information Act 4 of 2013 in Light of Recent 
International Developments, (Part 1). THRHR Journal, 51(68). 
Mzekandaba, S. (2014). Security Concerns Hold Back South Africa Cloud Adoption. 
Naude, A. (2014). Data Protection in South Africa: The Impact of the Protection of 
Personal Information Act and Recent International Development. Ll.M. Mini 
Dissertation(dissertation). University of Pretoria. 
Nazir, M. (2012). Cloud Computing: Overview & Current Research 
Challenges. Journal of Computer Engineering, 8(1). 
Neethling, J., Potgieter, J. M., & Visser, P. J. (2005). Neethling’s Law of Personality. 
LexisNexis. 
Neethling, J., Potgieter, J. M., & Visser, P. J. (2010). Law of Delict (6th ed.). 
LexisNexis. 
Neethling, J. (2012). Features of the Protection of Personal information Bill, 2009 and 
the Law of Delict. Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, 75(5). 
Neethling, J., Potgieter, J., & Knobel, J. C. (2015). Law of Delict (7th ed.). LexisNexis. 
New World Encyclopaedia contributors. (2017). New World Encyclopaedia. In New 
World Encyclopaedia. 
New Zealand ‘s Law Commission. (2008). Concepts and Issues, Review of the Law 
of Privacy Stage 1, Study Paper. 
Njue, D. (2013). Cloud Services Opportunities and Challenges for East Africa. 
O'Donoghue, C. (2015). Njue, D. (2013). Cloud Services Opportunities and 
Challenges for East Africa. Data and Cyber Security Journal, 1(1). 
O'Donnell, M. K. (2009). New Dirty War Judgements in Argentina: National Courts 
 230 
and Domestic Prosecutions of International Human Rights Violations. New 
York University Law Review, 84(5). 
OECD. (2001). Oecd Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border 
Flows of Personal Data. Paris, France: OECD Publication Service. 
Olga, E. Y. (1991). Trans-border Data Flows and the Sources of Public International 
Law. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation, 6(2). 
Omwansa, T. K., Waema, T. M., & Omwenga, B. (2014). Cloud computing in Kenya, 
A 2013 Baseline Survey. 
Orji, U. J. (2017). Regionalizing Data Protection Law: A Discourse on the Status and 
Implementation of the ECOWAS Data Protection Act. International Data 
Privacy Law,1(3). 
Pal, D., Chakraborty, S., & Nag, A. (2015). Cloud computing: A Paradigm Shift in IT 
Infrastructure. CSI Journal of Computing, 38(10). 
Parent, W. A. (1983). Privacy, Morality and the Law. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 12(4). 
Pearson, S., & Yee, G. (2013). Privacy and Security for Cloud Computing. London: 
Springer International Publishing, Springer- Verlag . 
Peikoff, A. L. (2008). Beyond Reductionism: Reconsidering the right to Privacy. N. 
Y. U. Journal of Law & Liberty, 3(1). 
Pillay, L. (2014). South Africa: Data Protection Legislation. Retrieved from Hogan 
Lovells Global Media and Communications Quarterly. 
Posner, R. A. (1978). The right of Privacy. Georgia Law Review, 12(3). 
Post, R. C. (2001). Three Concepts of Privacy. Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship 
 231 
Series, 185. 
Privacy International & Tanzania Human Right Defenders Coalition. (2015). The 
Right to Privacy in the United Republic of Tanzania, Stakeholders Report. 
Universal Review. 
Prosser, W. (1960). Privacy. California Law Review, 48(3).  
Qi, H., Shirazi, M., Gani, A., Whaiduzzaman,, M. D., & Khan, S. (2014). Sierpinski 
Triangle Based Data Centre Architecture in Cloud Computing. The Journal of 
Super-Computing, 69(2). 
Rajaretnam, T. (2014). The Implications of Cloud Computing for Information Privacy: 
An Australian Perspective. International Journal of Business, Economics and 
Law, 5(4). 
Ramgovind, S., Eloff, M. M., & Smith, E. (2010). The Management of security in 
Cloud Computing. A paper presented in Information Security for South 
African Conference in Johannesburg. 
Rani, D., & Ranjan, R. K. (2014). A Comparative Study of SaaS, PaaS and IaaS in 
Cloud Computing. International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer 
Science and Software Engineering, 4(6). 
Rao, C., Leelarani, M., & Kumar, Y. R. (2013). Cloud: Computing Services and 
Deployment Models. International Journal of Engineering and Computer 
Science, 2(12). 
Rasool, Y. (2017). An Examination of how the Protection of Personal Information Act 
4 of 2013 (Popi) will Impact on Direct Marketing and the Current Legislative 
Framework in South Africa(dissertation). University of Kwazulu- Natal. 
Razaque, A., & Rizvi, S. S. (2017). Privacy Preserving Model: A New Scheme for 
 232 
auditing Cloud Stakeholders. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems 
and Applications, 6(7). 
Reeta, S. A., Rao, K. D., & Prasad, B. D. (2013). Implications of Cloud computing for 
Personal Data Protection and Privacy in the Era of the Cloud: An Indian 
Perspective. Law Journal of the Higher School of Economics, Annual 
Review, 1(5). 
Richardson, H. (2018). Characteristics of a Comparative Research Design. 
Robert, M. (2016). Infrastructure as a Service, Options in Cloud Computing. 
Robinson, N., Valeri, L., Cave, J., Starke, T., Graux, H., Creese, S., & Hopkins, P. P. 
(2010). The Cloud: Understanding the Security, Privacy and Trust Challenges 
A report prepared for Unit F. 5, Director General Information Society and 
Media. European Commission. 
Rodero, L., Gonzalez, L., Caron, E., Murasen, A., & Desprez, F. (2011). Building safe 
PaaS Clouds: A Survey on Security in Multi-Tenant Software Platforms. 
INRIA. 
Roos, A., & Dana, M. (2016). Data Protection. In Information and Communication 
Technology Law. Durban: LexisNexis. 
Ross, A. (2008). Personal Data Protection in New Zealand: Lessons for South 
Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 11(4). 
Ross, A. (2013). The Law of Data (Privacy)Protection: A Comparative and 
Theoretical study(dissertation). UNISA. 
Ross, A. (2016). Data Protection Law in South Africa, in Makulilo, A. B. (ed) African 
Data Privacy Laws (1st ed.). Springer International Publishing AG. 
Ross, A. (2016). Data Privacy Law, in Van der Merwe, D., et al, Information and 
 233 
Communications Technology Law. Durban: LexisNexis. 
Rouse, M. (2016). Platform as a Service (PaaS). 
Rule, J. B., & Greenleaf, G. (17AD). Global Privacy Protection (1st ed.). Cheltenham: 
The first-generation Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Sahandi, R., Alkhalil, A., & Opara-Martins, J. (2013). Cloud computing from SMEs 
Perspectives: A Survey Investigation. Journal of Information Technology 
Management, 26(1). 
Salbu, S. R. (2002). The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International 
Relations. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 35(4). 
Samson, T. (2013). 9 Top Threats to Cloud Computing Security. 
Saravg, A., & Kant, C. (2012). Cloud Computing Security and Privacy 
Concerns. International Journal of Information Technology and 
Knowledge, 5(2). 
Schoeman, F. (1984). Philosophical Dimension of Privacy: an anthology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sen, J. (2013). Security and Privacy Issues in Cloud Computing, in Ruiz-Martinez, A. 
et al (eds) Architectures and Protocols for Secure Information Technology. 
IGI- Global publishers. 
Shapiro, F. R. (1985). The Most-Cited Law Review Articles. California Law 
Review, 75(3). 
Shoemarker, D. W. (2010). Self-Exposure of the Self: Informational Privacy and the 
Presentation of Identity. Ethics and Informational Technology, 12(1). 
Simon, M. K., & Goes, J. (2013). Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations and Scope 
of the Study in Dissertations and Scholarly Research: Recipes for Success. 
 234 
Singhal, A., & Malick, I. (2012). Doctrinal and Social Legal Research Methods: 
Merits and Demerits. Educational Research Journal, 2(7). 
Skolmen, D. E., & Gerber, M. (2015). Protection of Personal Information in the South 
African Cloud Computing Environment: A Framework for Cloud Computing 
Adoption, 2015. Information Security for South African (ISSA) 
Johannesburg, 2(5), 1–10. 
Sloot, B. (2014). Do Data Protection Rules Protect the Individuals and should They? 
An Assessment of the Proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation. International Data Privacy Law, 4(4). 
Solove, D. J. (2002). Conceptualizing Privacy. California Law Review, 90(4). 
Solove, D. J. (2006). A Taxonomy of Privacy. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 154(3). 
Solove, D. J. (2008). The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, 
in Chandler, A. et al., Securing Privacy in the Internet Age. Berkeley: Stanford 
University Press. 
Solove, D. J. (2008). Understanding Privacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Solove, D. J. (2011). Nothing to Hide: The False Trade-off between Privacy and 
Security. London: Yale University Press. 
Solove, D. J., & Schwartz, P. M. (2018). Information Privacy Law (16th ed.). New 
York: Wolters Kluwer. 
Sotto, L., Treacy, B. C., & Mclellan, M. L. (2010). Privacy and Data Security Risks 
in Cloud Computing. Electronic Commerce & Law Report. 
South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC). (2009). Privacy and Data 
Protection Report. 
 235 
Sriram, I., & Hossein, A. (2010). Research Agenda in Cloud Technologies, a paper 
submitted to the 1st ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing, SOCC. 
Sun, Y., Zhang, J., Xiong, Y., & Zhu, G. (2014). Data Security and Privacy in cloud 
Computing, Review Article. International Journal of Distributed Sensor 
Networks. 
Susanto, H., Almunawar, M. N., & Kang, C. C. (2012). A Review of Cloud Computing 
Evolution Individual and Business Perspective. SSRN Electronic 
Journal, 4(10). 
Sweeney, M. (2012). Book Review on Understanding Privacy by Solove, D., J. An 
International Journal of the Information Society, 28(5). 
Szabo, M. D., & Kiserlet, A. (2005). Privacy. InformációsTársadalom, 2(5). 
Takabi, H., Joshi, J. B., & Ahn, J. (2010). Security and Privacy challenges in Cloud 
Computing Environments. IEEE Security and Privacy Journal, 8(6). 
Tan, G. J. (2008). A Comparative Study of the APEC Framework-A New Voice in the 
Data Protection Dialogue? Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 3(1). 
Tanzania- Ministry of Health and social Welfare. (2013). Tanzania National e Health 
Strategy 2013-2018. 
Tavani, H. T. (2007). Philosophical Theories of Privacy: Implication for an Adequate 
Online Privacy Policy. Metaphilosophy, 38(1). 
Tavani, H. T. (2008). Informational Privacy: Concepts, Theories and Controversies, 
in Himma, K., E., and Tavani, H., T., (eds) The Handbook of Information and 
Computer Ethics. Hoboken: Wiley. 
Taylor, L. (2014). Writing a Legal Research Paper- Research Methodologies, in 
Scragg, J., et.al. (eds), Legal Writing: A Complete Guide for a Career in Law. 
 236 
LexisNexis. 
Taylor, M., & Matteucci, M. (2010). Cloud computing. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, 57(9). 
The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of works, Transport and Communication. 
(2016). National Information and Communications Technology Policy. 
The White Paper -TWP. (2010). Introduction to Cloud Computing. 
Thierer, A. (2008). Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy. The Technology 
Liberation Front, 2(4). 
Thompson, J. J. (2007). The Right to Privacy, in Schoeman, F., D., (Ed) Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Turahi, D. (2013). Security and Privacy: Can We Trust the Cloud? A paper presented 
in East African Information conference in Kampala Uganda on 13th to 14th 
August, 2013.  
Ubena, J. (2012). Privacy: A Forgotten Right in Tanzania. The Tanzania Lawyer, 1(2). 
Ulyashyna, L. (2006). Does Case Law Developed by the European Court of Human 
Rights Pursuant to ECHR Article 8 Add anything Substantial to the Rules and 
Principles Found in Ordinary Data Protection Principle? A Tutorial Paper 
Presented at the Norwegian Centre for Computers and Law (NRCCL). Spring 
2006. 
Verhenneman, G., & Dumortire, J. (2013). Legal Regulation of Health Records: A 
Comparative Analysis of Europe and the Us in George, C., et al, eHealth: 
Legal, Ethical and Governance Challenges. London: Springer. 
United Nation. (2015). The Universal Declaration of human Rights. 
Van der Walt, J. C., & Midgley, J. R. (2005). Principles of Delict (2nd ed.). 
 237 
LexisNexis. 
Vanberg, A. D., & Maunick, M. (2017). Data Protection in the UK Post Brexit: The 
Only Certainty is Uncertainty. International Review of Law, Computers & 
Technology, 32(1). 
Vibhute, K., & Aynalem, F. (2009). Legal research Methods, Teaching Material 
prepared under the sponsorship of the Justice and Legal System Research 
Institute. 
Vitkar, S. (2012). Cloud Based Model for E-Learning in Higher 
Education. International Journal of Advanced Engineering Technology, 3(4). 
Vyver, E. V., Leibowitz, C., & Smith, T. (2019). POPI: Final Regulation 
Published. South Africa Financial Regulation Journal, 1(1). 
Wacks, R. (1980). The Protection of Privacy. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Wacks, R. (1993). Personal Information: Privacy and the Law. New York: Oxford 
university Press. 
Wall, A. (2017). GDPR Matchup: The APEC Privacy Framework and Cross Border 
Privacy Rules. 
Wanyama, E. (2017). What African Countries Can Learn from European Privacy 
Laws and Policies. 
Warren, S. D., & Brandeis, L. s. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law 
Review, 4(5). 
Waters, N. (2008). The APEC, Asia Pacific Initiative- A New Route to Effective Data 
Protection or a Trojan Horse for Self-Regulation?  
Weber, R. H., & Heinrich, U. I. (2012). Anonymization. London: Springer. 
Weinstein, W. L. (2007). The Private and the Free: A Conceptual Inquiry, in Ciochon, 
 238 
R., C., Privacy & Personality (1st ed.). New York: Routledge. 
Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York: Athenaeum. 
Westin, A. (1998). Privacy in America. A historical and Socio-political Analysis. 
National Privacy and Public Policy Symposium, Hartford, 1995. Cited in 
Deighton, The right to be Let Alone. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 12(2). 
Whalstrom, K., & Fairweather, N. B. (2013). Privacy Theory of Communicative 
Action and Technology. 
Whitley, E. A. (2009). Informational Privacy, Consent and the control of Personal 
Data (Vol. 14). Information Security Technical Report. 
Wiesrma, W., & Jurs, S. G. (2008). Research Methods in Education: An introduction 
(9th ed.). Boston: Pearson. 
Wong, R. (2013). Data Security Breaches and Privacy in Europe. London: Springer. 
Woodrow, H. (2018). Privacy Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of New 
Technologies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Xue, C. T., & Xin, F. T. (2016). Benefits and Challenges of the Adoption of Cloud 
Computing in Business. International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services 
and Architecture, 6(6). 
Yousef, L. M., Butrico, M. A., & Da Silva, D. (2008). Toward a Unified Ontology of 
Cloud Computing. 
Youssef, A. E. (2012). Exploring Cloud Computing Services and 
Applications. Journal of Emerging Trends in Computing and Information 
Sciences, 3(6). 
 
 
 239 
  
 
